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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the experiences of women and couples who have undergone in 
vitro fertilisation (IVF) unsuccessfully and who have subsequently stopped treatment. 
The thesis is feminist in that it aims to make visible the gendered power relations within 
which TVF failure is experienced and accounted for. IVF is viewed here not as a neutral 
artefact, or the violent imposition of male power, but as a form of disciplinary 
technology, the experience of which is always contradictory and ambivalent. 
The thesis takes a discourse analytic approach to the interview data. This approach 
necessarily conceptualises the participants as active, but constrained, agents in the 
production of meaning in relation to TVF, and the analysis seeks to identify the 
discursive strategies which they employ in accounting for their experiences. It is argued 
that those who have stopped treatment occupy an ambiguous liminal space among the 
dominant discourses of gender, technology and body, and that this constitutes an 
unusually productive location from which to think about IVF, both in terms of 
challenging the apparent inevitability of those discourses and creating openings for the 
production of new knowledges. 
The analysis is organised around four key themes which emerged from the interview 
data: the negotiation of discourses of nature and technology; the location of IVF within 
consumer culture; the distribution of responsibility when treatment fails; and the 
seeking of resolution around the end of treatment. This thematic structure forms a 
platform from which to consider not only the specificities of the experience of IVF 
failure, but which also generates broader insights at the theoretical and conceptual level, 
focusing particularly on the limitations of oppositional paradigms of transgression / 
conformity, material / discursive, agency / constraint and theory / practice in the 
feminist theorising of IVF. 
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Part I: Foundations  
Chapter 1: Introduction  
Background  
Research topics are not plucked out of darkness, and every project has its own story. 
Originally, this was going to be a study of men and women's experiences of voluntary 
childlessness, prompted by my own identity as a woman who has chosen to live without 
children. In my late twenties and living with my partner, I was starting to be questioned 
with increasing regularity about our reproductive plans, especially as friends started to 
have children of their own. My response that I did not want or plan to be a mother was 
met largely with disbelief— an experience common to many voluntarily childless 
women l . Even now, everything my partner and I do seems to signify preparation for 
pregnancy: the two new kittens were taken as a sign that we were honing our nurturing 
skills; the spare room in our new house was assumed to be for a baby. But in reality, the 
cats are just cats, and the spare room means that we have the luxury of a study each. 
However, I did begin to realise just how powerful the assumption is that women will be 
mothers, and how awful that questioning must be for those who want to have children 
but are not able to, for whatever reason. 
As my attention turned to infertility, and in particular, to IVF, the project began to take 
shape based on two fundamental observations from the literature. Firstly, women's 
voices are curiously absent from the mainstream debates on IVF, which tend to focus 
instead on embryos. There is a dissonance between this invisibility of women on the one 
hand, and on the other, the overwhelming focus of the treatment process on 
interventions into the female body. Consequently, I was interested in the ways in which 
women are both supremely present and curiously absent in mainstream IVF discourse. 
The second key observation was that in spite of IVF's failure rate of over 80%, that 
failure is largely absent from popular representations of the technology, in clinic 
promotional literature, and in research. Treatment failure is not the only under-explored 
aspect of IVF. In particular, there is even less research available into the experiences of 
those who want to engage with IVF but are prevented from doing so, or those who 
would qualify as candidates for IVF and could afford the treatment, but who choose not 
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to engage with it. In both of these cases, research into the impact of the non-engagement 
with IVF on their experiences of infertility would offer an interesting perspective from 
which to think about the technology and its effects. But these are projects for another 
time, and I selected WF failure as my focus. This decision was made in part for 
pragmatic reasons, in that the process of recruiting participants, although not simple 2, 
was more manageable within the time and budget of a PhD project. However, my 
primary motivation was (and remains) the striking dissonance between the prevalence 
of IVF failure and the absence of that failure in popular and medical representations, 
and, more importantly, the implications of this absence. 
Introduction 
In vitro fertilisation (rvF) - literally, fertilisation in glass — hit the headlines in 1978 
when Louise Brown, the first baby to be conceived using the procedure, was born. In 
the years preceding her birth, the nascent technology had been the subject of intense 
debate in terms of both the ethics of the endeavour, and its practicability. The safe 
arrival of Louise Brown confirmed that it was indeed possible to successfully remove an 
egg from a woman's body, fertilise it in a petri dish and transfer it to the uterus via the 
cervix, resulting in a pregnancy that was capable of continuing to term. The caesarean 
birth was filmed, and before stitching the wound, like a magician pulling back the 
curtain to reveal the splendour of his trick, Patrick Steptoe, who pioneered the 
procedure with Robert Edwards, showed Mrs Brown's uterus to the camera to confirm 
the absence of fallopian tubes (Challoner 1999: 46). The miracle baby was born. 
Since 1978, IVF has mushroomed into a thriving industry, and in December 2000, the 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA)3 issued a press release 
announcing that more than 50,000 babies have been born in the UK using IVF, with an 
astonishing 50% of those born in the last three years4. However, this large increase in 
the number of babies being born does not reflect a dramatic increase in the live birth 
rates, which only increased from 12.7% to 18.2% between 1991 (when HFEA records 
1 See, for example, Morell 1994, Campbell 1999 
2 As described in Chapter 3. 
3 The HFEA was established in 1991 to regulate rvF, donor insemination (DI) and egg, sperm and 
embryo storage, as well as licensing and monitoring embryo research. For a detailed discussion of the 
parliamentary debates which led up to the establishing of the HFEA, see Franldin 1993, Pfeffer 1993, 
Challoner 1999. 
4 HFEA press release, 13 December, 2000 (www.hfea.gov.uk) 
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began) and 1999. Instead, the increase is explained by the rise in patients undergoing 
treatment from 15,087 to 27,151 in the same time period5 . IVF can be described as 
having entered the mainstream as a treatment for infertility, although as will be 
discussed in the following chapter, there are many who would question the legitimacy 
of the status of IVF as no longer experimental. There are currently 75 6 clinics in the UK 
licensed by the BFEA to perform IVF, and since approximately 80% of all treatment 
cycles are performed in the private sector, often at the cost of several thousands of 
pounds per cycle, this constitutes big business. Furthermore, the introduction of new 
technologies such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), where fertilised 
embryos are screened for genetic disorders, as well as the development of micro-
manipulation techniques which facilitate fertilisation even where the male partner has a 
low sperm count, suggests that this expansion will continue. 
The prevailing cultural representation of IVF locates it centrally within modernity — a 
seductive image of benign, rational, efficient science giving imperfect nature a helping 
hand. The poster family for IVF is the grateful, infertile couple cradling their "miracle" 
baby — what one of the interviewees in this project described as "Good Morning TV 
[...] — the nice little fluffy story on a pink sofa" (Graham). The image is one of the 
natural order restored and rests heavily on the assumption of the naturalness of 
reproduction, particularly for women, and the understanding of science as progressive 
and capable of comprehending and controlling human reproduction. This discourse is 
perhaps best suggested by the marketing literature of clinics performing IVF, where 
images of white-coated doctors and gleaming cutting-edge equipment are interspersed 
with soft-focused pictures of smiling babies and happy nuclear families. Arthur Frank 
observes a similar marketing strategy in the brochure for a new cancer treatment centre, 
where smiling images of people who had recovered were interspersed with shots of the 
medical technology. There were, however, no shots of the machinery in use, obscuring 
the arduousness and uncertainty of the treatment process itself (Frank 1995: 79) 7 • 
5 All statistics are taken from the HFEA press release. These are the most recent statistics available at the 
time of submission. 
6 As of 31 August, 2000 (www.hfea.gov.uk) 
7 This pattern of the before and after shot is a characteristic of cosmetic surgery (Balsamo 1999: ch.3). 
The work of the performance artist, Orlan, aims at undermining this erasure of the process of the 
transformation by being filmed whilst undergoing surgeries (Davis 1997; Carson 2001) 
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Implicit in the construction of parenthood as the natural order is the obvious corollary 
that those who do not reproduce remain outside the natural order. This underlies the 
portrayal in the media of women living without children as selfish and child-hating — 
characteristics that are precisely opposite those of the idealised "mother" (Morell 1994: 
55). Women who are involuntarily childless often find themselves tarred with the same 
brush, or alternatively portrayed as objects of pity, defined by their lack of a child 
(Sandelowsld 1993: 3). These "hopeless stories" conventionally conclude with the 
collapse of the marital relationship as the price to be paid for the failure to "complete" 
the family (Franklin 1990: 213). The assumed inevitability and necessity of motherhood 
for women fails to acknowledge the way in which this privileging of motherhood is not 
extended to everyone (Shildrick 1997: 190), as can be seen in the collective political 
and media hand-wringing over teenage single motherhood, for example, or the coercive 
use of contraceptive implants in poor black women in the US (Raymond 1993). In the 
context of IVF, we only have to consider the incongruity of the iconic "miracle baby" 
image if we substitute the conventionally white, middle class parents with two young, 
black teenagers, or a couple with disabilities to see the ways in which the assumed 
privileging of motherhood is heavily contingent. Rosario Ceballo's account of the 
experiences of two black women struggling with infertility highlights the extent to 
which dominant discourses of infertility and IVF continue to presume a white, middle 
class subject (Ceballo 1999). 
The exclusivity of normative constructions of reproduction points to an alternative 
understanding of IVF not as a helping hand to the natural order, but as a fundamental 
threat to that order — a representation which emerges when what is achieved through 
technology, or is imagined to be achievable, falls outside of a particular construction of 
idealised motherhood. Popular perceptions of reproductive technology are more 
ambivalent than the iconic image would suggest (see, for example: Hirsch 1993), and 
these concerns find expression in the miracle baby's counterpart — the designer baby. 
The creation of a monster that grows beyond the control of its creators is a staple of 
science fiction. Mary Shelley's fictional "Creature", compiled from the body parts of 
stolen corpses and galvanised into life by Victor Frankenstein, is perhaps the most 
enduring archetype (Shelley 1818), forming a central metaphor for contemporary 
biotechnology debates (Tumey 1998). The message taken from figures such as 
Frankenstein's Creature is that the further away from nature the procreative process 
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moves, the greater the dangers to the individual and society s . A headline in the Daily 
Express puts this unambiguously: "Human Clones Will Mean the Birth of Evil"9. In 
fact, the pioneers of IVF were so afraid of the effects of public perceptions of the 
procedure if the first baby was "abnormal" that the couples undergoing the first 
experimental cycles had to agree to an abortion if the developing foetus was discovered 
to be malformed (Challoner 1999: 41). An example of this continuing suspicion that 
IVF children will be somehow marked by their unconventional beginnings can be seen 
in the experience of one of the participants in this study who discovered to her horror 
that behind her back her son was referred to as Damien (the Antichrist in The Omen 
series of horror films) among certain members of her family because he was conceived 
through IVF. 
However, the products of reproductive technologies are not the only objects of 
vilification, and a key critical target in the designer baby discourse is the consumers, 
and specifically, the female consumers. While the desire for a child, especially for 
women, is judged to be natural, even morally necessary, it is also possible for that desire 
to be deemed dangerously out of control. The excoriation of lesbian or post-menopausal 
women engaging in the "unnatural" consumption of the reproductive technologies is a 
tabloid staple, and the nascent technologies that seem to hold the promise of even 
greater "deviations" such as genetic manipulation or cloning techniques receive equally 
short shrift. Whilst appearing at one level to shore up traditional "family values", IVF 
and its associated technologies is also capable of generating novel family structures, and 
fracturing the conventionally unitary categories of mother and father, creating new 
relationships which are legally and ethically without clear definition (see, for example: 
Andrews 1999). The unease is palpable when IVF is appropriated unconventionally, and 
a recent high profile case in France brought together many of these concerns, creating a 
story that the Daily Mail described as "sickeningly wrong", and which provoked many 
8 This is, however, a contemporary distortion of the original Frankenstein story, where the Creature's 
"monstrous" behaviour results from social prejudice and exclusion rather than from being "primitive". In 
the year before writing Frankenstein, Mary Shelley was living in Clifton, which neighbours Bristol — a 
town which had thrived on the slave trade. Both Mary and Percy Shelley had participated in the fight for 
abolition, refusing, among other things, to eat sugar because it came from the plantations. Even though 
the Abolition Act was signed in 1807, ending the trafficking of slaves, domestic slavery continued well 
towards the end of the century, and Mary was strongly aware of a residual black population in Bristol 
(and elsewhere) who were subject to strong social prejudice. This was an important aspect in the 
construction of the social experience of Frankenstein's Creature (Seymour 2000: 137-138) 
9 Daily Express, 21 June, 2001 
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column inches of discussion in the media. The substantial media coverage offers an 
interesting insight into the attitudes and assumptions surrounding the use of technology 
for reproduction, the consumption of that technology, and some of the dilemmas it can 
create. 
The story l° runs that Jeanine Salomone, a 62 year old French woman, gave birth to a 
son, Benoit-David, who was conceived using a donor egg which was fertilised using the 
sperm of her 52 year old brother, Robert. Robert's sperm was also used to fertilise a 
second egg from the same donor, who then acted as surrogate ll and gave birth to Marie-
Cecile eight days before Jeanine gave birth to Benoit-David. The children are full 
brother and sister, since they have the same genetic parentage, and although they have 
different gestational mothers, they share the same social mother. The baby girl is also 
Benoit-David's half sister and his cousin; their father is also their uncle, and Jeanine is 
their aunt as well as being Marie-Cecile's adoptive mother, and Benoit-David's 
gestational mother. Because fertility treatment is illegal in France for post-menopausal 
women, the brother and sister went to California for treatment, passing as a married 
couple, paying the Californian doctor over £100,000 in total for the treatment which led 
to the births of the two children. The story is made even more salacious firstly by the 
revelation that Robert tried to shoot himself in 1996, leaving his face severely 
disfigured, and secondly, that the motivation they gave for wanting children was to 
secure an heir to their 82 year old mother's £2 million inheritance. 
The newspapers almost universally observed that neither Jeanine nor Robert had ever 
married, or, as The Independent expressed it, they had "failed to marry" (my emphasis), 
marking their position as already outside of social norms. However, it was also clear 
who the villain of the piece was, and Jeanine was described as having "engineered the 
baby in a scheme with her brother" 12 (my emphasis). It was she, and not her brother, 
who was described in the Daily Express as having "sparked international outrage" 13 . Le 
Monde was cited in The Independent as noting her "cantankerous" nature, suggesting 
that "her bad temper probably brought about her brother Robert's depression which led 
io i It s important to note that even the basic "facts" are difficult to establish from the newspaper coverage, 
and the basic details varied significantly in the telling. 
The term surrogate is highly controversial here, since the "surrogate" is actually both the biological and 
gestational mother of the baby. 
12  The Times, 21 June, 2001 
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him to try and kill himself in 1995 14 . Robert's disability resulting from the suicide 
attempt is variously described as "partially paralysed" I5 , "handicapped" 16 , 
"disfigured" 17 and "mentally handicapped" 18 . Whatever the effects of his suicide 
attempt, in the newspaper articles he is constructed as a pawn in his scheming sister's 
machinations, and the blame is clearly laid at her door. This is a pattern of female blame 
that is repeated, although perhaps in less extreme circumstances, in cases taken up by 
the press where older women have given birth using IVF. While the female partners are 
criticised as selfish for risking the increased possibility of not living to see the child to 
adulthood, or of not having the energy to care for them, the male partners do not receive 
similar negative attention. In fact, older fathers fmd themselves congratulated for their 
virility, as was the case in February, 2000, when James Doohan (Scotty, from the Star 
Trek series) announced at the age of 80 that he was going to be a father again. The BBC 
could not resist trumpeting that he was preparing "to boldly go where few men of his 
age have gone before" I9 . 
It is important to remember that it is precisely the exceptional nature of such cases that 
catch the attention of the media, and therefore, in one sense, these extreme stories are 
sideshows which have little to say about the more mundane, everyday experience of 
IVF. However, the palpable unease and outrage when IVF is appropriated for non-
conventional purposes is revealing of the power of the heteronormative reproductive 
standards which underpin the development and delivery of IVF. It is also significant to 
note that although the behaviour of Jeanine and Robert Salomone may be considered by 
many (including myself) to be morally questionable, they did not break any laws in 
creating their desired family2°, highlighting the uncontainability of IVF within 
conventional "family values". Furthermore, their pursuit of genetic parenthood is 
completely in line with the current emphasis on the importance of genetics. The 
designer baby exposes the fragility of the construction of those values as the "natural" 
13 Daily Express, 21 June, 2001 
14 Le Monde, cited in The Independent, 23 June, 2001 
15 The Times, 21 June, 2001 
16 Daily Express, 21 June, 2001 
17 The Independent, 21 June, 2001 
18 The Independent/Daily Express, 21 June, 2001 
19  www.news.bbc.co.uk, 4 February, 2000 
20 They did not (technically, at least) commit fraud in allowing the assumption that they were married to 
continue, since they were never asked directly. 
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standard to which we should aspire, and puts into question the unified categories upon 
which those values are based. 
However, what is most striking about miracle baby / designer baby representations of 
IVF is the fact that they are profoundly unrepresentative of the reproductive 
technologies in general, and rvF in particular, and of the experience of infertility. 
Firstly, IVF is an expensive procedure with limited health authority funded provision, 
and the poorer sections of society are therefore automatically excluded. In the US, it is 
estimated that two thirds of couples experiencing infertility do not seek treatment, and 
although black women are more likely than white women to have trouble conceiving, 
this is not reflected among those seeking treatment as a result of higher rates of poverty 
among those groups (Sandelowski 1993: 8). The dominant representations also fail to 
recognise the "Other Mothers" (Farquhar 1996: ch. 8), including post-menopausal 
women, and those who are not in a social position to conceive through heterosexual 
intercourse, such as lesbians or single women. 
However, the problematic aspect of these representations of IVF that is of most concern 
in the context of this thesis is that both the miracle baby and the designer baby would 
not exist at all if they were truly representative of the dominant experience of IVF, 
which is of treatment failure. The reality of rvF is that less than 20% of all cycles 
started result in a live birth, and even those that are eventually successful will probably 
have been preceded by failure, which can occur at any stage in the process. This is 
particularly true for older women, whose chances of success fall away significantly as 
they enter into their forties. Ironically, it is the successes of IVF that have generated the 
ethical and moral debates in the media, the courts and the government, but little is 
known about the more prosaic issue of treatment failure. It is not difficult to see how 
WE failure has been rendered so invisible. IVF success, unlike failure 21 , is either 
seductively photogenic or salaciously newsworthy, and from the perspective of the 
clinics it is certainly not in their interests to over-emphasise treatment failure, although 
21 An exception to this general rule was the media coverage of the Mastertons, whose failed treatment was 
widely reported. They had sought to use pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to guarantee that they 
would have a girl, to replace the "female dimension" of their family after their only daughter had died in a 
fire. Refused sex selection in the UK, they sought treatment in Italy. However, the treatment produced a 
single embryo which turned out to be male and was given away (vvww.guardianunlimited.co.uk, 5 March, 
2001). Unusually, failure was the focus of this story. However, it was the terms by which failure was 
judged that was of interest, rather than the fact that it had failed. 
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the law does require them to issue standardised live birth rate statistics for comparison 
between clinics Furthermore, those for whom treatment fails literally drop out of the 
sight of the treatment providers, since they no longer attend the clinic unless they 
choose to seek further treatment. Consequently, as will be described in Chapter 3, this 
creates significant methodological and ethical dilemmas with regards to recruitment and 
confidentiality in conducting research, as well as, more generally, pulling the failure of 
treatment out of sight as a possible research topic. 
The current invisibility of TVF failure has a lengthy precedent, since Mr and Mrs Brown 
were not the first couple to have embryos fertilised in vitro and implanted (see, Crowe 
1990: 35). The first ever transfer of a human embryo fertilised by IVF took place in 
December 1971, and the first IVF pregnancy was confirmed in 1975, although this 
turned out to be ectopic22 and was terminated. A second TVF pregnancy was achieved 
(with a different patient) shortly afterwards, but was miscarried at a very early stage. 
Challoner describes these precedents as "false starts" (Challoner 1999: 37). In 1977, 
three further women were selected for treatment. For the first woman, her successfully 
fertilised embryo failed to implant, and Steptoe was unable to collect an egg from the 
third woman to receive treatment. The second woman was Lesley Brown, and the rest, 
as they say, is history (Challoner 1999: ch. 3-4). 
Those for whom treatment has failed are confronted with the difficult choice of whether 
to pursue further treatment or whether to stop, either to live without children (or the 
desired number of children), or to pursue alternative routes to non-biological 
parenthood such as adoption or surrogacy. One of the commonly reported features of 
the experience of TVF is of being on a treadmill from which there is no easily apparent 
exit point and the cyclical nature of IVF presents a persistent maybe-next-time promise. 
Franklin describes this as a sense of a "tentative future, a future 'on hold' until a 
resolution is reached" (Franklin 1997: 135). In this context, the decision to continue or 
discontinue treatment can be seen as one of the only elements that the couple can have a 
sense of control over (Monach 1993: 181). However, particularly for women, the 
decision to end treatment involves confronting a future without much-desired biological 
22 The early IVF female patients had ovaries that ovulated normally, but had no fallopian tubes. In the 
case of the 1975 pregnancy, the embryo had implanted at the point where the remains of one tube joined 
the uterus (Challoner 1999: 37) 
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children — a life course "for which there are few role models, maps or guidelines" 
(Daniluk 1996: 83). Furthermore, the end of treatment is often imposed rather than 
chosen, and even those who can choose have to negotiate the construction of IVF 
success as a matter of perseverance, which effectively renders stopping treatment as 
simply not trying hard enough. 
The decision to end treatment is not necessarily any easier for those whose families 
already include children, either from the same relationship or from previous 
relationships. Indeed, those with primary responsibility for the day-to-day care of 
existing children may find it harder to withdraw from treatment since their daily lives 
continue to revolve around child-focused activity, making closure around the promise of 
IVF difficult. Ironically, even those for whom treatment is successful are confronted 
with the decision over whether to pursue further treatment to try for another child, with 
the added incentive of already having been successful once. 
Aims and objectives  
This study takes as its focus IVF failure, the decision to end treatment, and the 
implementation of that decision and its consequences, and the analysis is based on a 
series of in-depth interviews with women and couples whose most recent cycle of 
treatment had been unsuccessful and had taken place at least two years previously. The 
study aims to explore the ways in which those people made sense of their unsuccessful 
engagement with IVF, and begins from three central questions: 
I. What are the factors informing the decision to stop treatment? 
A common assumption is that couples seeking IVF either have a baby, or they pursue 
treatment until negative circumstances force them to stop. This perception lies behind 
the only consistent media portrayal of women, and to a lesser extent, couples, for whom 
IVF has not been successful — that of tragic figures overwhelmed by failed marriages, 
fmancial ruin and debilitating emotional devastation. These images are frequently 
marshalled in support of campaigns for the more equitable provision of health authority 
funded treatment, but provide a salutary vision of life after IVF. It is also significant that 
these portrayals suggest that couples are always forced to end treatment, rather than 
choosing to stop, which is related to the underlying assumption that women do (and 
should) pursue motherhood at all costs. In this study, stopping treatment is understood 
17 
as a process, rather than a single moment, and it is assumed that different factors 
influencing that process will take precedence at different times. By exploring the 
different elements of the process and the ways in which they are used and accounted for 
in the interviews, the analysis aims to identify some of the broader social and cultural 
issues which both implicitly and explicitly have a bearing on the ending of IVF 
treatment. 
2. How does the experience of IVF failure impact upon perceptions of the technology? 
IVF can be described as a technology of hope, and the end of treatment without a baby 
marks the end of that hope, since IVF constitutes the "end of the line" in terms of 
treatment options. This research aims to explore the impact of treatment failure on the 
ways in which the participants evaluated the technology, and the extent to which the 
technology and / or its practitioners were held responsible for that failure. The research 
also aims to explore the ways in which treatment failure intersects with negative 
representations of reproductive technology as "meddling" with nature. 
3. How does the experience of IVF failure impact upon the ways in which involuntary 
childlessness is experienced? 
IVF is not a discrete event, but instead is one element of a long process of coping with 
infertility. Consequently, the research aims to examine the ways in which the failed 
technological intervention in the reproductive endeavour marks the wider experience of 
involuntary (biological) childlessness, and how the unsuccessful engagement with IVF 
impacts upon future choices and life paths. In particular, in a society that stigmatises 
those who live without children, the study explores the degree to which the engagement 
with IVF is perceived to make a life without children (or the desired number of 
children) more or less socially and individually acceptable. 
I have argued earlier in this chapter that IVF failure has been largely excluded from 
research into IVF, although this is not to say, of course, that the research is entirely 
without precedent. Indeed, this research is informed by a number of important studies of 
IVF which include the issue of treatment failure. These can be divided into three key 
bodies of work. Firstly, there have been a number of studies of treatment failure from a 
psychological or counselling perspective, focusing on data collected in the course of 
treatment, or at the point of stopping (see, for example: Callan, Kloske et al. 1988; 
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Braverman 1996; Braverman 1997; Epstein and Rosenberg 1997). These studies 
highlight the contradictory pressures which IVF places on women and couples and the 
emotional and psychological stress when treatment fails. However, they draw primarily 
on data from counselling sessions during, in between, or immediately after treatment, 
and therefore offer a commentary on the decision in the short term. This study, on the 
other hand, aims to establish a longer term perspective that will enable the participants 
to reflect on the ways in which the failure of IVF has marked the experience of 
infertility, and on the meanings given to IVF in the light of that failure. However, as the 
analysis will demonstrate, many of the conflicting pressures experienced by those 
confronting the decision to stop do not necessarily disappear over time, and these 
studies are therefore useful in understanding those pressures and the trauma that IVF 
can generate. 
The second body of literature which addresses treatment failure, although to varying 
degrees, is feminist studies of IVF, and particularly those which are based on personal 
accounts of treatment. Margaret Sandelowski includes IVF failure and the decision to 
end treatment as one element of her study of infertility and the transition to either 
biological or adoptive parenthood, although the decision to live without children is not 
included (Sandelowski 1993). Others include treatment failure and the end of treatment 
as one of a number of possible outcomes (see, for example: Franklin 1997; Becker 
2000). However, problems of accessing and recruiting research participants mean that 
the majority of studies recruit participants directly through clinics While this provides 
important and valuable insight into the process of treatment and the dynamics of the 
clinics (Cussins 1998), the participants' continued contact with the clinic, or with 
patient support organisations, often marks the continued hope of future success. This 
study aims to explore the experience of IVF failure once that hope of future restitution 
has largely gone, although as the analysis will demonstrate, even after several years, this 
hope for restitution rarely recedes entirely. Radical feminists writing in opposition to 
IVF and other reproductive technologies 23 have touched upon the issue of treatment 
failure and stopping treatment. However, the primary focus of this literature is to argue 
against IVF (and other NRTs) as a valid response to infertility, and therefore, while 
recognising the crisis that infertility can provoke, these feminists' primary concern is 
23 See Chapter 2 for a discussion of these perspectives. 
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the pressure towards biological motherhood which confronts women with "the choice 
that isn't" (Kozolanka 1989). This is seen as forcing women into the engagement with 
dangerous, abusive, experimental and ultimately unsuccessful medical interventions. 
The third body of literature which addresses rui failure and the decision to stop is the 
popular advice books on infertility and IVF (for example: Neuberg 1991; Brian 1998; 
McGrail 1999). The issue of treatment failure is raised towards the end of these texts, 
either embedded as one of a number of possible outcomes (Brian 1998), or as a final 
chapter (McGrail 1999). These concluding chapters characteristically end on an upbeat 
note, highlighting the ways in which IVF can reaffirm relationships and offer resolution 
through having tried everything: "normal people" posits Robert Winston on the final 
page of his "defmitive guide", "though they feel desperate at the time, come out of this 
feeling much better and stronger" (Winston 1999: 222). While the inclusion of 
treatment failure in these texts is important, its appearance as an optimistic afterthought 
is problematic. Conversely, IVF failure marks the opening of books on coping with 
involuntary childlessness and learning to live childfree (for example: Carter & Carter 
1998; Lisle 1999), but again, the specific relationship between the experience of 
infertility and the failed engagement with IVF is not explored in these texts. 
Therefore, while this thesis can be located within a growing body of literature, it is 
unusual for its explicit focus on treatment failure, and as such, addresses very directly 
an aspect of IVF which has been easily and effectively rendered invisible in the 
dominant representations. However, while I would argue that the disjuncture between 
the prevalence of WF failure and its lack of representation provide a strong imperative 
for research which focuses explicitly on that experience, the primary significance of this 
research does not lie in the plugging of a gap in the literature. Instead, the focus on TVF 
failure offers an opportunity to explore those aspects of the TVF process and the context 
in which it is experienced that are rendered invisible by treatment success. Those who 
have had WF unsuccessfully and who have since stopped treatment find themselves 
occupying an ambiguous liminal space between social conformity and transgression: 
they have tried to conceive but have been unable to; they desire children, but are no 
longer actively pursuing that desire; they have brought technology into the "natural" 
process of reproduction, but without the counterbalancing "natural" outcome of a baby. 
This ambiguous location emerges as a particularly dense and productive arena from 
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which to explore the social and cultural context within which IVF operates. In 
particular, this offers a rich perspective from which to explore the complex and 
imbricated relations between gender, technology and the body; issues of agency, 
resistance and conformity; and the problematic nature of theoretical splits between the 
discursive and the material. The significance of this research, then, is not simply in the 
adding of another piece to an incomplete picture, but lies in the recognition of that 
missing piece as the product of a particular social and cultural context which can have 
material-discursive24 , and often deleterious, effects on women's lives. The seeking out 
of ways of making sense of this context and its interaction with the specificity of the 
experience of IVF failure constitutes the purpose of this thesis. 
Clarifying the terms  
Having set out the background to the research and its main objectives, at this early 
juncture it is necessary to consider some of the key concepts that emerge in the analysis 
of these issues in order to clarify the ways in which they are being used here. This 
section will focus on the following key terms: the new reproductive technologies 
(NRTs), IVF, infertility, stopping treatment, and living childfree. 
The new reproductive technologies (NRTs)  
Broadly speaking, the NRTs are those technologies which either facilitate, manage or 
prevent reproduction. There is nothing novel about the intervention into the 
reproductive processes (Riddle 1997). In ancient Egypt, contraceptives made of 
pulverised crocodile dung and herbs mixed with honey were used to block the passage 
of semen (Porter 1999: 47). In the seventeenth century, herbal medicines to prevent or 
encourage pregnancy were well established. The juice of the herb savin (juniper) was 
said to work as a contraceptive or an abortificant (hence its nickname Covershame) and 
honeysuckle and rue were both credited with similar effects; more drastically, men were 
treated with emetic mixtures to "dampen their desire" and women were subjected to 
vaginal pessaries of ground bitter almonds and douches of camphor, castor oil and rue 
(Fraser 1999: 73-74). For the infertile, there was no shortage of advice 25 . In The Ladies 
Companion, or The English Midwife, written by William Sermon in 1671, 
24 To use Jane Ussher's term (Ussher 1997: Introduction) 
25 As the analysis of the interview transcripts will show, this still remains the case, with couples 
frequently receiving unsolicited advice of a distinctly folklore-ish nature. 
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recommended treatments included powered white ginger, or, more bizarrely, "sitting 
over a bath in which skeins of yarn had been boiled in the water and then mixed with 
ashes" (Sermon, in Fraser 1999: 69). 
In a contemporary context of the medical intervention in reproduction, the technologies 
include contraception, abortion, ante-natal testing such as amniocentesis and ultrasound 
scanning, the medical management of pregnancy and delivery, and the technologies of 
conception. These meclicalised interventions into reproduction have been termed the 
new reproductive technologies, although their "newness" is questionable, since 
technologies such as the contraceptive pill, for example, date back to the 1960's 
(Oudshoorn 1994; Clarke 2000; Marks 2001) and IVF is in its third decade. In fact, 
Renate Klein questions whether they ever were new, claiming that they are simply part 
of a historical continuum of the medical interference in women's bodies (Klein 1987). 
In response to this, I would argue that the term NRTs remains useful because it 
recognises these technologies as productive of, and products of, an intersection of 
ideologies of science, technology, reproduction and the gendered body at a particular 
historical and cultural moment. Therefore, I have chosen to use the term NRTs to refer 
to this constellation of procedures, practices and technologies, although this is not to 
suggest that they constitute a completely new departure or to disconnect them from their 
own histories. For the purposes of this thesis, I am addressing specifically the issues 
raised by the conceptive technologies, and particularly IVF, but these technologies 
cannot be separated out easily from the others. Ultrasound, for example, plays a key role 
in monitoring the growth of egg follicles during the hormonal drug treatments, and is 
used to guide the egg collection procedure; contraception, particularly in the form of the 
intra-uterine device (IUD) is often implicated in the cause of fertility problems, and the 
use of the contraceptive pill can disguise the destructive progression of conditions such 
as endometriosis; where treatment succeeds, the pregnancy will continue to be 
monitored and intervened in if deemed necessary. 
Not all of the conceptive technologies fall within the scope of this thesis, which focuses 
primarily on the constellation of technologies which rely upon the fertilisation of eggs 
outside of the body. In particular, the technology which does not fall under the IVF 
umbrella, and which is also potentially one of the least technological and therefore the 
most easily appropriated, is donor insemination (DI) — that is, where a semen specimen 
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is produced by masturbation, and then transferred while still fresh to a woman's vagina 
during ovulation (Farquhar 1996: 45) 26 . DI has a long history, dating back to 1790 
(ibid.) and does not require medical intervention. A more medicalised version of DI is 
intra-uterine insemination (IUD, where the sperm is washed before being introduced 
directly via a catheter into the uterus. Neither of these procedures is considered in any 
depth in this thesis, although many of the women who participated in the project had 
undergone 1111 as a preliminary stage in the technological escalation towards IVF. 
Although none of the participants in this study had undergone DI, having chosen, in the 
main, to pursue the possibility of shared genetic parenthood, donor sperm had been used 
in the IVF process in cases where both the male and female partners had fertility 
problems. 
IVF 
IVF is explained by Robert Winston as "the process by which egg and sperm are mixed 
in a small plastic or glass container outside the body and then placed in a woman's 
uterus after fertilisation. It usually involves the removal of eggs from the woman's 
ovary and the collection of sperm from her partner. The embryo, which results from 
fertilisation in the laboratory, is transferred to the woman's uterus about two to five 
days later" (Winston 1999: 1). This explanation is problematic, particularly in terms of 
the apparent equality of contribution by the male and female partners — an issue which 
will be considered in the following chapter. However, what is of interest here is that the 
term IVF, in centring on the moment of fertilisation, fails to even hint at the full process 
of engaging with the technology. 
The fertilisation, if it occurs, is preceded by perhaps years of trying to conceive, 
invasive and stressful tests27 , and by several weeks of hormonal injections and scans. 
For some, the moment of attempted fertilisation may also have been preceded by having 
to take out financial loans, working extra hours to save enough money to pursue 
treatment or spending years on health authority waiting lists. After the embryo transfer, 
the process continues for the patient with a stressful two week wait, followed the task of 
coping with the outcome. When treatment is successful, there is the worry of pregnancy 
26 For more discussion of DI, see, for example: Kimbrell 1993: ch.5; Saffron 1994; Farquhar 1996: ch.2; 
Daniels and Haimes 1998; Hogben and Coupland 2000. 
27 For a detailed description of the different testing procedures, see: McGrail 1999; Winston 1999. 
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loss, and the stress of ante-natal tests that could confront them with the cruel irony of 
having to decide whether or not to terminate a pregnancy. When treatment fails, couples 
have to grieve, communicate the news to others, and, in time, face the difficult decisions 
about what to do next. Therefore, in this thesis I make a distinction between the IVF 
procedure — the "fertilisation in glass" — and the wider IVF process, focusing primarily 
on the latter. 
IVF refers specifically to the fertilisation of the egg outside of the body, and forms the 
basis of a proliferating number of other procedures. There are three key variations on 
the fertilisation process. For women with healthy fallopian tubes and where male factor 
fertility is not in question, GIFT (gamete intrafallopian transfer) involves the collection 
of eggs via laparoscopy. These are then mixed with the sperm and injected soon 
afterwards into the fallopian tubes before fertilisation has been confirmed. MT (zygote 
intrafallopian transfer) is the same procedure, but the transfer to the fallopian tubes does 
not take place until fertilisation has been confirmed. And finally, TET (tubal embryo 
transfer) involves waiting until the embryo has begun to divide before transfer to the 
fallopian tube (Farquhar 1996: 53)28 . All of these techniques carry an increased risk of 
ectopic pregnancy. Where male factor infertility is implicated, micro-manipulation 
techniques such as ICSI (intracytoplasmic sperm injection) can be used. In ICSI, the 
sperm is sucked up into a fine glass needle, then injected directly into the eggs 29. In this 
study, IVF and ICSI were the two procedures most commonly used by the participants. 
The fmal IVF-related procedure of interest here, although none of the participants in this 
study had undergone it, is pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). In PGD, the eggs 
are fertilised in vitro, and then the fertilised embryos are tested for particular genetic 
defects, such as inherited disorders. This creates the prospect of a new group of users of 
IVF, which until now has been targeted at those who cannot conceive and carry a child 
to term. PGD remains highly controversial because of the difficulties of legislating 
which particular disorders can be legitimately selected out, and the problems of defining 
what constitutes a disorder in the first place. The figure of the "designer baby" looms 
28  Other variations on this theme include TUFT (transuterine fallopian transfer) and SHIFT (hysteroscopic 
intrafallopian transfer) both of which transfer the fertilised egg to the fallopian tubes via the uterus 
(Winston 1999: 52). 
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large over the debates. This is demonstrated by a recent headline in The Guardian3° 
which trumpeted "Designer baby gets go-ahead" in response to the news that the HFEA 
had decided to allow a couple to use POD to select out embryos on the basis of genetic 
compatibility with their seriously ill son. If treatment were successful and a baby was 
born as a result, blood cells from the umbilical cord would be used to treat the older 
sibling, who is suffering from thalassaemia (an inherited blood disorder). The high 
profile of this case in the media highlights the public interest and concern in these new 
developments and the unanticipated ethical dilemmas which they generate. Other cases 
have unsuccessfully fought for the right to use PGD to select a child of the desired sex. 
In the case of the Mastertons (see footnote 21), this caused the acronym to be misread 
by several newspapers, as well as Mr Masterton himself, as "pre-implantation gender 
diagnosis". 
Infertility 
Infertility is a concept which appears self-evident in meaning. Indeed, the HFEA does 
not even include "infertility" in its website glossary, and a number of self-help and 
advice books reviewed for this study fail to offer a clear definition (Neuberg 1991; 
Brian 1998; McGrail 1999; Winston 1999). Biomedical definitions are conventionally 
based upon a specified time period of regular unprotected intercourse without success. 
In the case of the HFEA, a two year time period is used 31 , but self-help and advice 
books often advocate a year, placing greater emphasis on setting the often slow process 
of testing in motion sooner rather than later (Brian 1998; McGrail 1999) 32 . Elizabeth 
Britt notes that these arbitrary temporal boundaries defining infertility are contested by 
women, many of whom identify themselves as having trouble conceiving after a few 
months of "trying" (Britt 2001: 81). Many of her interviewees responded to this self-
identified problem by keeping temperature charts in order to predict ovulation, and by 
beginning to make inquiries about further fertility testing and treatment. This is a 
pattern that was repeated by many of the participants in this study. This points to the 
nature of infertility not as "a static condition with psychosocial consequences, but as a 
29 Winston observes that the injection is performed with a "sudden but controlled thrusting movement"!! 
(Winston 1999: 68). See Francoise Laborie for an exploration of the ways in which the construction of 
ICSI is gendered (Laborie 2000). 
30 23 May, 2002 
31  www.hfea. gov.uk  
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dynamic, socially conditioned process whereby couples come to defme their inability to 
bear their desired number of children as problematic and attempt to interpret and correct 
this situation" (original emphasis) (Greil 1991: 7). Arthur Greil's understanding of 
infertility is articulated specifically in relation to heterosexual couples. However, this 
understanding can also extend the concept of infertility as a process of self-
identification to include those for whom "trying for a baby", in the sense of regular, 
unprotected heterosexual intercourse, is not an option. Lesbian women, gay men, and 
both women and men living without a partner may all be in the position of deeply 
desiring parenthood whilst being socially positioned to make that impossible without 
technological intervention. Britt describes these as the "socially infertile" (Britt 2001). 
In this thesis, therefore, infertility is understood as the active but frustrated desire for a 
biological child. This definition offers two key advantages over biomedical defmitions. 
Firstly, it opens a range of possibilities for resolution. Within the biomedical discourse, 
a baby is the only satisfactory resolution to infertility. Robert Winston demonstrates this 
clearly in his introduction, arguing uncompromisingly that "having a child brings 
parents a kind of immortality which childless couples may only watch with envy" 
(Winston 1999: viii). Denied the opportunity of "contributing to the continuity of 
human existence" (ibid.: xi), those experiencing involuntary childlessness are consigned 
within this discourse to unhappy, envious genetic death. However, if infertility is 
understood as the socially constructed, but unfulfilled, desire to be a parent (Shildrick 
1997: 185), then resolution of that situation can take the form of not only becoming a 
parent, biologically or by other means, but also by living without children (Carter & 
Carter 1998). From this perspective, it is possible to stop identifying as infertile without 
having a baby. The second advantage of this perspective is that it allows for the 
separation of identifiable (or unidentifiable) physiological impediments to reproduction 
from the experience of infertility. This is important in the context of heterosexual 
couples, for example, where the desire for a child may not be equally shared, or where 
the physiological impediment in one partner may result in infertility being experienced 
by the other. This is particularly pertinent where male factors are implicated, since it is 
the female partner who then becomes the object of fertility treatment. This also 
32 A DIY fertility testing kit for both male and female fertility is soon to become available, which could 
be expected to bring down the lengths of time a couple is prepared to wait, particularly if the tests indicate 
a problem (www.netdoctor.co.uk , 2 July, 2001) 
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facilitates the inclusion of the "socially infertile" for whom physiological problems may 
not be an issue at all, or who may be unaware of a physiological problem until long 
after the self-identification as infertile. 
Stopping treatment 
I have selected the term "stopping treatment" in a not entirely successful attempt to 
avoid the pejorative implications of "giving up", which renders stopping an act of 
weakness indicative of a pending downward spiral. Yakov Epstein and Helane 
Rosenberg, describing differing reactions to infertility, offer the scenario of people who 
"consult a gynaecologist, follow her advice about monitoring temperature and timing 
intercourse, and then if they don't get pregnant, give up and become depressed" (my 
emphasis) (Epstein & Rosenberg 1997: 131-2). This scenario is contrasted with the 
other "extreme" of "couples who constantly undertake new medical procedures, repeat 
cycles of the most advanced treatments, and persist until they become pregnant" (ibid.). 
They end with the question of what might account for the differences between "those 
people who give up easily and those who never give up" (my emphasis) (ibid.). Within 
this discourse, "giving up" is a personal, moral failure to fight the good fight — in this 
case, to continue to work towards pregnancy Ann Woollett identified this as a feature 
of infertility clinic and self-help literature, where those women who made the decision 
to stop treatment were seen as "giving up" or "failures" who lacked commitment, rather 
than as people capable of making positive choices (Woollet 1996: 75). However, this 
also has to be balanced against the popular construction of never giving up as equally 
pathological. 
Conventional medical discourse constitutes what Frank describes as a "restitution 
narrative" (Frank 1995: ch.4). The plot of the restitution narrative is of health, followed 
by sickness, then the restoration of health (ibid.: 77), and these stories have obvious 
appeal for those encountering illness, either in themselves or in others. However, 
implicit in this narrative is the assumption of the capacity of medical science to 
eventually provide a cure. The patient, then, is required to retain their faith in that 
capacity, and not to "give up". This can be seen in the exhortations to patients to "fight" 
their cancer, for example, and not to give up, as if "winning" were simply a question of 
trying harder (Frank 1995; Stacey 1997). The metaphors within this narrative are 
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distinctly militaristic 33 and extend into reproductive discourse, where the sperm that 
reach the egg are described as the "crack troops" (Lee 1996: 20), or in the recent 
delivery of septuplets at a Washington hospital, where each baby had its own "medical 
SWAT team"34 . What is clear from the restitution narrative is that the hope of restitution 
promised by medicine crowds out other options (Frank 1995: 83). In the case of cancer, 
these other options might include, at a certain stage, preparing for death (and preparing 
others) (Kleinman 1988: ch.9). In the case of infertility (although this is not to make a 
direct comparison between the two), this might be contemplating living without 
children, or acquiring children through another route, such as adoption. For as long as 
the only acknowledged form of restitution for infertility is the birth of a baby, there is 
no positive and empowering exit route out of treatment for those for whom it does not 
succeed. 
Consequently, "giving up" was clearly not an appropriate term to use in the context of 
this study, and I also rejected "abandoning" (Braverman 1997) and "withdrawing" (the 
term used in the working title) because of the inherent connotations of defeat. I finally 
settled on "stopping" or "ending" treatment, used interchangeably, simply because this 
suggests a degree of control over the end of treatment, although the decisiveness of the 
terms belies the lengthy process involved in making that transition. Therefore, "stopping 
treatment" should be understood as a long and complex process, rather than a single 
definable moment, and nor should it be understood as necessarily denoting the 
voluntary determination of the end of treatment, since many patients are forced to stop 
as a result of fmancial limitations, health problems, age or their partner's refusal to 
participate. 
Living Childfree  
The difficulty in locating a suitable and positive term for those living without children is 
a testimony to the extent to which parenthood continues to be the normative standard, 
particularly for women (Campbell 1999: 117). The lack implied by terms such as 
childless, living without children, or non-mothering suggests the normality of parenting 
from which those who are not parents must distinguish themselves. Mardy Ireland 
33  See Martin (1998) on the use of metaphors of war and violence to describe the workings of the immune 
system. 
34 The Guardian, 26 July, 2001 
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argues that for as long as motherhood is perceived as the only satisfactory identity for 
women, then for those who do not have children "the idea of absence is always present 
in their lives as emptiness, rather than as generative space" (Ireland 1993: 125). The 
term childfree is an attempt to replace the negative connotations of childlessness with 
the recognition of the positive opportunities that living without children can bring 
(Carter & Carter 1998: 10). 
The concept has its roots in the childfree movement of the 1970's, in a post-baby boom 
revolt against the "powerful postwar ideology of domesticity" (Tyler May 1995: 184), 
although childfree networks began emerging in the US as early as the 1960's (ibid.: 
182). However, the problem with the term childfree for both voluntarily and 
involuntarily childless people is that it implies the absence of something that is 
undesirable, as in "a smoke-free environment" or "fat-free food" (Morel] 1994: 21). 
Childfree, then, can imply that those living without children are hostile towards them, 
making it a highly contentious label, particularly for those whose life without children 
was not what they would have freely chosen. Consequently, despite its radical roots, 
"childfree" can be seen to "[reinforce] the dominant ideology which views mother as 
superior" (ibid.: 21). Furthermore, it leaves no space to accommodate the grief and 
sadness of those who have been unable to have their own biological children, which 
should not be seen as incompatible with living childfree. Similarly, just as mothers are 
conventionally not permitted to express ambivalence about motherhood, "childfree" is 
too absolute a term to allow for an expression of ambivalence in those who have chosen 
not to have children. 
Morell's ideal solution would be to create a new word, but she also accepts that this can 
cause confusion among readers, and finally settles on "childless" and "not-mother" 
whilst recognising the political risks of those choices. I use childfree in this thesis to 
refer to those participants whose lives are not defined by the absence of a child, in that 
they are no longer pursuing IVF or any other means of becoming parents and that their 
lives are now moving along a trajectory that is not dependent on the anticipation of 
parenthood. However, it is important to note that this childfree status is subjectively 
determined by me, and none of the participants described themselves explicitly as 
childfree in the course of the interviews. Elsewhere, I use "childless" and "living 
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without children", although with a constant caveat regarding the political implications 
of those terms. 
Structure 
Having clarified some of the key terms that will be used throughout the thesis, before 
moving on, I now set out the structure of the thesis, including a brief summary of each 
chapter's content. 
Chapter 2: A Feminist Approach to IVF 
This chapter aims to locate the thesis in relation to the core bodies of literature which 
have informed the research and to which it aims to make a contribution. There is an 
extensive body of feminist literature on the NRTs — a body of work which is marked by 
strong ideological divides, and yet which shares a concern to centralise women in those 
debates. It is this placing of concerns about women at the centre that marks out feminist 
research into the NRTs, and as such, this thesis is identified as feminist. The chapter 
aims to locate the thesis within the feminist literature by exploring the range of feminist 
positions on the NRTs against a backdrop of writings on gender, science / technology 
and the body. These narratives highlight the impossibility of conceptualising IVF as a 
distinct entity which can be understood in isolation from the broader social and cultural 
context within which it operates. This points not only to the importance of 
contextualising IVF in order to understand its specificities, but also to the ways in which 
a specific focus on one aspect of IVF can illuminate that wider context. In particular, it 
will be argued that this focus opens up important issues around the (in)separability of 
the material and the discursive, the possibility of agency and resistance in the 
engagement with medical technology, and the multiple intersections and overlaps 
between conceptualisations of gender, technology and bodies, which are shown to be 
both produced by, and productive of, each other. The chapter concludes by outlining a 
feminist approach to IVF which resists a defmitive acceptance or rejection of IVF in 
favour of an approach which can accommodate the ambivalent and contradictory nature 
of that engagement, and which aims to be able to speak both from and to the broader 
theoretical and social context. 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
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This chapter is divided into two main sections. Leading on from the exposition in the 
previous chapter of the feminist approach on which the research is based, the first 
section sets out the epistemological basis for the research and explores the reasons why 
a discourse analytical approach was used in the analysis of the interview data. It is 
argued that discourse analysis is particularly well-suited to the task of rendering visible 
that which has been obscured in dominant representations because it begins from the 
premise that talk is always doing something, rather than transparently reflecting reality. 
By extension, this reveals the extent to which agency, however constrained, is always 
present in the construction of talk or texts. This is important in the context of this study, 
which rejects at the outset an interpretation of IVF as the exercise of patriarchal power 
over female powerlessness. However, the analytical focus on discourse is identified as 
raising several methodological problems in the context of this study, particularly in 
terms of the contradictions which emerge from the integration of a discourse analytic 
approach with empirical research. The second section of this chapter will set out how 
these debates played out in the research itself. In particular, this section explores how a 
commitment to explicitly feminist research impacted upon the interview process and the 
subsequent process of analysing and writing up the research, and how I attempted to 
resolve some of the dilemmas that arose from this commitment. Feminist theory and 
practice emerge from this not as opposites, but as mutually constituted facets of a 
reflexive and iterative process. 
Chapter 4: Negotiating Nature and Technology 
This chapter is the first of the four analysis chapters which form the main body of the 
thesis, and focuses on a tension central to the concept of reproductive technology — that 
of the embodiment in the term itself of that which is constructed as supremely natural 
(reproduction) and that which is rational and progressive (technology). This tension is 
resolved in the dominant discourse through the concept of "giving nature a helping 
hand", but this resolution collapses when treatment fails and nature cannot be helped. 
Furthermore, when treatment fails, in the absence of an apparently "natural" baby to 
counterbalance fears about technological interventions into reproduction, this 
technological intervention remains exposed and suspect. This chapter explores the ways 
in which the participants managed the contradictory discourses of nature and technology 
in their accounts, and highlights the primary orientation of this discursive work towards 
constructing the self as within the natural (and therefore, normal) domain. The 
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implications of these discursive strategies are considered, both in terms of the material-
discursive impacts on the participants themselves, but also in terms of feminist 
theorising, particularly in relation to Donna Haraway's cyborg. 
Chapter 5: Coping with Consumption 
This chapter explores the ways in which those undergoing IVF are defined not only as 
medical patients, but also as consumers, regardless of whether that treatment takes place 
in the public or the private sectors. Consumption is an important focus for this analysis 
because it raises important questions about what is being consumed, and by whom, and 
what the implications of that consumption are when treatment fails. Furthermore, 
consumption is not only profoundly gendered, but it is also productive of new identities. 
In the case of IVF, treatment can be seen as strongly implicated in the creation of the 
identity "infertile", and this chapter aims to explore the identities that are produced by 
treatment failure. Consumption is also strongly associated in popular discourse with an 
individualism which does not sit easily with the normative selflessness of motherhood. 
However, it also offers an intelligible set of discursive resources by means of which the 
engagement with treatment can be normalised and the anxieties of others can be 
assuaged. This chapter aims to explore the ways in which the participants managed and 
negotiated competing discourses of consumption in relation to the engagement with 
IVF. It is argued that the identity of both patient and consumer in the engagement with 
TVF centralise the female partner as an object of public surveillance whilst locating the 
male partner beyond the scrutiny of others. 
Chapter 6: Taking Responsibility 
Following on from the conclusions of the previous chapter, this chapter focuses on the 
distribution of responsibility when treatment fails. It explores the ways in which it is the 
female partner who not only carries the burden of medical intervention throughout the 
treatment process, but she also performs the majority of the "work" of IVF, such as 
shopping for treatment, as the previous chapter discusses, organising appointments and 
arranging the injections. One of the consequences of this is that when treatment fails, it 
is the female partner who emerges as responsible, even where male factor infertility is 
implicated. It is argued that this is consistent with the wider social and cultural context 
within which IVF takes place, where reproduction is conventionally woman's work, and 
the female body has been constructed as inherently liable to failure. The chapter 
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explores the ways in which hegemonic masculinity is implicated in the construction of 
female insufficiency, and explores ways of making sense of the woman-blaming that 
emerges with shocking consistency in the interviews without recourse to a framework 
of female victims and male oppressors. 
Chapter 7: Seeking Resolution 
This chapter focuses specifically on the participants' experiences after stopping 
treatment, and how they are negotiating the transition out of infertility, where infertility 
is defined as the active desire for a child. This transition should not be seen as 
inevitable, and should be conceptualised as a long, non-linear process rather than an 
identifiable moment. In their accounts, the participants drew repeatedly on the desire to 
be perceived by others as fundamentally "normal", in spite of their inability to 
reproduce. This was achieved both by demonstrating that they had "tried everything" to 
become pregnant, but also that they possessed the attributes and characteristics of the 
"good parent", even in the absence of a child. The chapter concludes by looking at the 
ways in which the participants claimed and resisted the childfree life, and some of the 
risks that are incurred in "moving on" from identifying as infertile. The chapter 
concludes by considering the implications of these claims to normality for those 
normative categories themselves. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
This final chapter sets out the key findings of the research, the implications of the 
analysis for IVF policy and the delivery of treatment, and the areas of future research 
that this analysis opens up. 
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Chapter 2: A Feminist Approach to IVF  
This chapter aims to locate this thesis within the bodies of literature upon which it 
draws and to which it hopes to contribute. While it can be argued that feminist 
approaches to the NRTs share a concern with centralising the experiences of women in 
relation to those technologies, this extensive and constantly evolving body of writing is 
marked by its heterogeneity. Therefore, to claim a feminist orientation for this thesis is 
only the first step in setting out the approach which has informed this research and 
analysis. In order to articulate the specificities of this approach further, in this chapter, I 
have set the heterogeneous feminist debates against a backdrop of three areas of 
research where feminist critiques and writing have proliferated: gender, science / 
technology and the body. In exploring the complex ways in which these fields of 
research intersect, it becomes possible to understand IVF not as an isolated, immutable 
artefact which is inherently bad (or good) for women, but as a "cultural formation" 
(Balsamo 1999: 96) which has been developed along a particular, but not inevitable, 
trajectory. Both the technologies and their effects, then, are understood here as a product 
of "the articulation between technologies, cultural narratives, social, economic and 
institutional forces" (ibid.: 162). However, while there is nothing inevitable or 
immutable about the reproductive technologies, the discursive practices and networks of 
power relations through which the technologies are constructed are persistent and 
powerful, constituting significant limitations to the transgressive potential of the 
technologies. In particular, discourses of gender, the natural inevitability of 
reproduction as the only fulfilling life course for women, and of scientific knowledge as 
benign, progressive and capable of understanding and controlling reproduction are 
implicated in the construction and maintenance of the current technological formations 
and practices. 
This is not to suggest that the meaning of WF is produced entirely in the realm of 
discourse to the exclusion of the material body; the body is not treated here as a natural 
"thing" in opposition to cultural signification, or as the blank material upon which 
culture is inscribed. Indeed, the exclusion of the material female body in the dominant 
discourses of IVF can be seen as one of its most pernicious effects. Instead, I wish to 
follow Balsarno in treating the body "as a site of mutually constitutive interaction 
between discourses about the body and the materiality of specific bodies" (emphasis in 
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the original) (Balsam° 1999: 163).That is to say that there is no universal female body, 
only bodies, whose material specificities directly impact upon the body that is produced 
in the interaction with culture (Grosz 1994: 191). It is argued here that the engagement 
with IVF is never without consequence, and that the material-discursive body will 
always be marked by it, even when it fails. The analysis, then, seeks out the processes 
by which those marks are created, sustained and resisted, and the ways they can be seen 
to change (and be changed) over time. 
This chapter will begin by exploring what is meant by a specifically feminist approach 
to the reproductive technologies. The second section will consider the knowledge 
claims of the scientific paradigm, focusing on the scientific construction of the female 
body as inherently unruly, inferior to the male body, and naturally and inevitably 
reproductive. The section will conclude by exploring some of the feminist critiques of 
these dominant discourses and consider some of the ways in which feminists have 
approached issues of reproduction. The third section focuses on the dominant discourses 
of technology and explores some of the feminist responses. The fourth section 
concentrates specifically on feminist approaches to the NRTs, which are discussed 
against the backdrop of the preceding sections. The chapter concludes by outlining the 
key features of the approach taken in this thesis. 
A Feminist Approach  
The reproductive technologies are a site of profound ethical, legal and political debate, 
generating "ubiquitous public fascination and horror" (Farquhar 1996: 14). However, 
one of the most striking features of these debates is the absence of women. In the 
parliamentary debates which established the legislative framework for fertility treatment 
in the UK, it was embryos, eggs and sperm, and not women, that remained the central 
focus35 . In the course of these debates, an alliance of scientists and other interested 
parties, pointedly titled PROGRESS, argued for the long-term benefits that would 
accrue from embryo research in the relief of suffering, both in terms of infertility and in 
the detection and possible future treatment of genetic disorders. This remains the 
strongest argument for the pro-embryo research lobby, and in the recent debates in the 
US over whether or not to permit controversial stem cell research, a parade of public 
35 See, for example, Pfeffer 1993; Franldin 1993; Challoner 1999 for more details of these debates. 
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figures with direct or indirect experience of diseases such as Parkinson's, Alzheimer's 
and spinal injury spoke out in favour of research on this basis. Robert Winston, a 
leading practitioner and spokesman for the reproductive technologies, is not modest in 
his assessment of what this research can offer, suggesting that nothing less than the 
"salvation of the planet" is at stake (Winston 1999: viii). Women, however, are nowhere 
to be seen as actors in these scientific and policy debates. 
With the embryo firmly positioned at centre stage in the debates against a backdrop of 
promised medical-scientific advances in the fight against disease, women are easily 
instrumentalised as foetal containers for the precocious embryo protagonist, or as the 
suppliers of eggs. Indeed, as Sarah Franklin notes, the WF procedure itself is named 
after the one element of the treatment process that takes place outside of the woman's 
body (Franklin 1997: 105). From this perspective, women emerge as both supremely 
present as the objects of treatment, yet absent as active agents in that process. 
Sandelowski argues that infertile women are absent from conventional accounts of IVF 
to the point where their views seem irrelevant to health policy and are therefore "either 
storyless, or more typically, trapped in the wrong story — typified, for example, as 
selfish, desperate, damaged or easily duped" (Sandelowski 1993: 2-3). Writing of the 
use of military language in relation to nuclear weapons, Carol Cohn (1996) describes 
how the reduction of the technology to a series of acronyms that sound cute and 
harmless, and which trip easily off the tongue, make it difficult to keep in mind what the 
actual effects of the bomb potentially are, and Nora Jacobson (2000: 248) observes a 
similar strategy in the marketing of a new cosmetic surgery technique entitled Breast 
Augmentation Mammoplasty By Injection, or BAMBI, where the striking image of the 
harmless baby deer obscures the dangers of the surgery. In the context of IVF, this same 
strategy can be seen in the use of diminutive-sounding acronyms such as ICSI, or the 
altruism implied by GIFT. However, more generally, the delivery of IVF, as described 
in the previous chapter, is awash with acronyms, all of which refer to procedures, with 
no overt recognition of those whose bodies are the objects of these interventions. 
Robert Winston's description of IVF, as referred to in the previous chapter, offers a 
striking example of the ease with which the particular experience of women in the IVF 
process can be disregarded: 
36 
IVF is the process by which egg and sperm are mixed in a small plastic or glass 
container outside the body and then placed in a woman's uterus after fertilisation. 
It usually involves the removal of eggs and the collection of sperm from her 
partner (Winston 1999: 1) 
Most egg collection, and particularly in an NHS context, is performed under sedation 
rather than a general anaesthetic. The eggs are extracted from the follicles (following 
intensive hormonal stimulation by daily injections) by an aspiration needle which, 
guided by vaginal ultrasound, is passed through the top of the vagina — a procedure 
during which Winston confidently asserts that "[there] is seldom any real pain" (my 
emphasis) (Winston 1999: 9). This differs sharply from the descriptions of the 
procedure by women who have experienced treatment, where significant levels of pain 
are reported to have been endured (Franklin 1997: 117) 36 . The casual alignment by 
Winston of the experiences of egg and sperm collection not only belies the asymmetry 
of those experiences, but also actively invalidates the painful experience of the female 
partner. 
Feminist research into the reproductive technologies, then, is characterised by taking 
women as the focus of interest, although this takes many forms, as is described in the 
final section of this chapter. Choosing to focus on women does not imply that male 
experience is of no relevance, and nor does it imply that gendered power relations can 
be read simply as male power over women, since this fails to account for the ways in 
which men are more or less able to benefit from the advantages conferred by hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell 1995). Indeed, while male infertility has received some attention 
(Mason 1993; 'meson & McMurray 1996; Lee 1996; Webb & Daniluk 1999), the male 
experience of fertility treatment, particularly where male factor infertility is not 
implicated, has received very little research attention (although see, for example: 
Meerabeau 1991; Throsby & Gill, in press). Interestingly, then, men too are easily 
rendered invisible in accounts of IVF, although as will be described in Chapter 6, the 
implications of this invisibility are very different for the male partners. Therefore, while 
I would not support an approach which focuses exclusively on women's experiences 
outside of the broader context of gender relations, this research begins from the 
36 See also Chapter 4. 
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understanding that the extensive and intimate intervention into, and surveillance of, the 
female body which IVF involves demands the centralising of women's experiences in 
any analysis of the technology and its effects. 
Gender, Science and the Female Body 
The scientific paradigm has its roots in the Enlightenment — the European intellectual 
movement which reached its zenith in the eighteenth century, and which claimed to 
mark the transition out of the dark age of superstition and ignorance into a new era of 
scientific rationality, reason and social justice (Gamble 2001: 223). Steve Woolgar 
describes the paradigmatic view of science as based on four main assumptions: firstly, 
that human agency is incidental to the world out there and objects in the natural world 
are objective and real; secondly, that scientific knowledge is determined by the actual 
character of the physical world; thirdly, that science is a unitary set of methods and 
procedures about which there is consensus; and fourthly, that science is an activity 
which is individualistic and cognitive (Woolgar 1996: 13). Implicit in this paradigm of 
knowledge as discoverable rather than produced is an understanding of science as 
civilising, progressive and increasingly enlightening. The march of science is 
represented as unstoppable, and those who try and stop it are therefore uncivilised and 
ignorant. 
Feminist approaches towards science began to gather pace with the feminist concern in 
the 1970's with the lack of access for women into the conventionally male professions, 
including science (Wajcman 1991: 1) Efforts initially focused on recovering forgotten 
female scientists through the publication of biographies of women such as Rosalind 
Fratildin and Barbara McClintock — whom Harding describes as the "women worthies" 
who have "made important contributions but who are ignored or devalued in the 
androcentric mainstream" (Harding 1991: 22). Harding also highlights the less visible 
contributions of women to science, in the form of the female-run salons where scientists 
would meet patrons, as providers of the material conditions for scientific achievement in 
the form of domestic labour, and as illustrators, teachers, lab technicians, data analysts 
and computer programmers (Harding 1991: 25-27). This recovery of forgotten women 
has also led to a more general focus on the participation of women, and the structural 
obstacles they face in entering traditionally male professions. The issue here remains 
one of access, and has been seen as remediable through educational opportunities, 
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supported by equal opportunities legislation. Within this discourse, however, science 
itself remains beyond criticism, and the problems are located in women, who essentially 
have to become more like men in order to be accommodated and to be allowed to share 
in the bounties of professional status (Wajcman 1991: 2). 
When science itself became the focus of attention -for feminists, it was "bad science" 
that became the critical target (Wajcman 1991: 3) — that is, that androcentricity emerges 
in the research process when scientists have failed to follow the well-established 
methodological and theoretical principles of their fields (Harding 1992: 59). At one 
level, this "bad science" perspective leaves intact the possibility of better science", or 
"science-as-usual". However, Anne Fausto-Sterling's (1992) description of the rod and 
frame test — a test devised to assess the visual-spatial skills that are conventionally 
associated with men - demonstrates the extent to which the methodological critique 
extends outwards to a more penetrating challenge to science. In the test, subjects have to 
instruct an experimenter to adjust a lighted rod against an illuminated frame until it is 
vertical. However, the experiment fails to take into account the power dynamics of a 
male investigator alone in a dark room with a female subject, or a potential lack of 
assertiveness in female subjects which might make them reluctant to insist on minute 
adjustments. Furthermore, when the test is repeated with a human figure instead of a rod 
and redefined as an empathetic task, gender differences in the results are erased (ibid.: 
32). 
This is not simply a question of methodology. Fausto-Sterling notes that the actual 
differences in skills have proved to be very small, with gender accounting for only 5% 
of the variance (ibid.: 32-33). In addition, the role of learned skill through gendered toys 
and play are ignored in the interpretation of difference data (ibid.: 34), and there is also 
a cultural variation in skill levels that correlates with the degree of freedom allowed to 
girls (ibid.: 35). In spite of these observations, the possibility of social factors 
influencing sex difference is largely ignored. Scientists, argues Tanesini, have "latched 
on to the hypothesis that makes difference 'natural', a fact of life that one must simply 
accept" (Tanesini 1999: 71), and it is from this perspective that the research agenda is 
determined. Therefore, it can be seen that gender bias cannot be confmed to method, but 
extends to the interpretative framework within which the results are understood, and 
also in the selection of the research topic itself— in this case, the pursuit of research 
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which will confirm biological sex difference and a concomitant difference in particular 
skills which have been taken a priori as indicative of superiority. 
In the context of this study, the ways in which science has produced sex difference is 
crucial to understanding the development and practice of the NRTs and their effects. 
The shift towards the scientific paradigm that took place as a result of the 
Enlightenment is marked by the Cartesian dualism of mind and body, where the body is 
something to be rejected as an obstacle to rationality (Shildrick 1997: 16), constructing 
a separation between the rational knower and the unruly, natural known. The binary 
pairs form a predictable pattern of greater and lesser, with each defining the other by 
what it is not: culture / nature; order / disorder; strong / weak; subject / object; man / 
woman. "Woman" is situated in the realm of the natural, or of the body, as an object, 
and in the case of malfunction, to be fixed (ibid.: 15). 
With man positioned within the dualistic oppositions of Enlightenment thought as the 
rational knower, and woman as the known, the establishment of fundamental, biological 
differences in male and female bodies and physical capacities became a central feature 
of the scientific endeavour37 . Pre-Enlightenment, male and female bodies were assumed 
to be essentially the same, with the female body forming an inferior, and in the case of 
the reproductive organs, inverted, version of the male body (Martin 1989; Lacqueur 
1990; Shildrick 1997; Birke 1999). From this perspective, the ovaries are a form of 
testicles, and the vagina was imagined in the shape of a penis, turned inside the body. 
The two sets of organs are conventionally distinguished in illustrations by the presence 
of a fully formed child drawn in a uterus at the top of the penis-like structure (Lacqueur 
1990: 88). 
However, the one-sex model is not one of egalitarian interchangeability, as suggested 
by the description of the female body as the inverse of the male. Galen proposed that 
the male body was marked by an excess of heat, and that the female body was cool and 
moist. This was cited as an explanation for various aspects of (assumed) female 
37 	 . Schiebmger (2000: 26) credits this determined seeking out of difference to the increased need for 
population growth in response to rising mercantile interests, leading to a rise in the ideal of motherhood, 
and a re-evaluation of the female body in an attempt to buttress arguments against female participation in 
public life and to prove women's natural destiny for the private sphere of motherhood. 
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difference: their inability to produce fertile seed of their own; their underdeveloped and 
inverted genitals; and their inferior brains (Shildrick 1997: ch.1). The "hot-blooded 
male" of contemporary culture demonstrates the lingering endurance of this 
construction of sexual difference. It was also widely assumed that women could become 
men, and cases were reported of women coughing and forcing the inverted penis (the 
uterus) out of the body to form a penis (Birke 1999: 36), although men could not 
become women since "nature always tended towards the more perfect" and the male 
excess of heat would not allow the contraction of the organs (Lacqueur 1990: 141-2). 
What the one-sex model shows us, both in illustration and in explanation, is that what is 
represented is independent of the actual structure of organs and what was known about 
how they work: "Ideology, not accuracy of observation, determined how they were seen 
and which differences would matter" (Lacqueur 1990: 88). In her highly entertaining 
collection of tales of the lives of seventeenth century women, Antonia Fraser suggests 
that "the biological role of the female in procreation was only properly understood after 
the invention of the microscope revealed the existence of the female 'egg' as opposed to 
'seed' (my emphasis) (Fraser 1999: 74). However, this is to accept the scientific 
paradigm of knowledge as objective and discoverable (or in this case, already 
discovered). Past knowledges within this discourse are constructed as ignorant myths, 
whereas scientific knowledge has the status of truth. However, contemporary scientific 
"truths" about the body are equally ideological in construction. 
Londa Schiebinger's study of illustrations of the female and male skeletons is 
particularly revealing of the extent to which language and ideology both constrain and 
produce the seeing of differences (Schiebinger 2000). In the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, the one-sex model of the body meant that observation of anatomical sexual 
differences was largely confined to external appearance and the reproductive organs, 
with the skeleton assumed to be interchangeable (ibid.: 28). However, when specifically 
female skeletons began to be drawn as representations of biological difference, 
illustrations showed a small skull, a narrow chest and a large pelvis, based upon 
culturally determined ideal-types. In 1829, the anatomist John Barclay displayed male 
and female skeleton illustrations alongside animal skeletons which were deemed to 
reflect the most distinctive features of the human skeletons (ibid.: 38). The male 
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skeleton was shown alongside that of a stallion38 ; the female next to an ostrich skeleton, 
with its wide hips and tiny skull. Strikingly, the realisation that the female head was 
actually proportionately bigger than the male head relative to body size did not lead to a 
revision of the assessment of the capacities of women. Instead, the female body was re-
interpreted as child-like and primitive, since babies also have disproportionately large 
heads: it was incomplete growth that was now seen as responsible for relative skull size, 
rather than the size and potential power of the brain (ibid.: 42). This "natural" inequality 
and its reconfiguration formed a justificatory basis for the social inequality, and the 
exclusion of women from public life. 
Emily Martin's work on the role of metaphor in the construction of stories of 
conception demonstrates that ideology remains alive and well in scientific explanations 
(Martin 1989; 1990; 1996; 1998). Martin describes the ways in which stereotypically 
gendered characteristics of passivity and activity are ascribed to eggs and sperm in 
accounting for the process of conception (Martin 1996). Sammy Lee provides a perfect 
example of this in his book about male infertility and counselling, where he describes 
the sperm as undergoing an "epic journey" through the female body, with only the 
"crack troops" — "the roughest, toughest sperm" — making it all the way to the waiting 
egg (Lee 1996: 20). Furthermore, in semen analysis, as well as being counted, it is 
subjectively analysed for quality of movement based on "how strongly and purposefully 
the sperm move" (ibid.: 16). 
This discursive construction of ideology as scientific fact is not innocent, and the 
ascription of activity and task-orientation to the sperm has significant consequences in 
the practice of fertility medicine since it defines male fertility entirely by the capacity of 
the sperm to fertilise an egg. Consequently, once an egg is fertilised in vitro, male 
fertility is confirmed and the focus shifts onto the female partner. The "child" has been 
fathered, and it is time for the mothering to begin. This means that it is female, and not 
male, behaviour that is considered responsible for foetal development, ignoring the 
potential negative developmental impacts of male alcohol and drug abuse, or workplace 
exposure to pollutants (Balsamo 1999: 101-2; Daniels 2001). 
38 Ironically, it was the presence of "female" hormones in the urine of a stallion — that most masculine of 
creatures — that led to the revision of the construction of sex hormones as dualistic, with male hormones 
generating male characteristics, and female hormones generating female ones (Oudshoorn 2000: 98). 
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The blaming of women and therefore the need to subject them to surveillance and 
discipline is well established. Grosz observes that in the context of contemporary AIDS 
discourse, it is women and not men who are "urged to function as the guardians of the 
purity of sexual exchange" by insisting on using condoms, not to protect themselves, 
but to stem the spread of the disease (Grosz 1994: 197). Men, here, as in the case of 
foetal protection, are absolved of responsibility which is designated as female. This 
responsibility also extends to reproduction more generally, as is evidenced by the 
absence of men from contraceptive discourse (Oudshoom 2000b: 123). This 
contemporary construction of women as contaminants has its echoes in the Contagious 
Diseases Act of 1864, where women living in or around specific ports or garrisons who 
were suspected of prostitution could be arrested and forcibly examined for signs of 
sexually transmitted disease. If infected, they could be detained for up to three weeks 
and compulsorily treated. The Act was the result of fears that rising rates of infection 
would affect combat efficiency during the Crimean War. Similarly, more than 20,000 
US women were quarantined during the first world war in order to prevent soldiers from 
becoming infected and therefore being "lost to the war effort" (Porter 1999: 421). The 
status of women here as the spreaders of disease and a threat to the national order 
justifies their surveillance and discipline. In the UK, a recent study showed that in 
London in the previous year, there had been 33,000 new cases of chlamydia in women, 
and 24,000 in men, prompting a call for six-monthly screening of all women under the 
age of 25 for the disease 39. The screening for chlamydia will be offered to women 
alongside smear testing°, suggesting that the close surveillance of women's bodies 
continues. 
In seeking out difference, it is the reproductive capacity of women that remains the 
primary site of difference. Linda Birke notes that in medical illustrations of the body, 
the images offer a universalised male body, contrasted against a gravid female body 
(Birke 1999: 67), and diagrams of the female reproductive system routinely exclude the 
clitoris as irrelevant (ibid.: 71). Jack Challoner is particularly reductive, identifying the 
ovaries as "the female sexual organs" (Challoner 1999: 2). Fausto-Sterling (2000) 
39  www.netdoctor.co.uk, 27 July, 2001 
40  www.guardian.co.uk, 27 July, 2001 
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describes the way in which the two sex model is only able to cope with intersexed 
children by defining them as one sex or the other at birth, and then surgically altering 
the body to conform to that assignment. Babies are determined to be male based on 
whether they will be able to urinate standing up, and whether the penis will be big 
enough for heterosexual penetrative sex; however, a baby is designated female based on 
reproductive capacity (ibid.: 57). Furthermore, where babies designated female have a 
large clitoris, this is surgically reduced to meet medically determined cosmetic 
standards, regardless of the resulting loss of sensation. If the baby does not have fully 
functioning organs of either sex, it is more likely to be made into a girl, because of the 
technical difficulties of creating a penis. Fausto-Sterling cites one surgeon who jokes: 
"you can make a hole, but you can't make a pole", confirming the definition of the 
female body as empty and insubstantial (ibid.: 59). This highlights the extent to which 
ideology determines which treatments and technologies are developed, which in turn 
determines which treatments become available to patients. This is important in the 
context of reproductive technology, for example, where technological developments 
have focused on the female body, with scarcely any interventions into the male body for 
either contraceptive (Oudshoorn 2000b) or conceptive purposes (Laborie 2000). 
The definition of women according to their reproductive capacity assumes that women 
want to have children, and that that desire is biological in origin, and therefore, natural 
and inevitable: 
Many people experience an emotional desire to have children, which is deeper 
and more complex than a mere drive for sexual intercourse. This desire is so 
common — across all cultures — that it must be innate (my emphasis) (Challoner 
1999: 8) 
Challoner universalises the desire to reproduce across all cultures with disregard for the 
multiplicity of meanings that reproduction has for different cultures, and for individuals 
within those cultures. Furthermore, by attributing the desire to reproduce to "people", he 
fails to make a distinction between the construction of male and female reproductive 
motivations and the differential attribution of reproductive desire. In the context of 
contemporary western culture, it is women who are attributed with the innate, 
hormonally fuelled drive to reproduce, regulated by the biological clock. 
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The biological clock is constructed as a strictly female phenomenon, since it is women's 
and not men's reproductive capacity that is perceived to be imperilled by the march of 
time. However, the audible ticking which is presumed to correlate with the winding 
down of female fertility is constructed as beginning well over a decade, or even two 
decades, before the menopause. In medical terms, a woman is a "geriatric mother" even 
in her 30's. Furthermore, similar "drives" to reproduce at either end of the "natural" 
reproductive period are discredited as selfish, irresponsible and misguided, with both 
teenage motherhood (Aarvold 1998) and older maternity (Henriksen and Heyman 1998) 
perceived as beset with physical and social risks. Reproductive normality is also 
situated firmly in a heteronormative context and within conventional reproductive 
discourse, the lesbian mother is "a monstrous hybrid creature which threatens the 
ideological basis upon which society is structured" (Sourbut 1996: 228; Allison 1998). 
This is reinforced by the legislative framework for the reproductive technologies, and 
the Warnock Report (Warnock 1984), upon which the UK legislation is based, clearly 
affirms a belief "that it is better for children to be born into a two-parent family with 
both father and mother" (ibid.: 11). When in August 2001, Dr Antinori, an Italian 
fertility specialist announced that he was ready to clone humans by the end of the year, 
he justified his plans on the grounds that it will "give infertile men the chance to be a 
father"41 in order to give legitimacy to the procedure, even though this is precisely the 
procedure that would enable the realisation of gynogenesis, as imagined by Sourbut 
(1996). 
Ironically, the constructed "sacred calling" (Rich 1977: 43) of motherhood is something 
of a poisoned chalice, even for those who fall within the normative standards. The 
pregnant body, whilst represented as the natural state for women, is also an object of 
fear and disgust, as the response to the now infamous picture of a heavily pregnant 
Demi Moore on the cover of Vanity Fair in 1991 demonstrates. Showing her posing 
naked but for some diamond jewellery, the cover provoked raging controversy, and 
generated 95 television items, 64 radio shows, 1,500 newspaper articles and a dozen 
cartoons. Some news stands refused to carry the issue; others wrapped it in brown 
paper, signalling its pornographic status (Stabile 1994: 84). 
41  vvww.netdoctor.co.uk , 8 August, 2001 
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The pregnant body represents the leakiness and uncontrollability of the female body, 
and confusion of bodily boundaries implicit in pregnancy (Shildrick 1997). This 
highlights the fundamental contradiction in the location of the woman primarily in the 
biological, reproductive body which is the object of medical observation and 
intervention and the construction of the female body as uncontainable, leaky and 
beyond control (ibid.: 27) Ann Daily, a doctor herself, reinforces this message in her 
history of surgery on women when she describes gynaecology as "messy and smelly" 
(Daily 1991: 27). Reproduction, then, is both an act of natural order, but also of 
disorder. This fear of the messiness of the female body is clearly demonstrated in 
attitudes to pregnant women in public spaces (Longhurst 2001), menstruation, where 
feminine hygiene products are advertised according to their capacity to be hidden (Laws 
1990: ch.3), or in the discomfort around breast-feeding in public (Carter 1995: ch.4). 
The reproductive body also marks the curious positioning of the corporeality of the 
female body as existing alongside the absence of any real personal presence (Shildrick 
1997: 25). The materiality of the female body is diagrammatically represented in the 
form of disembodied body parts — "organs without bodies", in Rosi Braidotti's terms 
(Braidotti 1994: ch.1) - surrounded by empty spaces, or even constituted of empty 
space, as in the case of diagrammatic representations of the uterus — an empty space, 
waiting for a baby (Birke 1999: 69). Shildrick notes that this lack of bodily substance is 
apparent even in the pre-Enlightenment, one-sex illustrations, where it is the male 
model that is given structure and solidity with musculature and a skeleton, while the 
female body is represented in terms of surface and internal spaces. The body becomes a 
foetal container of highly developed foetuses, distinct from the mother — an image that 
has its echoes in contemporary ultrasound images of the foetus, surrounded by "space 
and silence" (Shildrick 1997: 38-41). These technological images posit an independent 
foetus whose interests are at odds with those of the mother, and who is perpetually 
threatened by her — the assumptions underlying the surveillance and disciplining of 
pregnant women, culminating in the US in foetal protection legislation (Bertin 1995; 
Gallagher 1995) or in legal actions by offspring against their mothers. Lupton reports a 
case in Australia where a woman with severe cerebral palsy successfully sued her 
mother for negligence, claiming that her mother's reckless driving had caused the 
46 
accident which had led to the injuries that were responsible for the cerebral palsy 
(Lupton 1994: 154). 
This assumed incompatibility between mother and foetus was explicitly referred to by 
Siemens when they launched a new, 3-dimensional ultrasound seamier. Although the 
advanced capability of the scanner to detect abnormalities was claimed as its greatest 
benefit, the developers also expressed hope that the machine would help to promote 
closer bonds between parents and their children42 - suggesting an assumption that their 
interests are already opposed and that they therefore need persuading to respond 
positively towards the foetus Ann Saetnan highlights the ways in which this "family-
building" function is built into the delivery of the technology, noting that the male 
partners of the women she interviewed were invited to attend the routine scans, but were 
actively excluded from scans instigated by symptoms suggesting pathology (Saetnan 
2000: 349) . Similarly, Lisa Mitchell observed sonographers in her Canadian study 
animate the foetus for the watching couples by "tickling" its feet on the screen, creating 
a voice for it to address its parents, or waving to it (Mitchell & Georges 2000: 388). 
Reproduction has been an obvious focus of interest for feminists. The feminist approach 
to reproduction which has been most easily absorbed into mainstream discourses to 
reproduction is that of the "right to choose". This liberal approach asserts that the right 
not to be pregnant, or to be able to control when to become pregnant, is essential to the 
achievement of equality in the public sphere. Campaigns focused primarily on access to 
abortion and contraception, with the goal of freeing women from the physical risks of 
closely spaced pregnancies, or of illegal abortions (de Beauvoir 1949: 504-508) and 
enabling women to achieve fulfilment through education and paid employment (Friedan 
1963). Legal access to contraception and abortion enabled women to limit their family 
size, or to create spaces between pregnancies. It also enabled women to live childfree, 
either to pursue a career, or to maximise leisure time as an individual or a couple (Tyler 
May 1995: ch. 6). From this perspective, reproduction constitutes an obstacle to equality 
of opportunity for women — an obstacle which could be transcended through birth 
control. However, there are a number of problems with this position. 
42  www.news.bbc.co.uk , 30 January, 2001 
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Firstly, it argues for a male norm to which women should aspire. This shores up the 
construction of the female body as inevitably devalued in comparison to the male, and 
of maternity as the defining manifestation of that inferiority. Therefore, far from 
disrupting the construction of women as naturally reproductive, the liberal feminist 
position paradoxically shores up this perspective by positing female biology as 
something to be controlled or escaped. And secondly, it posits a unified category of 
"women" which is based upon the experiences of white, middle class women, and 
which fails to account for the differences among women. This universalised category is 
unable to account for the contextual nature of the meanings given to maternity (and non-
maternity), as well as ignoring the wider social constraints which may prevent women 
from entering the public sphere, or which may make maternity a more preferable and 
higher status choice for women. 
Perhaps more fundamentally, this discourse of "choice" fails to take into account the 
social and cultural context within particular choices are made. The largely western "pro-
choice" campaigns for access to abortion or contraception have rarely taken into 
account the need to be able to assert the right not to have an abortion, or to use a 
particular form of contraception. In many developing countries, for example, women 
may find themselves coerced into having an abortion as a result of strict population 
control policies, or because they are carrying a child of the "wrong" sex (Hartmann 
1995: ch.13; Hadley 1997: ch.6). In developed countries, women can encounter 
pressures to abort a foetus which has been identified with a serious disability (Lupton 
1994: 151-2), or coerced into the use of contraceptives which cannot be reversed 
without medical intervention, such as Norplant or sterilisation (Raymond 1993; Tong 
1997: ch.5). Race is highly significant here, and it is black women in developed 
countries who are most likely to be the targets of coercive or punitive interventions into 
reproduction, based on stereotypes of hyper-fertility and dependency on the state. As 
Ceballo (1999) notes, this assumption is also reflected in the difficulties black women 
experiencing infertility have in gaining medical assistance. 
It is important to note, however, that feminist activism in the name of reproductive 
choice has done little to shake the pejorative characterisation in the wider social and 
cultural context of voluntary childlessness in women. Feminist studies of those living 
without children, either voluntarily or involuntarily, reveal that women are constantly 
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required to justify their reproductive choices in the face of derogatory stereotypes of 
selfishness and incompleteness (Faux 1984; Monach 1993; Letherby 1994; More11 
1994; Tyler May 1995; Lisle 1999; More11 2000). The wider non-feminist liberal and 
popular discourses of choice continue to be intractably natalist in orientation (Farquhar 
1996: 94). This can be seen, for example, in the reluctance of doctors to sterilise (white) 
women who have chosen not to have children (Campbell 1999: ch.4), or in the use of 
the term "family planning" to describe contraception. 
While liberal feminists have critiqued reproduction as limiting women's opportunities 
in the public domain, the critique from socialist feminism has focused on the role of 
women's unpaid reproductive work in reproducing and maintaining the means of 
production (Rich 1977: ch.2). From this perspective, the incorporation of women into 
the existing social and economic structure is a misguided enterprise, since it leaves the 
oppressive structures in place. However, Shulamith Firestone (1971) argues that 
socialist revolution is only one element of the wider transition that is necessary for 
women to be freed from the burden of reproduction. Firestone argues that in 
reproduction, "Nature produced the fundamental inequality" (ibid.: 232), creating a 
"slave class that maintained the species in order to free the other half for the business of 
the world" (ibid.). The source of the tyranny, then, is not capitalism, but women's 
biology, the overthrow of which constitutes a substantial threat to the social unit of the 
patriarchal family lying at the heart of the capitalist system. Pregnancy for Firestone is 
"the temporary deformation of the body of the individual for the sake of the species" 
(ibid.: 224), and she argues that technological advance will eliminate the need to work 
(resulting in an end to the division of labour) and will also herald the end of biological 
reproduction. This embracing of technology and the utopian imagining of ectogenetic 
reproduction will be considered later in this chapter. 
However, while Firestone constructs female biology as a natural disadvantage, other 
feminists have embraced reproduction as a source of female empowerment. While the 
liberal perspective aspires to equality with men (according to the male standard), this 
radical perspective emphasises fundamental differences between men and women — 
differences which have their origins in reproduction. Nancy Chodorow (1978), writing 
from a psychoanalytic perspective, argues that women are more caring, nurturing and 
preoccupied with relationships because they are raised by women. She identifies these 
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differences as problematic, and posits greater male involvement with the rearing of 
children as a possible solution. However, Carol Gilligan (1982) argues that the ethics of 
care that are associated with the mother are positive traits to be encouraged. The 
understanding of women as caring because they were mothered, and because they 
mother, has been embraced by eco-feminists (See, for example: Griffin 1984; Ruddick 
1989; Mies & Shiva 1993; Merchant 1995; Warren 1996), who argue that women are 
both closer to nature and naturally peaceful, providing a standard in relation which men 
are deficient precisely because they do not bear or raise children. 
Both the pro- and anti-natalist radical approaches are problematic because of their 
reliance on a universal female nature which exists outside of the social, cultural and 
historical context within which reproduction is experienced. These approaches are 
therefore unable to accommodate differences between women and the inflections of 
other axes of difference on the experience of maternity. Furthermore, neither 
perspective offers a satisfactory resolution to those who do not conform. In the case of 
the anti-natalist perspectives, the only resolution offered to those who have already had 
children, or who continue to desire biological parenthood, is noble suffering or 
collaborative false consciousness. Conversely, advocates of the pro-natalist perspective 
have no means of accounting for either voluntary or involuntary childlessness. Since 
maternity is positively constructed within this discourse as the essence of femininity, 
those who do not reproduce are automatically excluded from the elevated moral status 
which maternity is constructed as bringing. This is important in the context of this 
research because neither position is able to address the complexity of the experience of 
infertility. Furthermore, the association of womanhood with motherhood, and 
particularly with traits such as benevolence and caring, leads to a number of normative 
assumptions about women that are highly pertinent in the engagement with fertility 
treatment. This can be seen, for example, in the pressure on women to donate eggs for 
research, or for other women to use in their own treatment. 
What is missing from the approaches described above is a nuanced perspective which is 
able to accommodate and address the ambivalence and ambiguity that many women 
experience in the context of reproduction and motherhood. Therefore, this thesis looks 
towards those studies which have drawn on women's own accounts of maternity, 
mothering and not being a mother. In particular, this thesis contributes to the extensive 
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and heterogeneous body of feminist writing of experiences of maternity and 
motherhood which fall outside of the conventional representations. These would 
include, for example, studies of those who have chosen to live without children (Morell 
1994; Tyler May 1995; Campbell 1999; Lisle 1999; Morell 2000); involuntary 
childlessness (Stanton & Dunkel-Schetter 1991; Brian 1998; Carter & Carter 1998; 
Tyler May 1998; Inhorn 2000; Ratner 2000; Ulrich & Weatherall 2000); surrogacy 
(Ragone 1998; Roberts 1998; Ragone 1999); adoption (Sandelowski 1993; Modell 
1999; Gailey 2000); fostering (Wozniak 1999); parenting children with disabilities 
(Landsman 1999; Landsman 2000); pregnancy loss (Layne 1999b; Layne 2000); and of 
"bad" mothering (Ladd-Taylor & Umansky 1998). These studies demonstrate the 
complex ways in which the institution of motherhood intersects with the practice and 
experience of motherhood, and the ways in which women manage those interactions in 
making sense of their own experiences. In this way, it is possible to understand 
motherhood (or non-motherhood) as a contextually specific product of both agency and 
constraint. Therefore, in this study, reproduction is understood not as a universally 
positive or negative experience, but as one which is ambivalent and contradictory. 
Gender and Technology 
There are strong cultural associations between gender and technology, with men 
conventionally understood as the creators, maintainers and users of technology. 
Conversely, women are constructed as inept and incompetent as users of technology, 
and as absent from the fields of maintenance and invention. As in most gender 
stereotypes, this does not begin to tell the story about the complex relationship between 
gender and technology, although the existence of the stereotype in itself points to the 
gendered power relations in operation. 
Wajcman highlights the ways in which women's early contributions to technological 
developments were literally written out of history, since patent records tended to record 
the husband's name, or the name of the (typically male) patron (Wajcman 1991: 16). 
The attribution of particular technologies to their individual "fathers" has also facilitated 
the exclusion of a range of actors involved in developing those technologies. Therefore, 
one of the roles of feminist writing on gender and technology, as with feminist critiques 
of science, has been to uncover the gendered histories of particular technologies such as 
the telephone (Frissen 1995), the microwave oven (Cockburn & Ormrod 1993) and 
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reproductive technologies such as the contraceptive pill (Oudshoorn 1994; Marks 2000; 
Marks 2001) in order to highlight the input of women as technicians, consultants, 
research subjects and active users. Narrow definitions of what constitutes technology 
have also been central to the construction the relationship between women and 
technology in dominant representations. Nurses, for example, are engaged in highly 
skilled work involving high technical competence, and yet it is not considered to be a 
technically skilled job; the women who assemble computers and calculators are 
considered "nimble fingered", but not technically skilled (Wajcman 1991: 37). 
Wajcman proposes a threefold understanding of technology: as a set of knowledges; as 
something that people do; and as hardware (Wajcman 1991: 14-15). This moves away 
from the understanding of individual technologies as static "things", independent of 
those who create, maintain and use them. Evelyn Fox Keller defines technology in 
literal terms as "reasoning about the art of doing" (Keller 1992: 24), noting that 
technology predates science and exists in many places without scientific input (ibid.: 
31). This is important in the context of IVF because although scientific input is 
obviously considerable, the naming of rvF after the laboratory procedure obscures the 
work of women located outside of the scientific domain in both the development and 
delivery of the technology. 
In theorising the relationship between gender and technology, the liberal perspective 
begins from the understanding of particular technologies as artefacts. What is at issue, 
then, is not the technologies themselves, but the different ways in which men and 
women are positioned in relation to technology (Gill & Grint 1995: 6). From this 
perspective, technology is potentially progressive when used well. This use / abuse 
models underpins the popular representation of the mad, lone scientist who is not to be 
trusted with the science and technology which he (and it is always he) has at his 
disposal. The archetype is Victor Frankenstein, and his most recent modem equivalent 
in the media is Dr Severino Antinori — the Italian fertility specialist who claims to be 
ready to clone human embryos and implant them. The Guardian newspaper described 
him as a "maverick", dubbing Antinori and his colleague, Panos Mavos, as "Dr Miracle 
and the showman" 43 . In the world of cosmetic surgery, Antinori's counterpart can be 
43 The Guardian, 8 August, 2001 
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found in Dr Joe Rosen, who aims to be able to gait wings and tails onto human bodies 
in the next five years 44 . Within liberal discourse, legislation and codes of conduct secure 
the use and development of technology within socially acceptable boundaries, and it is 
in this spirit that Martine Rothblatt drafts an "International Bill of Genomic Rights", 
arguing that our fate lies "in our collective will to make living a wonderful experience" 
(Rothblatt 1997: 169). 
From a liberal feminist perspective, women are disadvantaged in relation to technology 
because of gender stereotyping which excludes them from conventionally masculine 
areas of study such as mathematics and engineering, as well as the making of policy and 
legislation. One solution, then, is affirmative action and equal opportunities policies to 
enable women to achieve in those high status, influential public arenas. However, this 
perspective fails to account for other power dimensions, and assumes a male normative 
standard to which women should aspire. Furthermore, this approach fails to take a 
critical position towards the construction of the technology itself as neutral and 
unmarked by the wider social and cultural context. Domestic technologies, for example, 
which seemed to offer the promise of freeing women from the burden of domestic 
labour, proved to be deeply encoded with gendered meanings which specified not only 
the user, but also the location of those technologies. Domestic appliances were located 
primarily in the kitchen — the female realm — while communication technologies such as 
televisions and radios were located in family areas (Wajcman 1991: ch. 4). Equally, 
gender considerations can be seen as central in determining which technologies are 
funded and researched, as the focus of reproductive technologies on the female, and not 
the male, body demonstrates. 
In contrast to the liberal approach to technology as a neutral artefact, some radical 
feminists perceive technology as fundamentally and irretrievably patriarchal, and 
therefore, dangerous. Within feminism, this position is represented most clearly by 
ecofeminists, as described in the previous section, who argue that technology is one 
means by which men try to dominate both nature and women in what Mary Daly 
describes as the "phallotechnic society" (Daly 1979: 9). Ecofeminists posit a uniquely 
close relationship between women and nature, and technology is understood as an 
44 www.guardianunlimited.co.uk , 11 March, 2002 
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attempt to master nature (and therefore, women). This has lead to a focus on issues such 
as the military, environmental issues, and the NRTs. 
Carol Stabile (1994) describes this position as "technophobic", although this 
problematically implies an irrational fear — an interpretation which fails to recognise 
their incisive commentary both of the ways in which technology is marked by gender, 
and also of the negative impacts of technologies that are assumed within the dominant 
discourse to be progressive and universally beneficial. However, this critical 
commentary is problematic because of its dependence on essentialised categories of 
men and women which fails to account for the ways in which gender intersects with 
other axes of power and difference in the ways that potentially dangerous technologies 
are developed and used. Furthermore, this perspective fails to account for women as 
active agents in the engagement with the technologies beyond direct resistance to them. 
Technologies are seen as statically and deterministically patriarchal, offering no space 
for resistance and negotiation. Therefore, this perspective, while offering an important 
critique of technology as gendered, tells us little about the specificities of individual 
technologies and the complex actions and interactions through which they are produced 
and experienced. 
An opposing radical perspective can be found in the positive embracing of technology 
as a means of achieving liberation from oppression. From this perspective, even where 
current technological formations may be unsatisfactory, there is still all to play for 
(Ross 1991). One of the early advocates of the revolutionary power of technology was 
Shulamith Firestone (1971), as described in the previous section. For Firestone, "the 
future takeover by machines of increasingly complex functions" — what she described as 
the process of "cybemation" (ibid.: 218) - would transform the relationship between 
work and wages, eventually eliminating the division of labour. Furthermore, biological 
reproduction, she argued, would be replaced by ectogenesis, with the task of 
childrearing shared communally by both men and women. Firestone argues that the core 
problem with technology at present (or at least, at her present in the 1970's), is that 
humanity is at "the transitional stage between simple animal existence and full control 
of nature" (ibid.). The goal, then, is not to redress the "natural" balance, which she 
believes disadvantages women, but to replace it, but Firestone's embracing of 
technology is flawed by her failure to address the means by which these technologies 
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will fall within the control of women, or how their development will come to represent 
the interests of women (assuming the possibility of collective women's interests). 
A more recent advocate for embracing technology as potentially liberating can be found 
in Donna Haraway's cyborg (the cybernetic organism) (Haraway 1991: ch. 8). Haraway 
sees technological advance and the subsequent restructuring of labour processes as "the 
emerging bases for new kinds of unity across race, gender and class" (ibid.: 173). She 
charges writers who celebrate "nature" with insisting "on the organic, opposing it to the 
technological" (ibid.: 174), and instead advocates "embracing the possibilities inherent 
in the breakdown of clean distinctions between organism and machine" (ibid.). 
Cyborgs, then, constitute liminal formations which undermine "the certainty of what 
counts as nature" (ibid.: 152), and which render machines not as threatening external 
threats, but as integral parts of ourselves 45 . For Haraway, technological advance is not 
to be feared, but should be seen as breaking down categories and static identities, 
including those of gender, race and class. Technologies, then, according to Haraway, are 
not deterministic. Instead, she argues that "We can be responsible for machines; they do 
not dominate or threaten us. We are responsible for boundaries; we are they" (ibid.: 
180). 
While Firestone's revolutionary vision had little following among feminists, the cyborg 
has become a dominant image within feminist theory, offering a useful means of , 
deconstructing the gender relations of technology. In particular, it has proved to be a 
useful metaphor for exploring the complex relations between gender and technology in 
the context of reproduction, the body and sexuality (for example: Lyklce 1996; Davis-
Floyd and Dumit 1998; Wolrnark 1999). However, Stabile argues that the cyborg has 
been created "out of circumstances distinctly not of our choosing" (Stabile 1994: 95), 
and therefore looks to the future, but "ignores history" (ibid.: 7). As with Firestone, it is 
unclear precisely how embracing technology will lead to being able to exercise 
responsibility for those technologies / machines. Furthermore, it could be argued that in 
asserting that she "would rather be a cyborg than a goddess" (Haraway 1991: 181), 
Haraway seems to be suggesting a new dichotomy between nature and artefact — a 
division which Lykke rejects in favour of the "monstrous sisterhood" of the two 
45  Even cats can be cyborgs according to Sadie Plant, who notes that her cats have identification 
microchips under their skin (Plant 1998) 
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concepts in the form of "cybergoddesses" (Lyldce 1996: 28). In occupying a "post-
gender world" (Haraway 1991: 150), it is difficult to see how the transition to that world 
can be made, except for the elite with access to and control over technology, and it is 
therefore important to remember the status of the cyborg as being in part a fiction. I will 
return to this issue in Chapter 4, in the analysis of the ways in which the participants 
negotiated discourses of both reproduction and technology. 
What the perspectives reviewed above lack in terms of the approach taken in this study 
towards technology is an understanding of technology having a history, but not being 
determined by that history. That is to say that there is nothing inevitable in the 
developmental trajectory of a particular technology. One of the features of technologies 
is that they evolve along unpredictable paths: radar technology led to the production of 
the microwave oven; the telephone was originally marketed as a business instrument, 
but women cultivated their own social uses for it which in turn impacted upon the 
development of the technology itself and its meanings (Frissen 1995). In the context of 
IVF, ultrasound scanning was a military technology initially, and the hormonal 
treatments for stimulating ovaries were transferred by Alan Trounson from techniques 
used in the breeding of prize sheep (Challoner 1999: 51) 46 . 
Susan Ormrod argues that while predispositions in culture, history or institutions may 
be part of the processes that create particular technologies, "they are never determining 
but only ever relevant in so far as they are actively enrolled as resources which help 
sustain a network" (Ormrod 1995: 45). Therefore, in studying particular technologies, it 
is necessary to look at how relations of power are exercised in order to sustain particular 
networks and formulations at particular points in time, and to attempt to appreciate the 
particular investments that individuals may have in positioning themselves within a 
particular discourse or network (ibid.). Where particular discursive practices are 
dominant and persistent, the possibilities for overt transgression may be ultimately 
constrained. However, that is not to say that there is no resistance, or that particular 
technological formulations are containable, since resistance is understood here in 
Foucauldian terms as constantly present. Instead, this is to argue that some discursive 
practices are so dominant as to appear static and inevitable. It is by looking in detail at 
46 Alan Trounson argued charmlessly that in terms of fertility treatment, "a woman is just an upright 
sheep"!! (Challoner 1999: 51) 
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individual engagements with particular technologies that these strategies of resistance 
and transformations in technologies and their meanings, if only at the micro-level, 
become visible. 
The New Reproductive Technologies  
The final section of this chapter will focus on feminist approaches specifically to the 
reproductive technologies, against the background of feminist work on science, the 
female body, reproduction and technology. 
As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the liberal focus on technology is on the ways 
in which men and women relate to technology, rather than the nature of the technology 
itself. It is in this context that Michelle Stanworth argues that the key issue is not 
whether or not the reproductive technologies constitute a technological invasion of 
women's bodies, but "whether we can create the political and cultural conditions in 
which such technologies can be employed by women to shape the experience of 
reproduction according to their own definitions" (Stanworth 1987: 35). From this 
perspective, it is only in unkind hands that the neutral technology becomes threatening 
to women — a problem that can be resolved by the engagement of women in the 
technological process, and increased access to information and resources. 
Christine Overall describes the liberal position as "complacent" with regards to the 
problems of the reproductive technologies (Overall 1993: 10). This is particularly true 
in the context of choice, since while feminists working from this perspective recognise 
the social factors which shape women's choices, they are less willing to accept the 
technologies themselves as socially shaped (Wajcman 1991: 62). In particular, the 
liberal focus on access to treatment ignores the ways in which the technology itself has 
redefmed infertility, generating an imperative to engage with those technologies as they 
become mainstream (Britt 2001). Prenatal ultrasound scanning is a powerful example of 
this, and it is increasingly constructed as an essential means of securing a healthy 
pregnancy (Lupton 1994: 154). Where scanning is "refused" — a loaded term reflecting 
the extent to which it is now the norm — the woman can then be held responsible for any 
negative outcomes. As with genetic tests such as amniocentesis, where scans detect a 
foetal abnormality, the implication is that the pregnancy will be terminated, with 
obvious eugenic implications concerning the social status of those who are born with 
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disabilities47 . Kathryn Morgan notes the rise of this pressure to achieve perfection 
through technology in cosmetic surgery, arguing: 
[as] surgically transformed women win the Miss America pageants, women who 
refuse to submit to the knives and to the needles, to the anaesthetics and the 
bandages, will come to be seen as deviant in one way or another. Women who 
refuse to use these technologies are already becoming stigmatised as 
"unliberated", "not caring about their appearance" (a sign of disturbed gender 
identity and low self-esteem according to various health care professionals) as 
refusing to be all that they could be" or as "granola heads". (Morgan 1998: 
274) 
This pressure is replicated in IVF, where couples engaging with treatment frequently 
cite the need to have "tried everything possible" before reconciling themselves (and 
others) to not being able to have the desired biological child. Infertility is redefined in 
this context as an illness to be treated, and where contemporary values assert the 
importance of taking individual responsibility for being maximally healthy, IVF 
becomes less a matter of choice than of necessity. Where the desire to have a child is 
constructed as "normal" and essential to feminine identity, then the "refusal" to engage 
with IVF blurs the boundaries between voluntary and involuntary childlessness, leaving 
the woman vulnerable to the suggestion that she was unwilling, and perhaps too selfish, 
to make the necessary sacrifices to be a mother. 
Other factors can constrain the "choice" to have ['IF, such as being unwilling to offend 
or alienate doctors by postponing IVF for fear of endangering the opportunity of further 
treatment — a source of pressure that is also significant in requests to participate in 
research projects in the course of treatments. Pressure is also experienced from partners 
or family members, or even, ironically, the provision of funding (Britt 2001: 90-92). 
Jakov Epstein and Helane Rosenberg, in their study of couple conflicts about fertility 
treatment, report a case where the male partner wants to stop treatment, but the female 
partner wants to continue because "We still have one more IVF attempt that the 
47 It was recently reported in the news that in the UK, a cheaper, but less effective test for Down's 
syndrome was being used. However, a British Medical Journal article had argued for the cost 
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insurance will cover" (Epstein & Rosenberg 1997: 141). Although the UK does not 
have standardised funding and insurers will not cover fertility treatment, one of the 
implications of standardised provision might be that the known availability of a certain 
number of cycles would generate an imperative to pursue treatment that might not 
otherwise have been chosen. Finally, when recognised experts with high media profiles 
present the option of living without children as a tragedy which is "unequalled in any 
sphere of life", and that those living without children are "barred from contributing to 
the continuity of human existence" (Winston 1999: 2), the terms of the choice of 
whether or not to proceed with IVF can hardly be described as neutral. Consequently, 
Stanworth's aspiration that women will be able to shape the experience of reproduction 
according to their own definitions seems naive and utopian. 
Radical feminist critiques of the liberal approach have set out the constraints on 
individual choice in the engagement with NRTs at length. Janice Raymond argues that 
the engagement with the NRTs is not simply a matter of individual choice, since "by 
participating in the exploitation of the self, one contributes to the exploitation of others" 
(Raymond 1993: 105). This is a sentiment supported by Robyn Rowland, who argues 
that those who choose to use the NRTs "should not be supported if they place feminist 
principles and women as a social group at risk of losing control of procreation" 
(Rowland 1992: 299). Both of these statements reflect radical feminist opposition to the 
NRTs on the grounds that they are irretrievably patriarchal and damaging to women. 
The feminist response from this perspective has been vociferous and well-organised, 
and has been represented most vocally by FINRRAGE (Feminist International Network 
of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering), which was formed in 1984 by 
feminist authors, including Gena Corea, Jalna Hamner, Renate D Klein, Maria Mies and 
Robyn Rowland (Wajcman 1991: 58) 48 . The fundamental principles of FINRRAGE are 
set out in the Resolution to the 1985 FINRRAGE conference, which states that "the 
female body, with its unique capacity for creating human life, is being appropriated and 
dissected as raw material for the technological production of human beings. For us 
women, for nature, and for the exploited peoples of the world, this development is a 
declaration of war. Genetic and reproductive engineering is another attempt to end self- 
effectiveness of the more expensive test, since the higher detection rate was presumed to lead to a cost-
saving in caring for babies with Down's (The Guardian, 24 August, 2001). 
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determination over our bodies" (Spallone & Steinberg 1987: 211). The statement goes 
on to call on women "to resist the take-over of our bodies for male use, for profit-
making, population control, medical experimentation and misogynous science" (ibid.), 
urging women to take "all women's healthcare back into the hands of women." (ibid.: 
212). The conclusion is drawn, as in the statements at the opening of this paragraph, that 
all women should not engage with the NRTs because they are damaging not only to 
individual women, but also to women as a class. 
Within this broad characterisation, radical feminist opposition to the NRTs has 
addressed a wide variety of concerns, highlighting related but easily invisible issues not 
only of gender, but also race and class. Gena Corea, for example, has written 
extensively on the link between the NRTs and the farming industry (Corea 1987; Corea 
1989b), arguing in the context of surrogacy arrangements that "a class of breeder 
women" (Corea 1989b: 181) is being established to service white, middle class women. 
She also pursues this identification of race / class / gender divides in her analysis of the 
disproportionate burden of harm borne by women of colour in the testing and 
distribution of Depo Provera — a contraceptive not approved for use in the US — to 
women in developing countries (Corea 1989a). Edited collections written from this 
oppositional perspective routinely include contributions from / about women in 
developing countries and their often coerced engagements with the NRTs (see, for 
example: Corea 1987; Spallone & Steinberg 1987; Hynes 1989). This reflects a refusal 
to allow the conceptive technologies, which are associated in the popular imagination 
with white, middle class women, to be separated out from the contraceptive and ante-
natal technologies which women in developing countries are more likely to encounter. 
Other concerns include: surrogacy (Corea 1988); genetic engineering (Bullard 1987; 
Mies 1987; Rowland 1992: ch.2); legislative frameworks (Spallone 1987; Raymond 
1993: ch.6); experimentation on women (Crowe 1990); commercialisation (Corea 
1987); medical science (Raymond 1993: ch.5); and strategies for resistance (Jansen 
1987). 
In many ways, this radical opposition to the NRTs is very compelling in its determined 
centralising of women in the debates, the uncovering of the gender politics that structure 
48 See, for example: Corea, Klein et al. 1987; Klein 1987; Spallone & Steinberg 1987; Corea 1988; Klein 
1989; Rowland 1992; Raymond 1993 
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the technologies, its intolerance of harm to women and an insistence on the need to 
focus on the causes of infertility. Equally compelling, but ultimately misleading, is the 
certainty of the opposition they express, which is highly seductive in the face of the 
highly troubling nature of NRTs for women. However, this seductive certainty is 
deceptive and ultimately reductive since the refusal to acknowledge that the 
technologies might not be all bad for all women renders those who do seek treatment as 
the delusional dupes of patriarchy and fails to account for the different meanings that 
engagement might hold for individual women. While it may be possible to say that 
every encounter with the reproductive technologies may involve some problematic 
aspects from a feminist point of view, it is also true that those aspects are never all there 
is to the story, and furthermore, that those aspects never impact uniformly on women. 
This failure to account for the complex and contradictory meanings of technological 
interventions in reproduction both for those who do and don't become parents 
represents a significant limitation to this perspective. This is particularly apparent in the 
adoption of an international perspective, which, even while offering an important 
insight into the global reach of particular technologies (and ideologies), relies upon 
assumption of uniformity in the experience of those technologies. However, as Browner 
and Preloran (2000) and Lisa Mitchell and Eugenia Georges (2000) demonstrate in their 
cross-cultural studies of ante-natal ultrasound scanning, the technologies do not 
translate unchanged between contexts. 
A further problem with this perspective, as is evident from the extracts from the 1985 
conference resolution, is the belief in a womanhood which predates patriarchy and 
which exists outside of power relations. This is a position which undermines the 
rigorous critique which is offered by these feminists of the ubiquity of gendered power 
relations in the development of, and engagement with, treatment. Furthermore, in 
positing women's "unique capacity for creating human life" as defining womanhood, 
this perspective has little to offer those who are unable to reproduce, whose needs and 
desires the statement fails to address except for the assertion that they deserve 
"compassionate treatment" (Spallone & Steinberg 1987: 212). 
Jana Sawicki (1991) employs Foucault's concept of biopower as a means of 
understanding the NRTs as something other than a violent exercise of male power over 
women. For Foucault, biopower is reflected in the "numerous and diverse techniques 
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for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations" (Foucault 1978: 
140). Power, in this context, is "everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but 
because it comes from everywhere" (ibid.: 93), and is not exercised as overt violence, 
but emerges through disciplinary practices over individual bodies, and regulatory 
practices over populations (ibid.: 140). It is the former aspect of biopower that is of 
particular interest here, and Sawicki argues that the NRTs should be seen as a series of 
disciplinary techniques which work not through violent imposition, but by "creating 
desires, attaching individuals to specific identities, and establishing norms against 
which individuals and their behaviours and bodies are judged and against which they 
police themselves" (Sawicki 1991: 68). In the engagement with TVF, women's bodies 
become the intense focus of medical surveillance, which is matched by women's 
rigorous policing of their own bodies. However, this watchful docility can also be 
perceived as empowering by those seeking treatment, since it marks the fact that they 
are taking action they perceive as positive and as bringing them closer to the identity of 
biological parent. Women engaging with IVF are never entirely without power, 
although they will always be individually located more or less favourably to it. 
Therefore, while always constrained, the possibility of resistance, if only at the micro-
level, is always present. The premature closure evident in the radical position is unable 
to accommodate the ambiguity of the co-existence of both agency and constraint, and 
therefore remains dependent on an all or nothing understanding of the engagement with 
the NRTs. 
In the context of cosmetic surgery, Kathy Davis argues that undergoing surgery should 
be treated "as a dilemma rather than a form of self-inflicted subordination", since this 
offers a route to understanding "what makes it both desirable and problematic for so 
many women" (Davis 1995: 180). Even though surgeons themselves might be working 
from "an shakeable belief in a Westernised notion of "natural" beauty (Balsamo 1999: 
78), this is not necessarily the way in which surgery is being used by the women who 
undergo it, and Davis reports her respondents as seeking "normal", not beautiful, 
bodies, for example. In the context of PIP, this difference in purpose is also apparent. 
Although both doctors and patients have the shared goal of that treatment will result in a 
live birth, for patients, the achievement will give them the parenthood they desire and 
identify them as "normal", whereas for doctors, this live birth will contribute to their 
statistical success rates, confirming the efficacy of their techniques and contributing to 
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their own professional status and the prestige of the clinic (Modell 1989: 129). Patients 
become expert at making the "right" case to doctors in order to obtain the treatment that 
they desire — a strategy that is apparent in IVF (Cussins 1998), cosmetic surgery (Davis 
1995), gender reassignment (Prosser 1998) and abortion (Hadley 1997), and one which 
reflects the possibility of a disparity between structure and experience. This can be seen 
as a form of "parodic repetition" (Butler 1990) which exposes the constructed nature of 
those standards to which they are performing their conformity. 
In spite of the persistence of the dominant discourses of nature and science which 
continue to structure the dominant representations of the reproductive technologies, the 
"truth" status of those discourses is unsustainable and ultimately uncontainable. Indeed, 
it is precisely this uncontainability that leads to the constant generation of new ethical, 
moral and legal dilemmas in relation to the technologies. In seeking to affirm the 
unified reproductive categories and identities, the reproductive technologies have 
fractured identities that have been constructed as self-evident and unified, and have 
created legally, morally and ethically confounding new identities. 
The Salomone case discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis is one extreme 
example, but IVF routinely fragments the central and unitary concept of motherhood 
into social, gestational and genetic motherhood through the technologies of egg 
donation or embryo transfer, and the status of frozen and stored embryos remains highly 
contentious. The law is called upon to rule upon disputes over the "custody" of embryos 
(Overall 1993: ch.5), the status of "orphaned" embryos (Hartouni 1997: ch.2) and over 
the competing claims of different "mothers" in surrogacy cases (ibid.: ch.4); and the 
advent of pre-implantation genetic screening techniques raises challenging questions 
about the nature of difference and the characteristics which could be justifiably selected 
out49 . 
The uncontainability of the reproductive technologies diffuses the oppressively negative 
power attributed to them by the radical position, facilitating an appreciation of those 
technologies as the product of a range of discursive practices. This deconstruction of 
49 For a more detailed consideration of the ethical, legal and moral dilemmas of the reproductive 
technologies from a feminist perspective, see, for example: Boling 1995; Callahan 1995; Purdy 1996; 
Steinberg 1997; Tong 1997. 
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self-evident "truths" of the reproductive technologies is an essential element to 
understanding the complex ways in which they are discursively and materially 
sustained, both by those developing and providing treatment, and by those undergoing 
that treatment. In the context of this study, I would argue that although less striking 
than, for example, a dispute over whether a gestational, genetic or social mother has the 
superior claim over a child, a focus on the failure of IVF and the decision stop treatment 
is equally disruptive of the dominant representations. In the popular and medical 
discourse, IVF resolves the tension inherent in the bringing together of nature 
(reproduction) and culture (technology) in the concept of "giving nature a helping 
hand", but when IVF fails, this fragile resolution is breached, and the self-evident nature 
of both concepts is challenged. 
Given that one of the effects of the dominant IVF discourses is the erasure, or at least, 
suppression, of treatment failure, even creating the space for that experience to be heard 
has value in disrupting the dominant representations of the technology. Occupying a 
space "in the gaps between the stories" (Balsam° 1999: 114), those for whom treatment 
fails are uniquely and ambivalently positioned in relation to discourses of reproduction 
and technology, and in accounting for the decision to end treatment, those discourses 
are strategically both used and resisted. This offers valuable insights into both the ways 
in which power relations are produced and sustained in the context of the reproductive 
technologies, but also into the ways in which the failed engagement with reproductive 
technology has material consequences for women. 
Conclusion: a feminist approach to IVF 
In this chapter, I have attempted to set this thesis in the context of the key feminist 
debates which form the backdrop to the research presented here. The chapter will 
conclude with a brief exposition of four core features of this approach. 
Firstly, as has already been stated, this research identifies as feminist, in that it takes the 
experience of women as its central (but not exclusive) focus. This is a response to the 
relative invisibility of women in the dominant discourses of IVF. This feminist 
orientation is also based on the long history of injurious, experimental and 
instrumentalist interventions into the female body (Moscucci 1990; Daily 1991), and the 
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thesis is therefore based on the assumption that the NRTs are, at least potentially, 
dangerous for women. This understanding makes it important to understand the power 
dynamics at play in the engagement with IVF and to find ways to assist women in 
managing the competing pressures which the experience of infertility generates. 
The second feature of my approach is that the technologies themselves are not neutral 
artefacts things to be used or abused — and nor is there anything inevitable or 
determined about their developmental trajectories or impacts. However, this is not to 
argue that the meanings of the technologies are free-floating, but rather, that the 
dominant discourses of reproduction and technology constitute a set of resources at any 
given time that are constraining, but always provisional and never absolute. Therefore, 
the trajectories of particular technologies are always uncontainable and unpredictable. 
IVF, then, is understood here as both product of, and productive of, discourse, and its 
meanings are always contextual and never static. This is not, however, to argue that as 
products of discourse, particular technologies are not of material significance. Instead, 
the material and the discursive are understood as mutually imbricated and ultimately 
inseparable. 
The uncontainability of IVF points towards the third feature of the approach outlined 
here — that women are not passive in their encounters with IVF. Instead, women should 
be seen as users whose engagement with IVF is not characterised simply by passive 
compliance, but instead, which should be seen as fundamental to the production of the 
technologies and their meanings (Saetnan, Oudshoom et al. 2000). IVF, then, should be 
seen not as something that is done to women (by men), but as something that they do in 
conjunction with others. This status as users of IVF should not be understood either as 
complicity, naivety or compulsion, as radical feminist opposition might understand it, or 
as unconstrained choice. Instead, it is viewed here as a form of material-discursive 
action which uses all the resources available. This approach makes it possible to explore 
any negative and troubling aspects of TVF without locating women either as masochists 
or dupes. Instead, it facilitates a shift away from woman-blaming or female victimhood 
towards a focus on the power relations within which IVF operates. 
This points to the final key aspect to the feminist approach to ru outlined here — the 
identification of IVF as a form of disciplinary power. By conceptualising IVF as a 
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disciplinary technology, it can be understood not simply as repressing women, but as 
"producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channelling desires, 
generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms 
and techniques for observing, monitoring, and controlling bodily movements, processes 
and capacities" (Sawicki 1991: 83). Where control is understood as exerted through the 
creation of new norms and identities, rather than through violence, it is possible to 
understand those engaging with TVF as active agents rather than collaborators lost in a 
fog of false-consciousness. Furthermore, a focus on the complex and constantly shifting 
discursive mechanisms by which the disciplining of the female body is accomplished 
opens up the possibility (but not inevitability) of strategies of resistance to the more 
pernicious aspects of the engagement with IVF. However, it is important not to 
overstate this transgressive potential, since IVF remains deeply embedded in dominant 
discourses of women as mothers, of IVF as successful, and of science and technology as 
benign and progressive. There are risks attached to transgression of the social norms 
and identities which these discourses produce, and therefore, in seeking transformation, 
it is important not to place the burden of this transformation onto those who are already 
at risk of being identified as "abnormal". 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
In the previous chapter, I outlined a feminist approach to IVF which identified as 
feminist, and which understands the meanings of the technology and the engagement 
with it as under constant negotiation, whilst being deeply embedded in dominant social 
and cultural discourses of gender, technology and the body. This chapter will focus on 
the research project itself, and specifically on the theoretical basis for the research in 
light of the approach outlined in the previous chapter, and the practical implementation 
of this theoretical framework. The chapter will begin by discussing the epistemological 
basis for the research, and will then explore some of the issues which this raises in terms 
of the use of empirical data for the analysis through the work of Donna Haraway, 
Elspeth Probyn and Rosi Braidotti. This will be followed by an outline of some of the 
features of discourse analysis, and will set out why this is an appropriate analytical 
approach for this study. The remainder of the chapter will describe the study itself, and 
will discuss some of the problems encountered. 
"Situated knowledges"  
In epistemological terms, this research is grounded in the "turn to language" that was 
precipitated by the postmodern challenge to epistemology, and post-structuralist 
critiques of realist views of language (Gill 1996: 172-3). While knowledge within the 
dominant, scientific paradigm is viewed as discoverable through the rigorous 
application of the scientific method, and as uncontaminated by subjective influence 
(Alcoff and Potter 1993: 1), postmodern perspectives seek to "distance us from and 
make us sceptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the self, and 
language that are often taken for granted within and serve as legitimation for 
contemporary western culture" (Flax 1990: 41). The postmodern perspective, then, 
broadly speaking, claims that "the very criteria demarcating the true and the false, as 
well as such related distinctions as science and myth or fact and superstition, were 
internal to the traditions of modernity and could not be legitimised outside of those 
traditions" (Nicholson 1990: 4). Knowledge from this perspective is a product of 
discourse (and therefore, power) rather than discovery, and is therefore always 
contingent and partial. 
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The critique of the scientific paradigm that this perspective offers is therefore distinct 
from the empiricist critique, which (as described in the previous chapter) argues that 
biases can be eliminated by strict adherence to the methodological norms of scientific 
inquiry (Harding 1987: 182). From an empiricist perspective, research is flawed by "bad 
science", where "good science" and discoverable truth remains a possible, or at least 
worthy, if elusive, goal. From a feminist perspective, the targeting of "bad science" has 
sought out androcentric and sexist biases, although there remains a constant tension 
between the feminist endorsement of politically informed research whilst adhering to a 
methodology which requires value-neutrality 50 . In the context of this thesis, the 
distinction between research conducted from an empiricist and a postmodern 
perspective is an important one to make. By addressing an issue that has largely been 
ignored, this research could be perceived simply as filling in another piece of the IVF 
picture, and therefore contributing to a clearer understanding of the "reality" of IVF. 
This is particularly true since the research presented here draws on empirical data in the 
form of interviews — an approach which implies a legitimacy to the category of 
experience — and I will address this issue directly later in this section. In contrast to the 
"better science" approach, this research begins from the understanding that the 
invisibility of treatment failure (or indeed, of other IVF stories outside of the dominant 
narratives) is not simply a matter of biased oversight, but is fundamental to the 
construction of IVF itself, based upon the dominant discourses of technology as 
progressive and efficient, and of women's bodies as inevitably reproductive. Therefore, 
from a postmodern perspective, the focus on treatment failure does not add to a more 
complete picture, but disrupts the existing picture — a picture whose meaning is 
predicated on the exclusion of narratives of failure, other than stories of persistence, 
where failure precedes success, or stories of emotional, financial and relationship 
devastation. 
Linda Nicholson proposes that postmodernism should be considered a "natural ally" of 
feminism in the critique it offers of universal knowledge claims, the objectivity of the 
academy, the autonomous self, and the assumed neutrality of agents involved in the 
production of knowledge (Nicholson 1990: 5). However, other feminists have expressed 
concern about postmodernism's utility for feminism, arguing that that it entails a 
5° For a detailed discussion of feminist empiricism, see for example, Harding 1987; Longino 1990; 
Nelson 1993; Tanesini 1999. 
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descent into relativism which negates the agency upon which feminism as an 
emancipatory project is dependent, leading to a "complete debunking of the concepts of 
selfhood, agency and autonomy" (Benhabib 1995: 21). Donna Haraway recognises this 
potential risk, arguing that strong deconstruction constitutes a "kind of epistemological 
electro-shock therapy, which far from ushering us into the high stakes tables of the 
game of contesting public truths, lays us out on the table with self-induced multiple 
personality disorder" (Haraway 1991: 186). For Haraway, an epistemology which 
accepts the possibility of objective, discoverable truths uncontaminated by social or 
cultural bias — "the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere" (ibid.: 189) — stands 
at one pole of what she describes as the "objectivity problem" (ibid.: 186). Relativism — 
"a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally" (ibid.: 191) - sits at 
the opposite pole. For Haraway, both of these positions "deny the stakes in location, 
embodiment and partial perspective; both make it impossible to see" (ibid.). The 
challenge which Haraway identifies, then, is "how to have simultaneously an account 
of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a 
critical practice for recognising our own 'semiotic technologies' for making meanings 
and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a 'real' world [...]" (ibid.: 187). 
In choosing to conduct research which begins from a postmodern perspective but which 
draws upon empirical data, this dilemma is duplicated here. 
The use of accounts of people's experiences of IVF failure was described in the 
previous chapter as offering a particularly productive perspective from which to explore 
IVF and the discourses which it is both produced and maintained by, and productive of. 
However, this is not to adopt a feminist standpoint approach, which conceptualises 
women's experiences as providing "a potential grounding for more complete and less 
distorted knowledge claims than do men's" (Harding 1987: 184-5). This perspective has 
its roots in Marxism and the concept of the proletarian standpoint. For Marx, the social 
positions occupied by different classes give them different perspectives on social reality. 
However, these standpoints differ not only in content, but also in accuracy, with the 
working class perspective — that from below — as less distorted, since their social 
marginality ensures that they have no vested interest in preserving the system by being 
blind to its shortcomings (Tanesini 1999: 139). Therefore, from the perspective of 
feminist standpoint epistemology, female experience, as distinct from that of men, is 
able to produce a version of social reality that is morally and epistemically superior. 
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This approach is problematic, firstly, in that it remains committed to the possibility of 
greater and lesser truths, and secondly, in that it assumes a sufficient degree of shared 
experience to constitute a standpoint. However, focusing on shared experiences 
underestimates the importance of differences, and the difficulties from this perspective 
of elaborating linkages between different oppressed groups constitutes a significant 
limitation (Nicholson 1990: 7). Indeed, in the context of this study, the possibility of an 
understanding of an epistemological position based on shared experiences of 
subordination soon becomes unsustainable as a means of making sense of IVF 
experiences because of the infinite range of differences among those experiences, 
depending on the cause of the inability to conceive, the attribution of male or female 
factors, access to treatment, success or failure, age, race, class etc., or in the case of 
surrogacy arrangements or the use of donated eggs, where more than one woman is 
involved, often in circumstances of dramatically asymmetrical power relations. 
Nevertheless, even though I am not arguing here that the accounts upon which this 
research is based constitute an epistemically privileged window to truth or reality, I do 
wish to make claims for these accounts as offering a particularly productive perspective 
on IVF. In Donna Haraway's terms, these accounts can be described as "situated 
knowledges" (Haraway 1991: ch.9). For Haraway, the situatedness of knowledges (as 
opposed to universal knowledge) becomes clear through the reclamation of vision, 
which for Haraway is not understood as the passive view from nowhere which aims at 
disembodiment, but as an active, engaged and embodied view from somewhere 
particular. These situated knowledges are "partial, locatable, critical knowledges" (ibid.: 
191) which resonate with knowledges from other vantage points in "conversation" 
(ibid.: 195). These "views from somewhere" (ibid.: 196) are always partial and 
contingent, but rather than disabling knowledge (and politics), Haraway argues that this 
prevents the "politics of closure" (ibid.), becoming instead "a process of ongoing critical 
interpretation" (ibid.) between "material-semiotic actors" (ibid.: 200). From this 
perspective, accounts of the "real" have value not as a means of discovering truths, but 
as a means of exploring the power relations which are produced by, and are productive 
of, particular experiences. Situated knowledges, then, do not require validity through 
coherence, and nor do they constitute a celebration of difference / diversity for its own 
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sake. Instead, they constitute an ongoing series of dynamic interactions between 
different locations and the knowledges which they produce. 
The accounts upon which this thesis is based can be usefully understood as situated 
knowledges, in that they constitute "faithful accounts of a 'real' world" (my emphasis) 
(Haraway 1991: 187) as experienced and made sense of from particular locations. The 
term "faithful" is important here, because it establishes an important distinction between 
construction and fabrication. That is to say that just because a particular account cannot 
be said to constitute an unmediated, discovered truth, it still has everything to say about 
the ways in which those giving their accounts experienced (and continue to experience) 
IVF failure, and the material-discursive resources at their disposal in order to make 
sense of those experiences. This process of meaning construction is ongoing and 
dynamic, and the resistance to the closure of meaning embraces unapologetically the 
ambiguous and often simultaneously contradictory ways the failure of treatment is 
experienced. The participants in this study are not required, therefore, to "get their story 
straight" for their accounts to be considered meaningful. On the contrary, it is their 
particular and extraordinary location on the boundaries between the often contradictory 
dominant discourses of gender, science and technology that makes these accounts 
particularly productive perspectives from which to think about IVF. These accounts do 
not, then, form the basis of this study because they offer an innocent and 
epistemologically privileged view from below, but rather, because they constitute 
situated knowledges whose liminal, boundary location produces new ways of seeing 
IVF. 
In asserting the view from somewhere, moreover, the awareness of a particular location 
is not meant to imply that that position is static. The liminal, boundary location is 
produced not by exclusion from particular categories, but by the movement between 
those categories — a movement which generates movement in the categories themselves. 
Elspeth Probyn conceptualises this in terms of "outside belonging" (Probyn 1996), 
arguing that the desire to belong "propels, even as it rearranges, the relations into which 
it intervenes" (ibid.: 13). This is important in the context of this research because it 
facilitates an understanding of those for whom IVF fails and who subsequently stop 
treatment not as passive, tragic victims who are perpetually excluded from belonging, 
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but as actively engaged in the production and (potentially) the transformation of those 
categories of belonging. 
Rosi Braidotti also fmds transformative potential in the "multiple criss-crossing" (ibid.: 
15) between categories, as articulated through the "figuration" of the nomadic subject 
(Braido -tti 1994) - "a political fiction that allows [her] to think through and move across 
established categories and levels of experience: blurring boundaries without burning 
bridges" (ibid.: 4). Braidotti argues that the nomadic consciousness opens up the 
possibility of "new forms of inter-relatedness and collective political projects" (ibid. 5) 
— a project which is articulated in the context of life experiences in order to avoid 
"falling into solipsistic language games" (ibid.: 6). Experience here is embodied, not in 
the biological terms of "women's experience", but as the "overlapping between the 
physical, the symbolic and the sociological" (ibid.: 4). In the context of this study, the 
understanding of experience as mediated by language but also as located in the physical 
/ material is crucial given the extensive interventions into women's bodies that IVF 
entails. 
However, while Braidotti celebrates the transformative potential of the nomad, she also 
acknowledges the limitations of this "political fiction", acknowledging that the location 
at the boundaries is not inevitably transformative: "it is crowded at the margins, and 
nonbelonging can be hell" (ibid.: 20). This a timely warning against the naïve 
celebration of boundary locations, and raises important ethical issues in terms of the 
identification at the theoretical level of potentially transformative spaces in experiential 
accounts of those for whom conformity to, rather than transformation of, categories is a 
primary goal. As such, nomadic consciousness should be understood as a privileged, 
and, perhaps, idealistic, perspective, in that the transgression of conventions that this 
location offers can only be relished when there is security in that boundary location. 
This brings me back to Haraway's concept of situated knowledges, which offers an 
important reminder that the accounts upon which this thesis is based always come from 
somewhere. Therefore, an experiential account as a social text can never be separated 
out from that person's lived (and often physical) experience, and what might offer 
important theoretical or political insights (as I believe the accounts used here do), may 
also represent a deeply personal tragedy, the feminist political theorising of which may 
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be unwelcome. The inclusion of the lived experience of the participants, then, carries 
with it both an ethical and intellectual responsibility to acknowledge the faithfulness of 
the accounts and the participants' personal investment in them in order to retain the 
richness and complexity of the texts and to offer an interpretation which reciprocates 
that faithfulness whilst pursuing inquiry at the theoretical level simultaneously. 
The need to appreciate the richness and complexity of texts makes discourse analysis a 
highly appropriate analytical framework for this research, as the following section 
describes. 
Discourse analysis  
Discourse analysis is a broad church, but it can be described as having the following 
four themes: firstly, it takes discourse itself as its topic, where discourse is used to refer 
to all forms of talk or text; secondly, language is viewed as both constructive and 
constructed, and is manufactured out of pre-existing linguistic resources; thirdly, all 
discourse is understood as social practice — that is, as a practice in its own right, that 
people use to do things; and fourthly, language is organised rhetorically in order to be 
persuasive (Gill 1996: 141-143). Therefore, since language cannot be understood as 
reflecting or describing an external reality, the key question in conducting a discourse 
analysis is not what is being said, but what that discourse is intended to achieve and 
how51 . As an analytical approach, discourse analysis is particularly well suited to this 
research project. 
Firstly, discourse analysis assumes texts to be doing something, and therefore, in 
constructing their accounts, the participants in this study can be seen not as passive 
narrators of a past event whose meanings have already been fixed, but as both 
producing and resisting meanings in an ongoing, iterative process. This offers a means 
of exploring the ways in which the experience of IVF failure changes over time and in 
different situations, rather than attributing a static, and therefore, inescapable meaning 
to that experience. Furthermore, it resists the categorisation of those who have engaged 
with treatment either as victims of patriarchal violence or as unconstrained agents 
exercising free choice. 
51 For a more detailed discussion of discourse analysis, see, for example: Potter & Wetherell 1987; 
Burman & Parker 1993; Gill 1996; Gill 2000; Wood & Kroger 2000) 
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Secondly, discourse analysis is able to accommodate ambiguity and contradiction, 
acknowledging a range of discursive strategies at work simultaneously, although not 
necessarily oriented towards the same task. Indeed, a discourse analyst would become 
suspicious if confronted with a entirely coherent set of accounts. This facilitates an 
analysis that is able to embrace contradictions both between and within accounts, not as 
anomalies, but as fundamental to the rhetorical function of the text, and demonstrative 
of the discursive resources available to the narrator. This offers valuable insight into the 
wider social and cultural context within which particular experiences are given 
meaning, and the power relations in operation in that process of meaning production. As 
described in Chapter 2, those for whom treatment fails occupy an ambiguous location in 
relation to dominant (and often contradictory) discourses of gender, technology and the 
body, meaning that an approach which is able to embrace rather than deride the 
resulting contradictions in the accounts is essential. 
Thirdly, while there is nothing inherently feminist in discourse analysis, it has much to 
offer from a feminist perspective. Discourse analysis offers an opportunity to render 
aspects of women's lives which have been rendered invisible visible, not in the sense of 
providing a truer version, but by laying bare the power relations through which that 
exclusion, and its exclusionary effects, are achieved. This opens up the possibility of 
locating the "gaps between the stories" (Balsamo 1999: 114), which have the potential 
for new connections and political identities, however contingent and provisional. 
Consequently, far from the focus on the accounts as texts constituting a retreat into 
"solipsistic language games" (Braidotti 1994: 6), a discourse analytic approach to 
accounts of IVF failure is able to acknowledge the dilemmas that those engaging with 
treatment face, and to identify what Braidotti describes as "points of exit" (ibid.: 39) 
from those dominant discourses. This may, as Keith Grint and Steve Woolgar suggest, 
not be "the kind of philosophy to start revolutions in pursuit of utopia" (Glint & 
Woolgar 1995: 67), but it does facilitate the asking of new and challenging questions 
about seemingly self-evident truths. In the field of the NRTs, where the dominant 
discursive practices within which the technologies are constructed, legitimised and 
experienced continue to be deeply entrenched to the point of appearing inevitable, this 
kind of thoughtful questioning is imperative. 
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In the first part of this chapter, I have set out the theoretical approach to this research 
project. The following section will describe the project itself, including some of the 
problems that I encountered in implementing this theoretical framework in practice. 
Study Design 
The primary goal in the setting up of this study was to generate a rich body of data 
relating to as broad a range of experiences of IVF failure as possible in a manner that 
was as ethically responsible as possible. At the outset, it was decided that the study 
would take the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, and that where possible, 
both the male and female partners would be interviewed, either together or separately 
according to their preference, in order to facilitate the exploration of the ways in which 
gender was a significant factor in their experiences. Interviews were chosen over the use 
of focus groups, for example, in order to enable me to talk with participants in a 
confidential atmosphere, and to give each participant the space to talk in detail about 
this intensely personal issue. Two interviews were planned for each woman or couple, 
six to eight months apart, both to assess any change in attitude or circumstances during 
the intervening period, but also to explore issues that had arisen out of the first round of 
interviews in more depth, since the exploratory nature of the study meant that it was 
impossible to predict which issues the participants would consider most important. 
It was planned to interview only those whose most recent cycle of treatment had taken 
place at least two years previously in order to explore the participants' reflections on 
that experience over time, rather than at the point of withdrawal. In addition, it was 
assumed, not entirely correctly (see below), that after two years had passed, 
participating in interviews would be less likely to interfere with the long term coping 
process, particularly in terms of disrupting the decision to end treatment. 
In the design stage of the project, it was initially planned to recruit participants from 
both NHS and private sector IVF clinics, but one of the chief difficulties encountered in 
the participant recruitment process was finding any clinic, NHS or private, which was 
willing to allow access to the dormant patient records. In the end, only one — a 
specialised clinic in a large NHS teaching hospital — was willing to support the project 
by providing the necessary access. There are several possible explanations for this. 
Firstly, IVF provision is regulated by strictly enforced legal confidentiality 
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requirements, and therefore, any breach of those requirements by an external researcher 
could leave the clinic exposed to legal sanction; secondly, the study is obviously about 
an aspect of treatment that providers of IVF are not necessarily keen to explore in depth; 
and thirdly, the qualitative methods being used in the research were considered, even by 
the clinic that did agree, to be unscientific and therefore of dubious value. 
The initial expression of interest by the clinic that did respond positively was followed 
up with a meeting with the clinic director, who advised that a research protocol be 
prepared and presented to the clinic staff to gain their approval prior to continuing. 
Once this was done, an application was made to the hospital ethics committee, and after 
their approval had been received, my name was added to the clinic's license. The 
purpose of this was not only to legalise my access to the dormant patient records, but 
also to ensure that, as the clinic director succinctly put it, if I breached confidentiality in 
any way, it was me who would go to prison, not him. It had also been hoped that some 
participants would be recruited through Foresight — a pre-conceptual nutritional 
counselling organisation — and this had already been agreed in principle with the 
organisation. However, as part of my discussions with the clinic, it became necessary to 
exclude Foresight as a possible source of participants, since the clinic director viewed 
the organisation with great cynicism, describing them as "charlatans", and did not wish 
to be involved in a project of which they were a part. 
The process of setting up the study, and particularly in arranging access to the records, 
proved to be a lengthy one, not least because the tentative inquiries to a range of clinics 
had to take place well in advance of the time when the study was ready to proceed, since 
it was necessary to establish early on whether it would even be feasible to access patient 
records at all, or whether alternative methods of recruitment would need to be devised. 
The initial exploratory inquiry to the clinic was made in March 1998, and the 
presentation of the research proposal to the clinic staff was made a year later. The 
application was reviewed by the ethics committee in June 1999, with final approval 
given in September 1999. The interviews began in November 1999 and ended in 
December 2000. 
At the design stage there was concern over whether there would be a sufficient number 
of positive responses, and the clinic staff had expressed reservations about this based on 
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their own experiences of trying to contact people in order to maintain their statistical 
records on IVF outcomes. The study design assumed a need for between 20 —40 
women or couples and any less would require further recruitment from other sources 
such as newspaper or radio advertising. In the unlikely event that there were more than 
40 positive responses, participants would be selected with the intention of including the 
widest possible range of experiences and situations, as well as, where possible, 
including participants from the ethnic minorities in order to reflect the vibrant ethnic 
mix of the hospital's catchment area. However, assuming that there would be no choice 
over who was interviewed, I would have no control over the demography of the sample, 
as proved to be the case. The difficulties of recruiting a participant group that is not 
over-represented by white, middle-class women and couples educated to degree or 
professional level has been well documented in the study of reproductive technology 
(Sandelowski 1993; Daniluk 1996; Franklin 1997), and there was little cause for 
optimism that this study would prove any different. This reflects not only the 
exclusivity of IVF itself, but also the emotional and time demands of articulating those 
experiences in a research context. The hospital is situated in an area where the ethnic 
minorities are well represented, and approximately half of all the IVF cycles performed 
by the clinic are health authority funded, and it was hoped that this might help to 
improve the mix of the participants. However, as is discussed in the next section, this 
was only very partially successful, although this was viewed as regretful rather than 
prohibitive in terms of the feasibility of the study as a whole. 
The staff of the clinic also expressed concern over the emotional consequences for the 
participants of discussing such a potentially distressing topic, and there was doubt over 
whether people would be either willing or able to talk in sufficient depth about IVF 
failure. In response to these concerns, it was agreed with the clinic that all the 
participants would be given the contact details of the independent counsellor (who was 
aware of the study) prior to the first interview, and a warning was included in the 
consent form and the patient information sheet of the possibility that the interviews 
might raise issues that could be upsetting to them. Furthermore, participants were 
assured of their right to not answer particular questions, or to withdraw from the study 
at any time, and these assurances were reiterated at the beginning of the interviews or at 
points during the interviews if participants became upset. In hindsight, it would have 
been better to have obtained the co-operation of a second counsellor with no connection 
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to that clinic, since it became clear as the interviews progressed that returning to the 
clinic for counselling would have brought back too many difficult memories for some of 
the participants. 
The possible reluctance to talk in depth about WF failure was broached primarily in the 
structure of the interview schedule, which began with the more factual elements 
concerning the treatment history. This gave participants an opportunity to speak 
descriptively about what had happened, with the more emotional aspects coming later in 
the interview, when both the researcher and the participants were more familiar with 
each other. It was also assumed that the interview schedule would be treated flexibly by 
the researcher, so that as much as possible, the interview could progress in a 
conversational style that was more informal than rigidly structured around questions and 
answers. The second interview schedule was not designed at the outset of the project, 
but was drawn up based on issues that had become apparent in the first interviews. 
However, this interview schedule replicated this structure of beginning with the more 
descriptive elements such as updating on events since the last meeting, and 
clarifications from the previous interview. 
Implementation  
Recruitment 
Unfortunately, the records at the hospital are not computerised, so possible participants 
had to be identified by sorting manually through dormant patient files, packed in dusty 
boxes into shelving space in every possible corner of the staff offices 52 . It was a stroke 
of luck that I was able to do even this, since the clinic was in the process of transferring 
all the records into remote storage, and recalling each record would have been 
prohibitively expensive. The staff member in charge of the transferral generously 
adjusted the order in which the records were transferred to allow me the time to obtain 
the information that I required. The records were examined for patients whose last cycle 
of IVF had been unsuccessful and had taken place between 1992 and 1997. Some 
patients were excluded from the list of prospective participants even where they met 
those criteria where it was known that they had experienced particular traumas such as 
late miscarriage, relationship breakdown or the death of a partner. Two of the 
52 A system which clashed with the high-tech image of the technology. 
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consultants took the time to review my list of prospective participants in order to check 
that nobody had been included who they knew had had a particularly difficult time, but 
where that was not necessarily on the medical record. This led to the removal of two 
women, both of whose partners had died 53 . In total, 350 letters were sent out on hospital 
headed paper signed by both the clinic director and myself. A Patient Information Sheet 
was also included, along with a reply card where they could indicate yes / no to whether 
they would like to participate. Those who responded positively were then sent two 
questionnaires — one covering basic demographic information, and a second covering 
the treatment history — plus a consent form for each participant. Once these had been 
returned, the interviews were arranged by telephone 54 . 
Initially, there were 36 positive and 32 negative responses, with 45 letters returned to 
sender. Of the negative responses, most simply marked the "no" box on the reply card, 
although several added notes explaining either that they had gone back into treatment, 
or that they did not wish to relive the experience again. There was only one complaint, 
which came from a couple whose IVF four years previously had resulted in a pregnancy 
that had ended in a tragic late miscarriage, of which the clinic was unaware. The male 
partner expressed his anger at being contacted both to myself and to the clinic director. 
Unfortunately, there was little we could do except apologise and guarantee that he 
would not be contacted again, but the incident was a sobering one. 
Of the positive responses, eight subsequently failed to return the questionnaires. In two 
cases, a follow-up letter from me established that their circumstances had changed 
making it difficult to participate, and two others simply felt that they no longer wished 
to continue. No further communication was received from the remaining four, and after 
several months, they were removed from the participant list. The final list of 
participants included 15 women whose partners did not wish to participate, and 13 
couples. 
53 Men diagnosed with cancer can deposit sperm in advance of treatment, which causes sterility, and then 
the couple can undergo IVF at a later date. In both of these cases, this had happened and the male partner 
had subsequently died since the unsuccessful IVF attempt. 
54 These documents are all contained within the appendix. The letters have been printed out onto plain 
paper because the confidentiality requirements prohibit the name of the clinic becoming known. This is to 
protect the anonymity of the patients, rather than the clinic. 
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As had been predicted, in spite of including as many patients from the ethnic minorities 
as possible in the initial list of possible participants, the sample was predominantly 
white, with one participant of Afro-Caribbean origin, and one who was Nigerian. Class 
representation followed a similar pattern, with the majority of the participants being 
middle class and well-educated. Of the 28 women or couples involved in the study, 15 
had children living with them at the time of the first interview. Seven of these were born 
prior to the fmal unsuccessful IVF cycles, conceived through fertility treatment or 
natural conception, either in the current relationship or in previous relationships. One 
child was adopted from China following the end of treatment, and the remainder were 
conceived either spontaneously or following conventional or alternative treatments 
other than IVF. One of these children was the result of a surrogacy arrangement with the 
female participant's sister. Apart from one participant who was separated from her 
husband, and another whose relationship broke down in between the first and second 
interviews, all the participants were in established heterosexual relationships. The 
number of cycles undergone ranged from one to 12, and many of the participants had 
received treatment at a number of different hospitals, both NHS and private. 
Expenditure on treatment ranged from very little up to well over £20,000. 
The Interviews 
With the exception of two of the participants, for whom it was more convenient to be 
interviewed at their offices, all the interviews took place in the participants' homes, 
facilitating an atmosphere which was as relaxed as possible. However, the hospital 
through which the participants were recruited attracts patients from across the region, 
and therefore, getting to the interviews often involved driving considerable distances. 
As a rather timid driver (at least at the outset) with an atrocious sense of direction, this 
was quite a stressful and exhausting aspect of the interview process 55 . However, armed 
with a mobile phone and the maps and instructions which the participants had provided, 
I always managed to arrive safely, if a little ruffled around the edges. 
On arrival I was always treated with unfailing hospitality, and the interviews took place 
either in the living room or around the kitchen table over coffee. Although the 
interviewees were not paid for their participation, a small gift of chocolates was given at 
55  In total, I drove over 3000 miles in the course of the year, by the end of which, if nothing else, my 
sense of regional geography had certainly improved. 
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the beginning of the first interview in recognition of their assistance with the study. 
Unfortunately, one of the consequences of the warning that the interview could be 
upsetting and raise difficult emotional issues was that several of the women were 
extremely nervous and reported having lost sleep in the days prior to the first interview. 
However, when it became clear that the interview was going to take a conversational, 
rather than interrogative, tone, much of this tension was dissipated. This nervousness 
was not apparent for the second interviews. It was also notable that many of the 
participants spoke more frankly and openly in the second interviews, suggesting that 
their responses had been slightly more guarded in our first meeting. 
The tape recorder also had an inhibiting effect on several of the participants, who were 
reticent while being recorded, but voluble once it had been turned off. I never felt that 
this was due to not wanting to speak "on the record", but had much more to do with 
worrying about sounding strange or inarticulate. This concern about appearing 
inarticulate was also reflected in the response of many of the participants to the 
transcripts of their interviews, where they were horrified to see the usual peppering of 
hesitations, false starts, urns and ers of conversation 56  . 
As was mentioned above, the approach to the interview guides was very flexible, and 
themes that were highlighted in the guides were generally pursued in an order dictated 
by the path the conversation was taking. Furthermore, as a qualitative rather than a 
quantitative study, it was not deemed important to replicate the form of questions 
exactly between interviews, and although all the themes were covered to some extent 
for all the interviews, questions were omitted where they were not relevant, or where 
participants were clearly unwilling to pursue that line of inquiry. Although the 
interviews were clearly structured to some degree, with the conversation occasionally 
being looped back to a theme that had not yet been covered, the tone remained primarily 
conversational, full of interjections, reciprocal questions and detours. Furthermore, even 
though sadness was inevitably a feature to a greater or lesser degree in all the 
interviews, they were also punctuated by good humour, knowing irony, jokes and 
laughter. I was also asked questions about my own reproductive history, marital status 
and so on, which I was happy to respond to. I also shared the fact that I suffer from 
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endometriosis with those who also have the disorder. The interviews, then, should be 
seen as dynamic events, full of activity, rather than a simple information gathering 
exercise. 
Where male partners participated in the interviews, the couples were always interviewed 
together. I had originally planned to allow them to choose whether to be interviewed 
together or separately, but it soon became clear that this only added to the initial anxiety 
felt by some of the participants, who felt that separate interviews constituted something 
of a "test" of the veracity of their accounts. In addition, several of the male participants 
found it quite difficult to talk about their experiences, and my feeling is that the 
prospect of a one-to-one interview might have led them to withdraw their participation. 
Finally, since many of the couples lived some distance away, it was logistically simpler 
for me, and far less time-consuming for the couple, if we all met together. 
The Transcripts  
The interviews were transcribed orthographically (Wood and Kroger 2000: 83) — that is, 
using standard spelling, with bracketed descriptions of key non-verbal responses such as 
laughter, crying or pausing to think. This method of transcription was selected primarily 
because of the difficulty of reading phonological transcriptions. The participants were 
all sent copies of their interview transcripts, and their corrections and further comments 
were invited, and therefore, it was important to use the most accessible transcription 
system possible. The intention to make the transcripts as accessible as possible to the 
participants reflects the feminist orientation of the project, which aimed to involve the 
participants to the greatest degree possible, and to provide the maximum opportunities 
for their input. This also provided a means of allowing the participants to withdraw or 
amend particular statements, which I perceived as a fundamental part of my ethical 
responsibility towards them. Even with the orthographic transcription, many of the 
interviewees found the transcripts impenetrable, and found the hesitations and 
repetitions of conversation distracting (and embarrassing). As such, the reviewing of the 
transcripts was perceived by several of the participants as an unwelcome chore, and 
when I realised this, I began returning the transcripts with a note saying that if I didn't 
hear from them with any changes, I would assume that they were happy with it. Some 
56 However, several also noted with relish the embarrassing regularity with which I say, "Right..." during 
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picked through the transcripts rigorously, adding afterthoughts and dates, and making 
small changes, while others chose not to read them. 
Very few of the participants reported showing the transcript to anyone else, including 
the male partners who did not participate, although most reported discussing it with 
their partners. One couple had shown the transcript to friends as a means of 
communicating their experience to them, and another asked for a copy of the tape. The 
interview included a lengthy description of their decision to have a child through 
surrogacy and they wanted to play this to the child when she was older. 
Confidentiality 
Aside from a clear ethical responsibility to respect the confidentiality of the participants, 
there was a strong legal imperative to maintain confidentiality. Shortly after the 
recruitment letters had been sent out, the FIFEA issued a memo about giving outside 
researchers access to patient records. The EIFEA has ruled that simply adding the 
researcher's name to the license is not sufficient, and that the patients must be contacted 
by the clinic in order to obtain their consent. Although the initial letter I sent out was 
from the clinic, co-signed by the clinic director and myself, the fact that I selected out 
the addresses from the records is probably in breach of the new guidelines. 
The confidentiality of the interviews was a point that was often confirmed by the 
participants before saying something particularly critical of one of the clinics they had 
visited, or while confessing to some small dishonesty which had been used in order to 
speed up the process of obtaining treatment 57 . All identifying information, including the 
interview tapes, was kept in a locked cabinet for the duration of the research, and on 
completion of the study, the tapes are to be destroyed. Pseudonyms have been used 
throughout the writing of the thesis and any other papers, and I have aimed to remove 
any other identifying information. On one or two occasions, I have referred to incidents 
without using a name for the participant at all, particularly regarding information which 
was intended to be kept secret from their partners. 
the interviews! 
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The Role of the Researcher 
The possibility of the impartial interviewer as discrete from the interviewees and their 
responses, or of the elimination of power differentials between the two, has been widely 
denounced (Oakley 1981; Maynard and Purvis 1995; Rubin and Rubin 1995; Kvale 
1996; Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1996; Woollet 1996). This study is no exception, and 
some of the ways in which the experience of being interviewed, as well as perceptions 
of the researcher, influenced the responses of the participants were easily apparent. 
Firstly, the association of me with the hospital could be seen to be inhibiting the 
participants' willingness to criticise the hospital, particularly if the possibility of seeking 
further treatment still remained. Furthermore, several of the participants perceived me 
as a potential source of information about new techniques that might be available or 
even, in one case, as a means of acquiring "brownie points" with the hospital which 
might lead to priority access to any new treatments. I corrected these false assumptions 
as soon as I became aware of them. Secondly, in two cases, the participants cited the 
first interview as having given them the motivation to return to treatment (although not 
necessarily to IVF), and in one case this was being done behind the partner's back. This 
was obviously very disturbing to me, and was an outcome that had been identified in the 
project design as highly undesirable. However, closer examination of the interviews 
with these two women suggests that even at the outset of the interviews, they were still 
not resolutely committed to the idea of stopping treatment, even though circumstances 
had prevented them from continuing at the time. Consequently, it was felt that although 
the interview clearly was a catalyst for the decision to return to treatment, it is probably 
a decision that would have been reached in any event. Nevertheless, it was a sobering 
reminder of the potentially disruptive effects that being interviewed can have on the 
interviewee. The third area where the interview became embedded in the narrative itself 
was when the experience of being interviewed was perceived as having facilitated 
greater communication and understanding between the couple. For several of the 
couples, the interview provided an opportunity to explore lingering doubts about their 
partner's feelings about the treatment, and was perceived by them as cathartic. For 
others, the interviews had raised issues which they had not previously considered, but 
57 It was quite common, for example, for women to exaggerate to their GP's how long they had been 
trying to conceive for fear that they would be forced to wait before they could be referred to a consultant. 
Deception about smoking habits was also common 
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which they then discussed together after the interview was over. This was not always a 
positive outcome, however, and in one case, the first interview (with just the female 
partner) led to the raising of several painful issues between the couple, who 
subsequently separated. As in those cases where participants returned to treatment, I 
believe that my role here was as one of any number of possible catalysts, but 
nevertheless, this is a sad outcome which I deeply regret. More positively, several of the 
participants reported themselves to be now considering the use of contraception, and 
others reported having felt more able to talk openly to friends and family about the 
treatment, secure in the knowledge that they could now talk about it without becoming 
very upset. Of course, these are only the most apparent examples, but it can only be 
assumed that more subtle manifestations of the interactive nature of the relationship 
between interviewer and interviewee remain embedded in the talk that was produced. 
The Interview Schedule 
The study set out to answer three key questions, as described in Chapter 1: 
1. What are the factors informing the decision to stop treatment? 
2. How does the experience of IVF failure impact upon perceptions of the technology? 
3. How does the experience of IVF failure impact upon the ways in which involuntary 
childlessness is experienced? 
These key questions suggested a number of themes around which the interviews could 
be loosely structured. These are set out below, with a brief description of the rationale 
behind each theme and some of the key areas of questioning incorporated into it. Copies 
of the interview guides for both interviews can be found in the appendix. 
First Interview 
The first interview was structured largely chronologically to facilitate the telling of the 
participants' stories whilst creating openings for further exploration and discussion 
within that narration. The interview can be divided into four main sections: treatment; 
withdrawal from treatment; after IVF; and future plans. The interview was brought to a 
close with a brief discussion of the participants' motivations for taking part in the study. 
Treatment 
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The process of seeking IVF treatment is frequently lengthy and complicated, and it was 
important for the interviewer to be able to share reference points in the treatment history 
in future sections of the interview. It was also anticipated that further themes would 
emerge from within the narrative which could be explored either during this interview, 
or postponed until the second interview. The largely narrative responses required by the 
questions in this section also created space for both the interviewer and the participants 
to become more familiar with each other and establish a degree of trust before 
approaching the more emotionally challenging aspects of the interview. Questions 
focused on aspects of clinic selection, expectations of WE and the extent to which the 
actual experience matched those expectations, information-seeking behaviour and the 
perceived degree of control over the process. 
Withdrawal From Treatment 
This section covered four main areas: the decision to withdraw; the role of friends and 
relatives; the significance of money; and the role of the clinic. 
The decision to withdraw 
The key focus of this section was the extent to which a definite decision to withdraw is 
perceived as having been made and who took responsibility for making that decision. It 
was anticipated that this area of questioning would create opportunities to explore the 
gender relations between the couple, as well as identifying a range of factors that have a 
bearing on the ending of treatment. Questions covered the establishing of limits prior to 
starting treatment, the making of the decision and the degree to which it was perceived 
as mutual, the retrospective view of that decision, and the extent to which the decision 
could be said to be final. 
The role of friends and relatives 
Friends and relatives are conventionally assumed to be valuable sources of emotional 
support during times of great stress. However, this section was designed to explore the 
degree to which that assumption was true, particularly in the context of the decision to 
end treatment. This also involved a more general discussion on the involvement of 
family and friends before, during and after treatment. Questions explored who was told 
about the treatment and the ways this information was presented or kept secret; the 
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response of family and friends both to starting and stopping treatment; and the 
involvement of people outside the couple in decision-making. 
The significance of money 
Financial limitations are perceived within the dominant representations of IVF as a 
crucial factor in the decision to continue or withdraw from treatment programmes, and 
the questions here explored that assumption. Questions focused on the financial 
sacrifices that had been made to pursue treatment, the significance of financial factors in 
the decision to end treatment, and how that expenditure was perceived in light of the 
fact that the treatment had failed, given the centrality of "getting your money's worth" 
in consumer culture. 
The role of the clinic 
The structural positioning of doctors in relation to patients creates a power difference 
that gives the doctors considerable influence over the decisions that are made by the 
patients. Consequently, it was assumed that doctor-patient interaction would play an 
important role in the decision to end treatment. The questions in this section were 
intended to consider the kinds of advice patients wanted and received from clinics, as 
well as the influence that the level of satisfaction with regards to the delivery of 
treatment had on the final decision to withdraw. Questions also considered the extent to 
which counselling and support groups, both within and external to the clinic, played a 
role in the participant's management of treatment failure and the decision to end 
treatment. 
After IVF 
Given the exclusion of IVF failure from the dominant representations of IVF, very little 
is known about what happens after treatment has failed and the decision has been made 
not to undergo any further treatment. The only images that we are given of those for 
whom treatment has not worked present women, in particular, as defmed by the 
perpetual lack of a child and irretrievably sad and trapped within that definition. This 
section aimed to explore the veracity of that discourse. Questions focused on the 
making of plans for the future; the kinds of support that were drawn on; feelings of 
regret in relation to having engaged with IVF; perceptions of the self as infertile; 
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perceptions of IVF; and responses to high profile media stories about IVF once 
treatment had ended. 
The Future  
IVF is big business, and considerable resources are being invested into research and the 
development of new techniques. This contributes to the discourse of science and 
technology as progressive, and this section was concerned with whether the promise of 
future developments rendered any decision to stop contingent. Questions explored the 
extent to which participants followed new developments, either out of interest or 
searching for new treatments that might help them, and the likelihood of returning to 
treatment if a suitable new treatment did become available. The possibility of returning 
to treatment if financial constraints were removed by increased health authority 
coverage, for example, was also considered. 
Participation in the study 
All the participants were asked their reasons for participating in the study. This was 
primarily with the goal of understanding the ways in which their perceptions of the 
study and their role in it might have a bearing on the responses that they gave. 
Second Interview 
The second interview guide was drawn up when all of the first interviews had been 
completed and the transcripts had been carefully studied. Based on this, the following 
broad areas , including both issues raised in the first interview that needed further 
exploration, and issues which had been unanticipated but which had become apparent in 
the course of the first interviews were identified: update; clarifications; approach to 
infertility; negotiation; confiding; relationships; children; the body; advice to others; 
and being interviewed. 
Update  
The second interviews all began with an opportunity for the participants to fill me in on 
any significant changes that had taken place in their lives, either around the fertility 
issue, or in consolidating their lives without children, or the desired number of children. 
Participants were asked specifically about whether new cycles of treatment had been 
started, planned or considered, and more generally about any changes in circumstances. 
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Clarifications 
This section presented an opportunity for factual details such as the number of cycles or 
where different cycles had taken place to be clarified, since these details often became 
lost in the telling of long, complicated treatment histories. It was also a good 
opportunity to raise the issue of money, which had proved to be a very sensitive subject 
about which many of the participants were very reluctant to speak. The questions here 
were designed to explore the extent to which money and the control of it became 
significant when the male and female partners disagreed about whether or not to pursue 
treatment. Participants were asked whose money had been used to pay for treatment, 
whether household finances were separated, and who was responsible for money within 
the household. 
Approach to Infertility 
Infertility is commonly defined in a static way as the biological inability to conceive 
and carry a baby to term. However, the first interviews had demonstrated that the ways 
in which that experience was perceived at different stages of the process changed. In 
particular, it had been interesting to note the almost universal rejection of the label of 
infertility, even where it was accepted that they would never have a child. Therefore, the 
questions in this section considered changes in their attitudes towards their inability to 
have the family that they had hoped for; contraceptive use as a means of putting an end 
to any uncertainty over future conception; and continuing hopes for spontaneous 
conception. 
Negotiation  
While IVF is assumed within the dominant discourse to be a couple's technology where 
both parties act out of common interest, the first interviews revealed the extent to which 
those interests could differ between the male and female partners, and the complex use 
of negotiating strategies in the decision-making process. Gender relations proved to be 
central to these negotiations, and this section encouraged the participants to consider 
these issues further. Participants were asked to describe how they make decisions as a 
couple, not only in the context of IVF, but also more generally, and they were asked 
who, if anyone, was understood as taking the lead in decision-making. 
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Confiding 
The first interviews had revealed the issue of confiding in friends and family to be a 
very difficult one for the participants to manage, and this section encouraged the 
participants to elaborate on this further. In particular, it was hoped that this would 
illuminate further the extent to which reluctance to tell people was related to feelings of 
shame associated with having IVF, or whether it was more pragmatically motivated, in 
order to retain privacy and to limit social awkwardness when treatment failed. 
Questions included whether confiding is made easier by increased public awareness and 
acceptance of IVF; whether they considered themselves to have made the right 
decisions with regards to telling people about the treatment; whether they were ever 
given any advice in coping with the problems associated with the decision of whether to 
confide or not; disagreement between the couple over who to tell; advice to others; and 
if they had been successful, whether they would have told friends and family that the 
child was conceived through IVF. 
Relationships  
The questions here were aimed specifically at those who either had no children, or who 
had expected to live without children. Many of the women in this situation had spoken 
in the first interview of the social exclusion of living without children when most of 
their friends had children of their own, and this section aimed to establish the extent to 
which living without children had affected the social relationships which they had 
chosen to actively pursue. Questions focused on the ways in which the experience of 
infertility had led to a change in their social circles. 
Children  
This was perhaps one of the most sensitive sections of the interviews, and it explored 
the participants' motivations for wanting to be parents. In particular, it was hoped that 
these questions would explore the extent to which a personal sense of identity was 
invested in the concept of parenthood and the impact of this on coping with 
childlessness, or living without the desired number of children. Participants were asked 
why they wanted children; whether they had ever explicitly considered those 
motivations during or after the IVF process; the importance of social inclusion in the 
decision to have IVF; and the importance of genetic continuity. Questions also explored 
the extent to which, if at all, and at what stage, the prospect of living without children 
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had been seriously considered, and whether there were any significant role models in 
their social, family or working lives of women and couples who had lived without 
children. Concepts of parenthood, particularly for women, were also explored in terms 
of plans to return to work, had the treatment been successful. 
Body 
One of the most significant and shocking outcomes of the first interviews was the extent 
to which women, in particular, took responsibility for the failure of treatment onto 
themselves, even where male factor infertility was confirmed. This section was 
designed to explore the extent to which perceived bodily failure impacted upon the 
relationship between the body and the self. Perceptions of the male body were also 
explored, particularly in the context of the common association between male fertility 
and virility, and the impact that this had had on the attribution of responsibility for 
treatment failure by both male and female partners. Questions encouraged participants 
to consider where they saw the treatment failure as lying; the role of doctors in the 
attribution of responsibility for the failure of treatment, both implicitly and explicitly; 
the perceived effects of that failure on the sense of self; and the gendered impact of 
treatment failure. This section also considered the role of IVF as a means of achieving 
resolution around the issue of infertility by having done everything possible. This was 
frequently referred to by the participants in the first interview, with many stating that 
they did not wish to look back with regret in later life. The final questions in this section 
explored the extent to which this goal was perceived to have been accomplished and the 
role that this discourse played in defending themselves against the negative images of 
those living without children. 
Advice to others 
It soon became clear in the first interviews that the majority of the participants had 
received very little constructive advice from the providers of treatment about dealing 
with IVF failure and the withdrawal from treatment. However, even at that early stage it 
was becoming apparent that strategies such as the setting of tentative limits to treatment, 
provisional planning for a future without biological children, and early consideration of 
the consequences of telling or not telling family and friends about treatment were all 
useful when it came to managing the tragedy of treatment failure. In almost every case, 
these strategies had been developed by the couples themselves, rather than on advice 
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from the clinics The questions in this section aimed to identify strategies for coping 
with IVF and its failure which their own experience had taught them was useful, or not, 
which might be useful to future patients. 
Being interviewed 
One of the primary concerns from the outset of this study was the impact that being 
interviewed on this issue might have on the participants, both in terms of emotional 
well-being and also in terms of future decision-making In addition, it was felt that 
feedback from the participants on the experience of being interviewed would be a useful 
learning experience for me. Questions explored the participants' feelings about the 
interviews and the transcripts; whether the interview or the issues raised in it had been 
discussed between the couple after the interview; whether the possibility of returning to 
treatment had been revisited following the interview; the extent to which the interview 
had been upsetting to the participant; and whether the transcript had been shown to 
partners who had chosen not to participate. 
Analysis  
The analysis of the data began with repeated re-readings of the interview transcripts, 
taking notes of recurrent themes. The data was then organised using NUD*IST, a 
qualitative data analysis software package. All the interview data was transferred to the 
NUD*IST database, and then coded into ten broadly thematic categories according to 
the framework included in the appendix. This initial process facilitated the breaking up 
of the extensive transcripts and laid the foundations for a more iterative analytical 
process by which the relationships between those coding categories became more 
apparent. At this point, the slightly disappointing reality that I have never fully managed 
to make the transition from pen and paper to computer screen became apparent, and I 
found it impossible to think analytically about the transcripts by reading the text, or 
coded sections of text, on screen. So, somewhat embarrassingly 58, I ended up printing 
out the coded content of each of the categories, creating ten large themed books of 
transcript extracts. I then worked through each of these, picking out recurrent themes 
through repeated re-readings, and marking them with coloured highlighters and post-it 
58  Although why I feel I should use the computer (aside from having paid a large sum of money for the 
software) is another issue to think about in terms of the status of technology. 
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notes. A little messy, perhaps, but effective. It was in the course of this process that I 
arrived at the themes which form the basis of the four analytical chapters of this thesis. 
Throughout the analysis and writing-up process, the problem of how to represent the 
participants without giving up my own responsibilities as a researcher to think critically 
about the interview data was a persistent problem59 . If research is to be more than plain 
narrative without analysis, the voice of the researcher will inevitably become dominant, 
not only in the selection of illustrative narrative, but also in its interpretation (Acker, 
Barry et al. 1991: 136). It is therefore possible that the conclusions may not be 
acceptable to individual research participants. This was demonstrated in the work of 
Verta Taylor and Leila Rupp (Taylor & Rupp 1991), who found their respondents 
unwilling to identify as feminists even though this is the identification they wished to 
use to describe them. In the context of this study, I felt (and continue to feel) 
uncomfortable about making interpretations which might appear to be calling into 
question the participants' interpretations of events. One effect of this concern can be 
seen in my relative willingness to assess critically the actions of those men who did not 
take part in the study (based on interviews with their female partners), while I was far 
more ready to seek out alternative explanations for similar actions in male interview 
participants, to whom I felt (and indeed, had) a greater obligation. Aside from 
suggesting a need to be more sensitive to portraits of individuals whose stories I have 
only heard second hand, this also made me appreciate the impulse to censor myself to 
avoid conclusions which particular participants would probably fmd unpalatable. I have 
tried to achieve a balance whereby I demonstrate the process by which my conclusions 
were reached whilst reflecting dissent (or the expectation of it), including textual 
examples where possible. However, this is a difficult balance to strike and one which I 
have only (inevitably?) imperfectly achieved. 
Distributing the Results  
Lorraine Code argues that the feminist researcher is responsible not only for the 
production of knowledge, but also for the whole process, including the distribution of 
those findings, requiring her to consider how that information enters the public arena 
(Code 1993: 30). This should be considered not only from the perspective of the 
59 The problems of representing others in academic and political writing are addressed in Sue Wilkinson 
and Celia Kitzinger's edited collection (1996) . 
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channels which are used to distribute the information, but also the form in which it is 
presented. 
There are four key target audiences for this research: the treatment providers, the 
counsellors, the patients, and the feminist academic community. The preliminary results 
of this study have already been reported to the doctors at the clinic through which the 
participants were recruited, and several recommended changes to the delivery of 
treatment were discussed at this time. These included: proposals to assign a particular 
nurse to each patient in order to offer some continuity of care; changes in the 
geographical layout of the clinic; the reconsideration of the use of "baby pictures" as 
decoration; including stories of "successful failure" in the clinic literature; arranging an 
introduction to the counsellor at the earliest possible stage in the treatment process; and 
changes to the system in place for the provision of sperm samples. This meeting also led 
to the re-drafting of some of the patient literature distributed by the clinic, with 
particular focus on clarifying the role of the counsellor and how to access her services. 
All the participants will receive a short summary of the research findings. Other 
intended distribution channels include the academic journals of fertility counselling 
bodies; infertility support group publications; feminist academic journals; and books 
aimed at academic and popular audiences. 
Conclusion  
This chapter has set out the methodological framework for this research project and the 
ways in which this was implemented. This framework is one which complements the 
approach taken to IVF as described in Chapter 2, and is intended to facilitate a feminist 
politics which aims not at universalising statements about women, or reproductive 
technology, but instead, which seeks out spaces between the dominant discourses, or 
points of exit from them. It is argued that this approach potentially opens up new ways 
of thinking about, or seeing, IVF which extend beyond exclusive and over-arching 
categorisations of benign or malevolent. 
As a piece of research which has its foundations in the postmodern suspicion towards 
truth claims, there is nothing defmitive in the analysis which follows on from the 
methodological position outlined here. Instead, the analysis should be understood as an 
interpretation, and as such, the data presented here remains open to alternative 
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readings. This resistance to closure around meaning, and the refusal of definitive 
knowledge claims is fundamental to the "conversation" which comprises "situated 
knowledges". For reasons of participant confidentiality, it is not possible for others to 
have access to the tapes or transcripts, and I have therefore included substantial excerpts 
from the transcripts in the analytical chapters as a means of maintaining this openness, 
although I am inevitably present in the selection of passages. 
It is to this analysis that I now turn, and which forms the substantive body of the thesis. 
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Part IL Analysis 
As described in the previous chapter, the analysis itself draws heavily on the interview 
data, and focuses on four key themes: the negotiation of discourses of nature and 
technology; the identity of the IVF patient as a consumer; the distribution of 
responsibility for IVF and its failure; and the seeking of resolution when IVF fails and 
treatment ends. These were selected as the broad themes around which the analysis 
would be structured, based on their identification in the accounts as issues of 
importance to the participants themselves, recurring repeatedly across a number of 
topics throughout the interviews. Each of these chapters can be read independently, 
although they are linked by core issues which emerge across these themes, including: 
the misrepresentation of IVF in popular and medical discourse; the ambiguous location 
of the participants between contradictory discourses; the desire for "normality" among 
the participants; and the intractability of reproductive normativity, particularly for 
women. 
The research generated an enormous amount of data, and inevitably, not everything of 
importance could be included in depth. There are a number of issues that are alluded to 
briefly in the thesis, but which are not explored at length. These include: the 
management of risk; the problems of who to confide in about the treatment; 
employment and IVF; secondary infertility and IVF failure; the meanings given to 
statistics by the participants; and "the family". It is planned to develop the analysis 
further by focusing on these issues at a later date. The number of themes that it was 
impossible to include in depth testifies to the amount of work that there is to be done on 
the important issue of IVF failure, and I have made a start on this in the analysis that 
follows. 
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Chapter 4: Negotiating Nature and Technology 
The concept of reproductive technology embodies a tension between that which is 
constructed as supremely natural (reproduction) and that which is rational and 
progressive (technology). As described in the introductory chapter, this tension finds an 
uneasy resolution in the notion of "giving nature a helping hand" for as long as the final 
outcome is a baby. The gametes, the end product and the desire for a child are still 
understood as "natural", and the use of technology to facilitate this outcome is rendered 
invisible once the child is born, since there is nothing to mark an IVF baby out from any 
other60 . However, this resolution is extremely fragile, and unsuccessful 1VF confronts 
the women and couples who make use of it with a general unease about the use of 
technology for reproduction, both in themselves and others. This chapter will consider 
the ways in which the tension between nature and technology is negotiated in the 
participants' accounts, and the implications of this for feminist theorising of the 
relationship between nature and technology. 
Chapter 2 addresses the emergence of the "cyborg" in feminist theory, and its growing 
importance as a means of making sense of the relationship between nature and 
technology, and by extension, gender and technology. Donna Haraway argues that 
modern medicine is "full of cyborgs, of couplings between organism and machine" 
(Haraway 1991: 150) — a coupling that is starkly apparent in the context of reproductive 
technology. As a product of theory, the cyborg is a seductive "feminist figuration" 
(Braidotti 1994: 3) which offers a new way of expressing "feminist forms of knowledge 
that are not caught in a mimetic relationship to dominant scientific discourse" (ibid.:75). 
Like Rosi Braidotti's figuration of the nomad, the cyborg offers a means of "blurring 
boundaries without burning bridges" (ibid.: 4) — a boundary confusion which Haraway 
identifies as a potential source of "pleasure" (Haraway 1991: 150). For Haraway, the 
cyborg is her "blasphemy" — an ironic piece of "serious play" (ibid.: 149). However, its 
status as a "political fiction" allows the concept of the cyborg to transcend social costs 
of blasphemy. The accounts in this study demonstrate the strong awareness among the 
participants of the risks inherent in the claiming of technology as a reproductive 
resource, particularly for those already exposed as "unnatural" by their failure to 
reproduce. Consequently, while the end result may be a blurring of the boundaries, the 
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accounts should be seen as aiming at a clarification of those boundaries, subsuming 
IVF within the natural (and therefore, normal) realm, whilst still retaining the 
oppositional category of technology against which to define the natural domain within 
which the participants wished to locate themselves. This highlights the tension that is 
constantly present in the use of lived experience as a basis from which to draw 
theoretical (and political) insights. 
Chapter 1 described the ways in which, in tandem with representations of NRTs as 
benign and progressive, reproductive technology is strongly associated in social and 
cultural discourse with the commodification of life (Hirsch 1993: 115), and the risk of a 
rogue scientist attempting to create a "master race" (ibid.: 99). These fears find 
expression, for example, in repeated media references to the misnomer, "test-tube 
babies", provocatively suggestive of the dystopian ecto-genetic reproductive production 
lines imagined in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World (1932), or in the agitated 
responses to developments in genetic engineering, or every tabloid's favourite, cloning. 
The film The Boys from Brazil, where an army of Hitler clones is generated with a view 
to achieving world domination, offers a powerful example of this fictional re-enactment 
of the "master race" fears that Hirsch identifies. The atrocities in Nazi Germany in the 
name of eugenics remain a focal point in the concern over the eugenic implications of 
the NRTs61 , alongside contemporary concerns about the pernicious effects of racism or 
discriminatory attitudes towards those with disabilities. 
But as described in Chapter 1, the fertility patient herself, and to a much lesser extent, 
her (conventionally male) partner, is the new villain of the piece. Within the dominant 
discourse, socially sanctioned reproduction is situated firmly in the natural domain, 
although what actually constitutes that domain is heavily contingent, and the boundaries 
are constantly shifting and mediated by age, race and class. In this context, nature is 
conflated with normal, where normality, which is constructed as self-evident, is always 
60  The exception to this would be if there was a large multiple birth, although this is not possible with IVF 
in the UK, where the number of embryos which can be transferred is legally limited to two. 
61  The substantial UK and US role in the development of eugenic ideas remains less well known. Marie 
Stopes, for example, is renowned in the UK for her work in establishing the world's first birth control 
clinic, but it is not so well known that she was a life-long Fellow of the Eugenics Society (now the Galton 
Institute). The continued location in the popular imagination of eugenics in Nazi Germany constitutes an 
act of Othering which sanitises contemporary technologies with potentially eugenic applications in other 
national and temporal contexts. 
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normatively determined62 . The excoriation of women who have engaged with NRTs 
outside the prescribed boundaries is a media commonplace, with post-menopausal 
women who have conceived through IVF making particularly easy targets, since they 
are, by definition, reproducing outside of their naturally reproductive life-span 63 . 
However, the accusation of unnatural reproduction is equally targeted at those 
reproducing outside of a stable, monogamous, heterosexual context, or those who 
undergo contract pregnancies specifically with a view to giving up the baby (Ragone 
1998; Ragone 1999). Consequently, while the NRTs can be seen as a potential site of 
resistance or politically transformative transgression which is able to blur boundaries 
which appear static, they are not always explicitly articulated and intended as such by 
those undergoing treatment. To return to Braidotti's reminder, "nonbelonging can be 
hell" (Braidotti 1994: 20), and not all transgression is transformative; counter-normative 
applications of the technologies can have serious social and material consequences. 
The construction of a distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable IVF based on the 
criteria of what would occur in nature — i.e. that lesbians and post-menopausal women 
would not reproduce, and young, heterosexually partnered women would — does not 
stand up well to scrutiny, since it ignores the problems inherent in determining what 
constitutes the natural. Indeed, many would argue that 1VF is in and of itself going 
against nature64 . This ambiguity means that there is always risk in the engagement with 
IVF of the charge of meddling with nature — a course of action which is assumed a 
priori to be beset with dangers. However, those whose treatment fails are caught in a 
"double bind" (Britt 2001: 11-14), since they are rendered doubly unnatural (and 
therefore, abnormal), firstly for engaging with technology for reproduction, and 
secondly, for being unable to reproduce. Indeed, it can be argued that IVF foregrounds 
that inability to conceive when WF fails. 
This chapter takes the discursive management of this double bind as its subject, and will 
explore the ways in which the participants deployed and resisted a range of often 
62 See, for example, Margrit Shildrick's discussion of definitions of monstrosity in relation to conjoined 
twins and the assumption of the need for surgical separation (Shildrick 2000) 
63 It is important to note, however, that the distinction between a "normal" menopause (and therefore not 
warranting treatment), and an early menopause (warranting treatment) is in itself an arbitrarily drawn 
distinction. Nelly Oudshoom describes a similarly arbitrary process by which 28 days became the 
determined length of the menstrual cycle (Oudshoom 1996). 
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contradictory discourses in order to negotiate the tension between reproduction and 
technology. It will be argued that the primary purpose of this discursive labour on the 
part of the participants is to locate the self as normal, and therefore implicitly within the 
privileged natural domain, but as rational agents within that natural domain. This task of 
locating the self as normal is one which recurs throughout the analysis, and is 
considered more broadly in Chapter 7 as a means of pulling together many of the 
threads that have emerged in the course of the analysis. However, this chapter will focus 
specifically on the (normative) association of the natural with the normal, in opposition 
to the technological. The analysis which follows focuses on five key strategies: (1) 
drawing on the high status of science and technology in western society; (2) the 
demystification and naturalisation of treatment; (3) the defmition of treatment in terms 
of medical necessity; (4) the claiming of the natural female body; and (5) the 
construction of the self as rational and moderate. These discourses should not be viewed 
as mutually exclusive and are used in combination within accounts, often with apparent 
contradiction, in order to achieve specific strategic ends. This chapter will consider 
these strategies in terms of their implications for the participants, and also in terms of 
feminist theorising of the relationship between nature and technology. 
The High Status of Science and Technology 
One of the most striking features of the accounts in this study was the reluctance of the 
participants to acknowledge the technological aspects of IVF. Instead, the technological 
aspects of the treatment were either played down, ignored, or subsumed within the 
natural domain. The possible reasons for this will be discussed later in this chapter. 
However, the exception to this is the strategic claiming of the technology as a means of 
establishing the mainstream status of IVF within a tradition of benign scientific 
progress, thereby diffusing the tension around the use of technology for reproduction. 
This is a strategy that conforms most closely to the ways in which IVF is represented by 
providers, and, unusually in these accounts, depends on laying claim to the highest 
technology possible. Largely as a consequence of western political and economic power 
and its overlap with the discursive strategies of scientific investigation, western 
medicine — and high technology medicine in particular — has become "uniquely 
64  See, for example, the parliamentary debates on the HFEA (Franklin 1993; Challoner 1999), or the 
broader bioethical debates (Purdy 1996; Tong 1997). 
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powerful" (Porter 1999: 6), leading to the assumption that the high technology medical 
response is the last word in treatment — if that won't do it, nothing will: 
Melissa: I mean, personally, I felt that going to [hospital], having the IVF 
and the ICSI, we had actually done the best we could by. 
The hospital where Melissa had her treatment is a major teaching hospital with an 
excellent reputation for its research. Furthermore, the consultant who heads the unit is a 
recognised expert in his field, with a high media profile, often appearing on television 
and radio debates. At the time she underwent ICSI, it was a very new procedure, and 
certainly the most sophisticated treatment on the market at that time, meaning that, for 
her, the treatment was as complete as it could possibly have been. The state of the art 
reputation of IVF, therefore, serves as a useful, demonstrative shorthand for having 
tried everything65 . 
However, while this strategy of reifying the technology may be effective in deflecting 
criticism in the short term, it is not without consequences, including: (1) confounding 
the decision to stop treatment by the future promise of success; (2) generating misplaced 
linear expectations of the scientific process; (3) focusing on high-tech treatment over 
low-tech prevention; and (4) placing the doctors in a win-win situation which absolves 
them of the responsibility for treatment failure. 
The future promise of IVF 
The assumption of medical technology as constantly progressing generates the promise 
of more effective treatment in the future, making it impossible to find an ending to 
treatment: 
Alice: [...] I'm probably 10 years behind everything, because these things are 
cropping up just as I'm reaching the too-old stage for it all, and in 10 years time, 
it will probably be so run-of-the-mill that it will be happening all over the place, 
and I'll be looking back thinking, "Why am I just 10 years too old for 
65• 
„Doing everything possible" is considered in detail in Chapter 7. 
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everything?" But erm ...I feel like I'm trying to sort of catch the tail of kite, you 
know, and it's always just fluttering out of reach. But I might grab it, you know. 
Liz: I think, in a way, you might kick yourself in 10 years' time when they find out, 
"Gosh, you could have just taken a vitamin B6 while you were there. It would 
have made all the difference." You know, like they found out about spina bifida 
and folic acid. A simple little thing like that. 
At 47, Alice was the oldest of the participants still to be considering treatment, but she 
remained tantalised by the prospect of having that one last opportunity, and was 
searching with increasing urgency for a procedure that would enable her to receive 
treatment using her own eggs, since her husband was very resistant to the idea of donor 
eggs. At the time of our second interview, she was considering travelling to Italy to 
undergo a controversial experimental treatment that involved removing the genetic 
material from one of her own eggs, and injecting it into a donor egg that had already had 
its genetic material removed. Any child that resulted would still be genetically hers, 
although with the greater survival chances, in theory, of the egg of a younger woman. 
As her age advanced, bringing a decline in fertility that compounded her other fertility 
problems, Alice turned to increasingly high technology procedures in the hope of 
successful treatment, and was frustrated by the tantalising idea that in just a matter of 
years, all these treatments that she was chasing would be routinely accessible. For Liz, 
however, the imagined future resolution was surprisingly low-tech, with fertility 
problems resolved by Vitamin B6 - a simple dietary supplement. This was a common 
vision among the participants, many of whom felt they were so close to pregnancy, with 
only one small, apparently insignificant obstacle standing between them and success. 
This provides an equally strong incentive to continue with treatment, inspired by the 
belief that one tiny tweak of the treatment protocol could tip the balance in their favour. 
Science as linear 
However, the pressure to continue with treatment does not only come from the promise 
of future technologies, since IVF brings with it the conviction that each cycle of 
treatment will add to the doctors' understanding of the particular circumstances of their 
inability to conceive, leading to a gradual refinement of treatment protocols within the 
existing technology: 
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Lisa: You [husband] were great... because he was very realistic. Every time... after 
every cycle, when something had gone wrong, and I was distraught, Simon would 
say, "This is great, because we're getting closer each time to finding out what the 
problem is. And here we are...we should look upon this as a positive thing." 
Simon: Business teaches you that 99% of solving a problem is recognising what 
the problem is. So all the time, we were trying to uncover what the problem was. 
Simon takes a "common-sense" approach to resolving their fertility problem, isolating 
out the problem, strategy and outcome, mirroring the scientific approach which 
identifies the natural body as ultimately knowable. However, this linear perception of 
the treatment process does not reflect the reality of IVF, which the interviews 
demonstrated as producing dramatically varying results between cycles: 
Susan: [...] At what point do you call a stop? And especially as it's not like an 
exam, is it, where you think, "Well, I've got 50% this time, therefore next time I'll 
get 100" You know, I had no... If it was going to happen, it could have happened 
at any one. And I thought, well, the first one... and also, we reacted differently 
three diffirent times, didn't we. 
While the scientific and technological context of treatment seems to suggest incremental 
progress, driving IVF patients towards further treatment, the reality of the experience 
proves otherwise, although it may take several cycles before a couple fully 
comprehends the random nature of IVF success or failure. For a very small number of 
the female participants, this realisation that fertility was not within the remit of 
individual agency came as something of a relief: 
Melissa: Jam used to the idea. Erm ...you know, we've lived with it for quite some 
time now. I'm fairly comfortable. But there is still that ...it's something I 
personally cannot do. Anything else, you'djust go out, get some training. You 
know, you want to learn a language, you'd go and do it. There's absolutely 
nothing that we can do. 
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Liz: I think [I felt] frustration because it wasn't ...it wasn't something that could 
be put right in a way of erm... maybe I've gone to do something and I've made a 
complete hash of it, so I will come back and there is no way that I would make 
that mistake again. I will find out where I went wrong and I will rectify that and 
the next time that I do that, that will be perfect. Erm ...so I think not having that 
ability to correct that failure, and that sense offrustration of: „you have to accept, 
erm ... that you failed and you.. .1 won't get any better. You won't be able to put it 
right. 
Both Liz and Melissa were accustomed to setting and achieving personal goals. 
Consequently, the realisation that nothing more could be done, and that the equation of 
"effort = outcome" did not apply, was significant in their decision to move on from 
treatment. Both eventually returned to education, in Liz's case to obtain a professional 
qualification, and in Melissa's case to pursue her interest in horticulture. However, it is 
important not to overstate this sense of relief, and they are unusual among the 
participants in this, with the majority of the female participants experiencing profound 
feelings of guilt and responsibility with regards to treatment failure66 . Furthermore, Liz 
and Melissa both had access to considerable financial and educational resources that 
facilitated this process of establishing new and achievable goals — resources which not 
all the participants had available to them. 
High-tech cures over low-tech prevention 
Another problem associated with the focus upon high technology is that it directs 
research interest and money away from the development of treatments which address 
the causes of infertility, including, for example, the early identification of endometriosis 
and pelvic infections, which can cause permanent tubal damage. In fact, several of the 
participants in this study were seeking treatment to circumvent scarring caused by 
infections resulting from the use of RTD's, or from undiagnosed and untreated 
endometriosis or infections. One of the patients even lost an ovary in the course of IVF 
treatment following an infection Similarly, relatively little research is conducted into 
the influence of environmental and lifestyle factors, such as pollution, smoking, poverty 
or inadequate nutrition (Farquhar 1996: 42). 
66 This is explored in Chapter 6. 
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From the perspective of the practitioner, the lower the technology involved, the less 
specialised the practitioner needs to be, meaning that professional status depends on 
complex high technologies, which are inherently more glamorous and heroic than 
preventative sexual health education, for example. Pfeffer notes that when general 
practitioners in the 1970's were asked to distribute contraception, they were resistant 
"...on the grounds that such as activity reduced their professional status to that of a 
barber or retailer of rubber goods" (Pfeffer 1993: 154). While IVF practitioners 
undoubtedly share the goal of their patients of a successful pregnancy, what is an end in 
itself for the infertile couple is also a means to an end for the practitioner in terms of 
economic success and professional status, leading inevitably to an emphasis on 
specialist technology which will always be exclusive of the majority of people who 
might identify themselves as candidates for treatment. It is also clear that the technology 
is developing beyond the treatment of infertility, particularly with the advent of POD, 
and advances in genetic medicine that appear to offer future treatments for a range of 
serious illnesses. 
Win-win for the doctors  
The high status afforded to the NRTs relative to less glamorous methods, places 
practitioners in a win-win situation, where they cannot be held responsible for the 
failure of treatment (leaving the women to shoulder the blame), but can claim 
responsibility for its success. The constructed infallibility of science, coupled with the 
obvious fact that with over 50,000 IVF babies now having been born in the UK alone, 
the treatment is successful sometimes, the responsibility for the failure falls, even if 
only implicitly, onto the woman receiving treatment67 . However, when the treatment is 
successful, it is a different story: 
The birth [of Louise Brown] was announced at a press conference held at 
Prestwich Hospital, and Edwards and Steptoe gave interviews to television 
crews. Steptoe later recalled, in his own account of the birth: "It was Bob's 
[Edwards] brain, skill and perseverance and Jean's [Purdy (assistant to 
67 As described in Chapter 6. 
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Edwards)] hardworking devotion which led to this wonderful moment of 
achievement (Challoner 1999: 46) 
The contribution of Mrs and Mr Brown, as well as that of all the couples preceding 
them without whom the procedures could not have been developed, remains unnoticed 
in the excitement. Similarly, while the responsibility for treatment failure is carried 
predominantly by the female patients, it is the clinics, and not the patients, whose 
successes are recorded. Nelly Oudshoorn records how "women" were written out of the 
reporting of early clinical trials of the contraceptive pill, in favour of the universal 
"cycle" (Oudshoorn 1996). This is replicated in the standardised statistical success rates, 
which measure the live birth rates per cycle of treatment started. 
However, although many of the interviewees use the discourse of the certainties of 
science and technology extensively in their accounts, it is also clear that this discourse is 
being used selectively and with cynicism68 : 
Rachel: I still find it quite strange that in this day and age, and all the things 
that we can do and all the sort of technological advances in other areas, 
there still is this black hole over infertility [...] There's been sort of 
amazing, some amazing advances in the field, but even now, you know, 
doctors, specialists and that, they're still saying, "We just don't know." And 
even some of the treatments that are around, some of the things that they 
can do, they still don't seem to know quite how it works or why it works. 
And sometimes it does. And I just...frustration, I think. I just think 
sometimes that's really frustrating, that you know, you can do all these 
other marvellous things, but really we still don't know why there 's 
infertility, and why there's so much of it about. 
While IVF was used by many of the interviewees, including Rachel, as offering the 
final word on their reproductive capacity, a certain realism remains about the limited 
capacity of technology and modern medicine to fully comprehend the mysteries of 
human reproduction. This echoes a more general cynicism in UK health discourse of 
68 Hindsight is very important in this scepticism. Many of the interviewees reported that the experience of 
failed treatment led to the adjustment of their expectations of science and technology. 
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scientific assurances of safety, as in the uncertainty concerning the relationship between 
BSE, vCJD and meat consumption, or the ongoing concerns about the safety of the 
triple MMR vaccine and its possible relationship to the onset of autism. Margaret 
Sandelowski highlights the fact that a third of all infertile couples never have any 
explanation for their infertility, and treatment protocols that have repeatedly failed may 
suddenly, and unexpectedly, succeed without explanation (Sandelowski 1993: 15). For 
some, as discussed in the following section, this limited knowledge served to confirm 
the predominance of nature in the reproductive endeavour and was therefore 
discursively useful once treatment had ended. However, for others, this represented a 
gender bias in research initiatives. As Mary succinctly put it, "I think if it affected 
men's penises, I think we would have spent millions on it by now." 69 It will be 
interesting to see whether this scepticism becomes increasingly widespread in response 
to the growing consumer activism in relation to health following the Bristol heart 
surgery scandal, where high death rates for heart surgeries on babies went apparently 
unnoticed, or the scandal at Alder Hey Hospital, where babies' organs were retained for 
research without parental consent. 
The normalisation of reproductive technology 
For those for whom IVF does produce a child, the presence of a visibly unmonstrous 
child, posing no obvious threat to anybody, counters many of the widely held concerns 
about reproductive technology and its possible consequences. However, the 
normalisation of the technology and those engaging with it that is effectively performed 
by the presence of the baby when treatment is successful has to be performed more 
explicitly and discursively by those for whom treatment doesn't work: 
Tim: It seemed quite a simple technology really, to us. It didn't seem 
particularly.., they made it seem quite straightforward. They just 
collect... they give you some drugs to make you produce eggs, then they 
collected them, then they fertilise them, put them back. I mean, that's 
simplistic, but that's what they were doing [ ...] 
69 Rates of male and female factor infertility are approximately equal, but the technologies have been 
developed focusing on the female body. Therefore, while men are equally likely to be infertile, they are 
far less likely to be the object of medical intervention as a result. 
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Tim's construction of IVF as fundamentally low-tech stands in stark contrast with the 
claiming of high technology that was described in the previous section. The emphasis 
on the treatment as mundane supports the normality of the choices they have made to 
pursue it, and Tim later comments that all the more extreme stories in the media "give 
us IVF-ers a bad name", claiming a legitimatising and normalising group identity in 
accounting for the engagement with treatment. This normalisation of IVF is achieved 
'through two strategies: (1) the construction of IVF as just another technology; and (2) 
IVF as simulating and facilitating natural processes. 
Everyday technology 
IVF is normalised in the accounts by its identification simply as another technology in 
a society where technology, and particularly medical technology, is omnipresent: 
Paula: For years, people have been doing all sort of things to help conception, or 
hinder conception, or whatever. I've had lots of operations ...just...nothing 
nasty... things like ligament reconstructions of the ankle, and wisdom teeth. I've 
just had 7 moles removed from my body under local anaesthetic. 
Tracy: If my computer goes down, I can't work. You ...I mean, it's inevitable that 
you are going to get things. I mean, people are going to live a hundred years. The 
turn of the century, people 's average age was 60, and now it's 90. You'll always 
get that, and I don't think you can stop progress. And, you know, why would you? 
I have a very good friend who 's had leukaemia twice. She's still here, thanks to 
technology. 
Both Paula and Tracy see IVF as part of a progressive scientific continuum. By 
positioning IVF alongside other, less controversial, medical technologies, the 
particularity of NF and the concerns that surround it are diffused on the grounds that it 
is simply part of the unstoppable, benign march of progress. Conversely, it is precisely 
this technological continuum that is cited by radical feminists in opposition to the new 
reproductive technologies, who argue that there is nothing new about IVF at all, and 
instead, its pedigree can be traced back through a series of conceptive and contraceptive 
technologies that are abusive of women and damaging to their health (Klein 1987). 
However, when used in defence of IVF, the alliance of the technology with the vast 
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array of medical technologies now available is a powerful strategy in demystifying TVF 
whilst simultaneously drawing on its status as progressive and beneficial. This is 
particularly true when "normal" IVF is now being superseded by other more 
controversial technologies such as POD, or even cloning. 
Simulating nature 
Another strategy for normalising the technology is to highlight the extent to which IVF 
can be seen to mimic the natural process of conception. Technology, here, is doing 
nothing that nature would not "normally" do: 
Tim: We considered the IVF that we were having was just helping us to do 
something that was natural ... really still a natural act, but just taken out... the 
natural act was being done outside the body and being put back. It was us ...it was 
still all of our bits that were being involved in it. All we were having was 
technology helping us. We weren't altering with technology. 
Cathy: [...] You know, all you're doing is putting mine and his together and doing 
what normally would have happened, but I can't do it because of other things. So, 
it 's a natural process. 
Robert: It was natural ...it was just the mechanics of it that were assisted. It 
wasn't like cloning a sheep, or growing ears on the backs of mice, or things like 
that. 
A distinction between helping nature and tampering with nature is crucial to the 
construction of IVF as fundamentally natural, with rvF functioning within this 
discourse as low rather than high tech; mechanical rather than technological. Sarah 
Franklin suggests that conventional rvF discourse renders nature and technology "not 
only commensurate, but substitutable", in that "[just] as WE clinicians 'learn' from 
nature how to improve their techniques, so 'nature' can be improved by scientific and 
technological assistance" (Franklin 1997: 209). However, the awareness demonstrated 
by the participants of the dangers of too much technology reveals the limitations to this 
substitutability. It is "nature" that provides the discursive benchmark for the 
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acceptability of particular levels of engagement with reproductive technology, with 
technology strategically subsumed within that constructed domain. 
It is also very much in the interests of practitioners to naturalise (normalise) IVF, 
although not necessarily for the same ends as the IVF patients. As will be explored in 
detail in the next chapter, IVF is big business (Moore 1999) and clinics, particularly in 
the private sector, are forced to compete for patients in the open market, rendering it 
against the interests of practitioners to articulate clearly the downsides of treatment. 
Furthermore, once a treatment appears normal and routinised (and therefore, 
presumably, safe), it is assumed that women will be more likely to demand that 
treatment (Wajcman 1991: 71). 
The case of egg collection is a good example of this attempt to soften the impact of the 
treatment. Robert Winston, as discussed in Chapter 2, confidently asserts that "[there] is 
seldom any real pain" (my emphasis) (Winston 1999: 9) in the egg collection 
procedure, and this is endorsed by promotional clinic literature, which rarely concedes 
little more than the possibility of "discomfort", or "light twinges" 70 . This denial of 
female pain71 is paralleled by the diminution of the pain of childbirth (or at least, the 
over-estimation of women's capacity to cope with childbirth) (Bendelow & Williams 
1998), which was seen by one of the male participants as an unmissable part of the 
whole maternal experience — a view that his wife, who had experienced the protracted 
vaginal delivery of their daughter, disputed. The medical descriptions of the egg 
collection procedure differ sharply from the descriptions of the procedure by women 
who have experienced treatment (see also: Franklin 1997: 117): 
Sarah: [...] and they said there were 13 follicles, and then they took me in 
and they had to take the eggs out. That was excruciatingly painful. 
70  Several of the male participants were also very reluctant to acknowledge the pain of this procedure, 
although one explanation for this is their own feelings of guilt at their female partners having to be the 
object of medical intervention. 
71  Ann Dally described how the capacity to feel pain was associated with civilisation, with women, 
therefore, less able to feel pain than men. This convenient explanation was used to justify the use of black 
female slaves for the development of surgical techniques (before the advent of anaesthesia) to treat 
fistulas, since they were doubly uncivilised by virtue of their race and gender (Daily 1991: 5). 
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Catherine: And we went in, and she did the operation to collect the eggs, 
and I've never had so much pain in all my life. I could feel her, like, going 
up into the ovaries and things. 
Furthermore, the egg collection is only the final stage of a lengthy process of daily 
injections which have to be carefully timed and are often self-administered. The entire 
process of IVF is described by those who have experienced it as an "obstacle course" 
(Franklin 1997: ch.3), with the constant possibility of failure at every stage. The linear 
narrative, and particularly the casual alignment of egg and sperm collection is an 
oversimplification of the reality of IVF — a simplification resented by many of the 
participants, and particularly the women who have been on the receiving end of 
treatment. As Susan understatingly pointed out, "it's not like a picnic where you take a 
couple of tablets". This recognition of the technological nature of IVF, particularly on 
the part of the women who have been on the receiving end of it, conflicts with the 
construction of IVF as essentially natural, illustrating the way in which contradictory 
discourses are recruited to address specific problems. The discourse of fVF as 
fundamentally natural diffuses the tension around the use of technology for 
reproduction, while the emphasis on the arduousness of IVF demonstrates the lengths to 
which they went to try to achieve parenthood. IVF may be natural, but it is not to be 
understood as an easy option. 
The closeness of the delivery of treatment to the natural process of conception is also 
exploited by both the users and the providers of treatment to refute the accusation that 
IVF is a failed technology because of its low success ratesn. Challoner, in his pro-
technology history of IVF, asserts that "a woman's body naturally rejects most embryos 
that reach this stage [cell differentiation]" (Challoner 1999: 32), and even for those 
embryos that do progress but fail to implant, "failure to implant is common in those 
produced naturally, so this negative result did not necessarily indicate that the IVF 
procedure was to blame" (Challoner 1999: 38). The same argument is used later in the 
book as part of his defence of cloning technologies, arguing that many animals 
reproduce asexually (Challoner 1999: 137). The equation of the natural failure to 
72  This same strategy was used by Gregory Pincus to ease political concerns about the contraceptive pill 
he was developing. By allowing for menstruation by incorporating a five day break without pills into the 
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conceive and that failure to conceive through IVF fails to acknowledge the fundamental 
differences between the two processes and the differential physical, emotional and 
financial costs of those failures. Nevertheless, it is a strategy that was also useful to the 
participants in establishing the failure as a natural outcome which serves to diminish the 
technological effects of the process: 
Paula: But...I don't know. While there's not perfection, I guess it in some kind of 
way still feels natural. It's not a perfect process, even without anybody getting 
involved. When it's just the man and the woman, it's still not a perfect process. All 
sorts of things can go wrong, and this was just an extension of that, I guess. 
The accounts given in this study also demonstrate that even while drawing heavily on 
the normality of the treatment, what actually constitutes normality is extremely fluid, 
both within and between accounts. Many couples went into treatment with a limit as to 
the level of technology they were prepared to use, especially with regards to the 
freezing of embryos and the use of donor gametes. Decisions not to continue treatment 
past a certain age, or placing a limit on the number of cycles of treatment were also 
common. These limits not only varied enormously between interviewees, but were also 
often transgressed once they had embarked on a treatment programme, illustrating the 
constructed and contextual nature of the normality to which the interviewees wish to 
ascribe. 
Infertility as a disease 
As described in the first section of this chapter, technological intervention for medical 
reasons is a common feature of western society, and medical intervention into 
involuntary childlessness has a lengthy precedent (Pfeffer 1993: 1). Therefore by 
constructing infertility as a disease, those who engage with IVF are able to deflect much 
of the unease about using technology for reproduction. 
Karen: What's your general view of the technology itself? I mean, do you 
see it as a positive thing? 
process, he was able to argue that the pill was simply mimicking the natural process (Oudshoom 1994: 
121) 
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Courtney: I wouldn't have said that 10 years ago, because of having a child 
of my own, I'd see it, you know, as abnormal and... but to help people, I 
think, when people can't have kids, it's not just that... it's a disease and 
people should help it, not just, "Oh, go away!" You know. It's... it can't kill 
you, you know, like cancer and everything else. But it's still a disease, that 
people need help. 
Beth: [...] And this is just another medical treatment to help people 
overcome a physical problem that they've got, and I don't see why it should 
be any different from any other treatment. 
The positioning of IVF within the medical system validates this interpretation, and on 
entry into the medical system, the WF candidate is quickly identified as a patient. The 
prospective patient follows an established routine for seeking medical care by visiting 
first a GP, undergoing preliminary tests, then being referred on to see a hospital 
consultant where necessary. On starting treatment, she finds herself in daily contact 
with the paraphernalia of medical treatment, even outside of the hospital environment, 
because of the daily injections, and as the treatment process progresses, she is subject to 
scans and surgical interventions, all within a hospital environment. The treatment 
records are explicitly medical records and subject to the same stringent confidentiality 
laws as any other medical record. These records are held in the name of the female 
partner, highlighting the medical focus of WF on the female body. All the signals that 
treatment delivery sends out are of infertility as a disease that has a valid claim to 
treatment, and these signals were drawn on extensively by the participants in their 
accounts. 
The reservations that Courtney had about IVF prior to her own experience of infertility 
— that the treatment was abnormal — are put aside with the understanding of treatment as 
"to help people" who are suffering from a disease, although this is quickly put into 
perspective, in that it's not cancer, and it can't kill you. Although not perhaps one of the 
most serious diseases, the listing of the social and medical sequelae of infertility was a 
common feature of the accounts, including depression, suicide and relationship 
breakdown, although with the exception of depression, these are largely social and not 
medical consequences. This catalogue of negative outcomes is used to reinforce the 
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status of infertility as a disease, and therefore to justify treatment. This need for 
justification stems in part from the tension that currently exists around the use of NHS 
resources to provide fertility treatment, and these issues are considered in detail in the 
following chapter. However, the key point here is that the use of medical technology to 
treat illness and disease is an established aspect of contemporary western culture, and 
therefore, by establishing infertility as a disease, the tension which exists around using 
technology for reproduction is circumvented. 
The treatment also gained legitimacy in the accounts from the fact that it is subject to 
regulation by the HFEA: 
Angela: [...] you know that the HFEA is spoken about, you know that it's being 
controlled. You know you're not, you know, there's not some wacky doctor doing, 
you know, ... You know you are in a controlled environment, that it is regulated. 
They're not allowed to put more than three embryos back in, and all that sort of 
thing. 
Regulation not only serves to limit maverick practices and to prevent IVF being used 
beyond delineated bounds, but it also offers legitimacy to IVF, producing its 
mainstream status. For Susan and Matthew, this established status was very important in 
resolving their concerns about the technology: 
Matthew: [...] If we were the first ones to have used the technology, I think that 
might have been different, but erm.. 
Susan: Yes, we're not brave enough to do something like that. 
Matthew: To be guinea pigs. But this is technology that already in use. 
By following the example of others, Susan and Matthew are defining themselves as 
conventional and part of a large community of people who have made similar choices. 
IVF is, in this sense, a profoundly normal choice. For several of the participants, the fact 
that a close friend had undergone treatment performed a similar function, providing 
them with an opportunity to air their doubts and be persuaded 73 . 
73  In the context of cosmetic surgery, Davis notes the key role of close friends in accounts of the decision 
to have surgery, with the friend constructed as the persuader, and the narrator as having dilemmas over 
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The assertion of the mainstream status of IVF was used in reference to all aspects of the 
delivery of treatment, but particularly the use of hormonal drugs, the long term effects 
of which are still uncertain. The construction of IVF as located within mainstream 
medicine, and therefore assumed to be thoroughly tested, facilitated the management of 
risk in relation to those drugs. Not everybody would agree, of course, that IVF is no 
longer experimental. Indeed, this is one of the key issues raised by radical feminists in 
opposition to the new reproductive technologies, since the distinction between research 
and practice in IVF is very blurree. 1VF routinely generates an excess of embryos, 
which practitioners, with consent, can use for research purposes up to 14 days, and the 
production of embryos for research is an important income-generating activity for many 
clinics (Moore 1999). The distinction is further blurred by the offers of free treatment in 
exchange for participation in certain research programmes, which raises significant 
issues concerning informed consent, since there is clearly a strong financial incentive to 
participate. This is compounded by the obvious desire to stay on the good side of those 
providing the treatment (Cussins 1998: 113). 
Although the pathologising of infertility can be seen as an effective and powerful 
justificatory strategy for introducing medical technology into the "natural" reproductive 
process, it can also be risky, particularly for women. In the long term, once treatment 
has ended without success, the pathology remains even after the treatment has ended 
and she is no longer presenting herself as a candidate for treatment. This residual 
pathology is problematic for women because while contemporary culture accepts the 
use of medical technology to treat disease, there is also a potent social imperative to 
remain healthy, and this is combined with an assumption that an individual's health is 
determined largely by the extent to which they are prepared to take responsibility for it 
(Sontag 1978; Coward 1989; Stacey 1997). As Bettina Leysen argues in the context of 
her research into the menopause, "...[the] message of popular culture is to be fit, 
healthy and active at whatever age or stage in life" (Leysen 1996: 173), but the 
whether to go forwards. This enables the narrator to demonstrate the thoughtfulness with which they have 
approached surgery, as well as having received the stamp of approval from significant others (Davis 
1995: 125). 
74  In her study of sex hormones, Oudshoorn notes that hormonal preparations were never fully tested, 
fixed products before becoming available, and were developed in an ongoing process of testing and 
research (Oudshoorn 1994: ch.6) 
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responsibility for achieving that state of health lies with the individual, making the 
failure to meet the healthy ideal a matter of personal failure: 
Melissa: 	I think I always ...this sounds really awful... but I've always 
seen it as a bit of a weakness. If you're ill or you have something wrong 
with you, it's a kind of a weakness. I don't actually think that about other 
people... honestly, I don't, but in myself I do, and I just really didn't want 
anyone to know.[..] So, to actually admit something like that, no, no... 
The pathologising of infertility synecdochically pathologises the whole woman, 
defming her entirely by her inability to reproduce, and by declining treatment, or 
stopping it, the woman herself becomes responsible for that pathology by refusing to 
treat it (Raymond 1993: ch.1). Ironically, even where male factor infertility is 
implicated, it is still the woman who is identified as the object of treatment. This reflects 
the wider identification of the female rather than the male body as defmed by 
reproduction, and therefore the object of reproductive medical intervention, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. A further irony is that while the identification of infertility as a disease 
warranting treatment is central to the claim to IVF, the technology is unusually situated 
in that the ideal patient is a healthy one75 . Indeed, many of the participants cited their 
own good physical health as enhancing their status as good candidates for treatment. 
This highlights the conventional and contradictory construction of the normal female 
body as unstable and unruly and therefore requiring medical management. This is 
particularly true in the context of hormones, as the next section will discuss. 
The Natural Female Body 
Women are conventionally understood as being at the mercy of their hormones 
(Oudshoorn 1994), which are constructed as driving them towards reproduction 76 . The 
construction of the maternal drive as hormonally fuelled provides a strong justification 
for the use of technology for reproduction, since this retains the dominance of the 
natural in the reproductive endeavour, with technology appearing to function simply as 
75  Oudshoorn observes that the contraceptive pill was the first drug to be administered to healthy people 
for a social purpose (Oudshoorn 1994: 112) 
76  Hormones are also considered responsible for "unpredictable" behaviour by women, and this issue is 
explored in detail in Chapter 6. 
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a means to an end77 . However, the very need for a strategy of justification testifies to the 
dilemmas and risks inherent in engaging with that technological intervention and the 
need for careful discursive management. 
In the context of this study, the hormonal discourse had very different implications for 
the male and female participants, and it was in the accounts by the male participants that 
it emerged most directly. The construction of an irrepressible maternal drive enables the 
male partners to create a distance between themselves and the technology, since the 
technological means becomes subordinated to feminised natural ends: 
Martin: I think it's been a bit of a burning desire for Nancy to have a child. But if 
I'm honest with myself I'm very much...I was very much, if it happens, it happens. 
If it doesn't, it doesn't. 
Brian: Why go with all that stress? Be happy with what you've got, which was 
always what I said. Obviously, you have to, erm, put that against the maternal 
instincts, and so on [...] 
Both Martin and Brian contrast their own fatalistic approach with the "maternal 
instincts" of their wives, making it clear who the driving force in the treatment was. In 
both cases, the men take on the conventional masculine role of obliging protector, doing 
whatever was necessary to make their partners happy. They are witnesses to the natural 
drives, rather than being subject to them. This enables them to distance themselves not 
only from the engagement with technology, but also establishes an emotional distance 
from the unsuccessful outcome. This functions as one of the primary discursive 
mechanisms for maintaining the equation of femininity with the desire for a child in the 
wider IVF discourse, as well as shifting the responsibility for the decision to engage 
with treatment onto the women. 
The doctors confirmed this irrepressibility of the maternal drive: 
77 The hormonal discourse is also evident in popular discourse about "career women", and The Daily 
Telegraph (23 April, 2001) reported research which claimed to have shown that women are genetically 
programmed to have children at an early age. Dr Ian Owens, the researcher, insisted: "When women talk 
about the ticking body clock, that is true. Everything is saying reproduce now, but they are putting it off 
for cultural reasons, to keep their careers going and so on." 
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Lisa: I remember that first meeting, he [the consultant] was very sympathetic, and 
he said, "I do understand that secondary infertility is actually more distressing 
than being infertile, because your body is screaming out, because the hormones 
have already been through the process of being pregnant and having a child. Your 
body wants to do it again." 
According to the consultant, Lisa's body is demanding to be pregnant, embodying the 
traditional medical view that women are controlled by their bodies, rather than the other 
way round as is assumed to be the case with men 78 . Her body is credited with volition 
and voice, and its "screaming out" for a baby is to be taken seriously, although this 
acquiescence to the presumed demands of the body is notably absent in other areas of 
women's lives, such as diet or sexuality, where pressure to control and silence the 
unruly female body is more commonplace. 
In terms of withdrawing from treatment, the discourse of an irrepressible maternal drive 
is highly problematic, since it is constructed as a fundamental drive that will not go 
away and therefore must be pandered to. Imagining and creating a positive future 
without children, or the desired number of children, is therefore impossible within this 
discourse. Consequently, even though the discourse of biological drives is used by 
women when they are undergoing or waiting for treatment (Ulrich & Weatherall 2000), 
when treatment fails, an alternative strategy is required, particularly by the female 
participants, in order to facilitate a positive passage out of IVF. In this study, this was 
achieved not so much by rejecting the idea of a biological drive, but by laying claim to 
the conventionally male prerogative of the Cartesian mind-body distinction and 
adopting a medicalised focus on particular, malfunctioning body parts: 
Alice: It's sort of...none of my bits are useful for what they're supposed to be used 
for, for whatever reason. 
78 The obvious exception to this would be the construction of male sexual desire, which is conventionally 
constructed as controlling men, rather than being controlled by them. 
118 
This focus on "organs without bodies" (Braidotti 1994: ch.1) enables Alice to distance 
herself from her "bits". The idea of those "bits" being unable to fulfil their purpose 
recurs in other accounts: 
Beth: The things I've been put here for don't work. 
Stephanie: At the end of the day, we're women and we're here to reproduce. 
Liz: [..1 you know, you're there, and your role in the big scheme of things is to 
produce, keep the race going. Errn ...which is probably a bit Neanderthal, but I suppose 
it's there. 
In this study, it was only very rarely that women laid claim to a biological drive to 
reproduce, articulating their desire for a child not in terms of drives, but in terms of a 
wider, externally-determined role in the "big scheme" which they were unable to fulfil 
because of their "bits". This performs the function of demonstrating their active 
intention to conform to their assigned role in the natural order, but also releases them 
from the perpetual craving implied by the hormonal discourse. It is also significant to 
note that the technology and its failure is necessarily absent from this strategy. This has 
the effect of disguising the significant role of reproductive technology in confirming the 
intractability of the malfunctioning body parts, focusing instead on the desire to 
reproduce. This marks a redrawing of the reproductive norms to include intention, rather 
than parenthood, with intentional non-parenting as the abnormal Other against which 
that normality is defmed. 
Another strategy used in response to the "maternal drive" discourse was to question the 
nature of that drive, positing it as a social, rather than a natural, phenomenon: 
Graham: Well, the woman's got the biological clock ticking, and they've got a lot 
more hormones floating around I mean, I think it's easier for a man. 
Karen: Being childless, or not being able to have children? 
Graham: It's easier being childless for a man. A woman's expected to be a 
mother figure. You reach a stage, you know, married — you're engaged, married, 
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house, kids. You know, nice loving mum and kids. [inaudible] It just...there is 
more pressure as well. 
Denise: Or do you think it's more acceptable that men haven't got children? 
Graham: Yeah, because there are a lot of men about that are divorced, that are 
part-time, weekend dads. Men sort of.. .you know I think it's more of a woman 
thing. They're supposed to be mothers. 
Denise: Yeah, we're expected to want children as well. 
Graham shifts from a biological to a social explanation, commenting later that the 
pressure to have children is "unbelievable". Many of the female participants recalled 
incidents from early childhood where the link between reproduction and femininity was 
made: 
Claire: [...] I remember thinking right back to being a little girl —you get a doll 
for Christmas and your mum says, "Oh, well, you know, ifyou look after this, 
you'll be able to give it to your little girls when you have one. 
The doll offers an opportunity to practice caring — a feminine trait — and also represents 
her future children. For Susan, reproduction was linked directly to her body by her 
mother when she developed breasts at age 9: 
Susan: I was a very... erm...mature little girl. You know, I mean, I was 	developed 
by the time I was 9, so I was a very...you know, "Why do I have these things with my 
tummy? And why do I have these chests? And why...?" "It's for when you have babies 
when you're older." So from 9, it was always, "this is what happens". 
The message Susan constantly received was that she would reproduce, and that that was 
what her body was explicitly designed to do, with her early puberty cited as evidence of 
that future. For others, the social messages were more omnipresent: 
Charlotte: [...] one thing that I did notice, when we wanted children, there 
seemed to be children all around, in the media and television, and it sold the 
wrong idea. It sold this idea of marital bliss, children [...] And you think "What a 
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load of crap!" You know — little babies in their Pampers, with their mums looking 
unharrassed. And you think, "Why does society sell...?" It's an illusion, isn't it. 
Making the direct link with consumer culture, Charlotte interprets the ideology of 
motherhood as a product which is literally sold to women, and therefore, as something 
to be treated with scepticism. It is important to note that it is the ideology of 
motherhood, rather than practice of motherhood (see, Rich 1977), which is the target of 
these critiques, allowing them to lay claim to the desire to reproduce, whilst distancing 
themselves from the imperative to do so. Claire recognises the usefulness of this 
resistant position as a coping strategy for dealing with her involuntary childlessness, and 
speculates whether this is all "a big defence mechanism": 
Claire: Whether it's because I've intellectualised [the biological urge to 
reproduce] out because it was helpful to me to think that it was socially 
imposed.. .you know, "I'm not going to be conditioned! ", because it actually helps 
me to move on away from the children issue. I don't know. 
While an understanding of the socially constructed nature of the reproductive drive was 
strategically useful to many of the female participants, this also risks diminishing the 
significance of such a thorough-going normative construction. Ironically, this can 
become a strategy which ends up in self-recrimination, with the woman berating herself 
for "allowing" herself to be conditioned. However, this is to underestimate social 
construction, and the ideology of motherhood is no less potent for being socially rather 
than naturally produced. 
Moderation  
While it was important to those whose treatment had failed for others to know that their 
childlessness was involuntary, it was equally important that others' perceptions of 
involuntary childlessness were carefully managed. One of the most common popular 
stereotypes associated with the experience of infertility is that of the desperate woman 
who is willing to do anything to have a baby, even if it means exploring the full range 
of technological opportunities, borrowing money to the point of fmancial ruin, and 
focusing entirely on that endeavour to the irreparable detriment of personal 
relationships, frequently resulting in marital breakdown. The desire for a child in 
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women is assumed within the dominant cultural discourse to be entirely normal, ar\ 
yet, when that desire impacts upon the woman's ability to act within reason in other 
aspects of her life, then the desire for a child is deemed out of control. The desperate, 
infertile woman, the story goes, is not in control of herself, and this lack of self-control 
automatically places her outside of the normative standards of motherhood. 
Consequently, while discourses of desperation can be useful rhetorically in asserting the 
strength of desire for a child, therefore providing some justification for turning to IVF, 
the denial of desperation was a key feature in the accounts given by the participants. 
This denial serves two primary functions. Firstly, it diffuses some of the tension around 
the use of technology for reproduction, since for as long as the engagement with IVF is 
tempered by moderation, there is less danger of allowing the naturalness of reproduction 
to be subsumed by the technology; and secondly, the discourse of moderation limits the 
extent to which an individual is defmed solely in terms of infertility, facilitating the 
transition towards a life without (biological) children, or the desired number of children. 
There are four aspects of the engagement with IVF treatment and its failure that were 
perceived by the participants as potentially indicative of desperation, and therefore as 
sites for the assertion of moderation, and these will be considered in turn below: (1) the 
number of cycles; (2) the use of alternative and complementary therapies; (3) the use of 
counselling services; and (4) the pursuit of parenting alternatives. 
The number of cycles 
As has already been noted, the reality of the experience of IVF, even where the 
treatment is eventually successful, is one of repeated hurdles, failure at any of which 
necessitates returning to the beginning again. For those who are not successful, the 
cyclical nature of the treatment makes it difficult to stop, because of the inherent 
"maybe next time" promise of future success. Even practitioners acknowledge that the 
first cycle of treatment is largely experimental, providing useful information for future 
cycles, encouraging the couples to persist, and this pressure is compounded by the use 
of deceptive cumulative success rates, which can reach up to 70% for four cycles of 
treatment (Brian 1998: 90). The misunderstanding of the statistical odds and the 
interpretation of the odds as improving with each cycle provides a distinct incentive to 
continue with treatment (Modell 1989). 
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But for all the pressures to continue, the stereotype of the desperate, infertile woman 
who is unable to stop looms large: 
Susan: I didn't want to be one of these women that you saw on television, that are 
sort of in their 50's, that have had sort of like hundreds and hundreds of it. And it 
does take over your life. I didn't want to be.. .1 mean, we did get obsessive, but I 
didn't want to be one of these completely obsessive people that that's all they live 
for. And we had to have some sort of ...reality. You know, we had to have some 
sort of life. Although it did take over, that sort of three seemed... I don't know. 
Three just seemed a good control number, a good sort of, you know, that's your 
best shot. 
The hyperbolic caricature of the ageing woman doggedly pursuing endless cycles of 
treatment featured regularly in the accounts 79, and Susan positions her moderate three 
cycles in stark contrast. This is reinforced by her use of the language of science — "a 
good control number" — to support the decision. She recognises in herself the potential 
for becoming "completely obsessed", and the limit is her means of preventing this and 
distinguishing herself from others who are less able to retain a sense of perspective. It is 
important to note, however, that she acknowledges that their engagement with IVF was 
marked by a degree of obsession, and this emphasises that moderation is not to be 
confused with apathy. Stopping at three is to be understood as an act of strength rather 
than weakness, marking the assertion of rationality over the overwhelming desire to 
have a child. 
For those who set relatively high limits to the number of cycles they were willing to 
undergo before stopping, or those who did not set limits and subsequently underwent a 
high number of cycles, the strength of character lies not in stopping, but in keeping 
going: 
Katy: [...] that target of 6 [...] it probably spurred me on, because I'm not a 
defeatist. So whereas each treatment got more difficult because of the injections 
79 Kathy Davis identifies a cosmetic surgery counterpart to the "desperate infertile woman" in the 
"surgery junkie" or "scalpel slave", who was cited by her interviewees in order to highlight their own 
123 
and knowing what you have to go through, the disappointments and so on, I had 
sort of that was my target. I suppose that kept me going. And also, maximising 
your chances, because after three goes, they were prepared to put more than two 
eggs back, so I think that's what spurred me on. I'm not a giver-upper. 
For Katy, IVF is an activity that is an act of will, where it is her strength of character 
rather than weakness that enables her to persist with treatments that become 
increasingly difficult to undergo. This understanding places the IVF within the control 
of Katy herself, thereby distancing her own experience from the out-of-control 
engagement with the treatment that signifies desperation. Furthermore, she calculates 
her chances as increasing through her perseverance, making the choice to continue a 
logical rather than a desperate one — a fact that is reinforced by the fact that she did stop 
at five cycles when she became unwell. 
The actual determination by the participants of what constitutes an excessive number of 
cycles of treatment varied hugely. However, the actual number of cycles proved to be 
far less important in the accounts than the discursive construction of that number as 
moderate, reasonable, subject to the control of the individual, always related to and 
regulated by the excessive "not me". 
The use of alternative therapies  
The use of alternative and complementary therapies for the treatment of infertility is not 
encouraged by IVF practitioners. The majority of these therapies are unregulated and 
evidence of their efficacy is ambiguous. Consequently, many doctors express concern 
that the use of unproven, alternative therapies will generate false expectations for those 
experiencing infertility (Winston 1999: 40), although it could also be argued that this 
resistance also reflects efforts to shore up the high status of western, high technology 
medicine in the face of less glamorous or technologically specialised therapies. This 
suspicion of the alternative therapies was largely endorsed by the participants, with 
alternative therapies often perceived as lesser, and therefore unnecessary, treatments, 
the use of which is indicative of unacceptable levels of desperation: 
rationality and moderation in their engagement with surgery. In the context of IVF, this figure of 
desperate excess reappears as the compulsive consumer of IVF, as is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Susan: Don't get me wrong. If suddenly, there's something new and they've still — 
you know, if you stand on one leg and drink a bottle of mistletoe extract [it will] 
get you pregnant, then I'd probably do it. But... most of them, I'm not really. ..I 
don't not believe in them particularly, but I wouldn't...I'm not like that... 
Claire: And then there was a bit of me that thought, "Oh, maybe I should give it 
[alternative medicine] a try", but really I'm too cynical about alternative 
therapies, and I think, I could have done it, but in a way it would have been me 
saying "You're that desperate that you're clutching at all these straws." Perhaps 
I didn't want to. Perhaps I wasn't that desperate... 
Susan undermines the idea of alternative medicine by using an extreme and outlandish 
example whilst apparently imagining even more outlandish therapies which she would 
not do, and although she is unwilling to condemn alternative medicine out of hand, its 
use is associated with being "like that" and therefore to be avoided. However, it is the 
unproven nature of the therapy rather than the form of the therapy that forms the basis 
for the objection, thereby locating herself discursively in the realm of determined 
rationality rather than uncontrolled desperation. Claire, however, is more explicit about 
what being "like that" actually means — desperately clutching at straws — and her 
description of herself as cynical distances herself from that image. 
For those who did make use of alternative therapies, the use is downplayed and 
rationalised: 
Sarah: I had a friend who used it [Foresight — a preconceptual nutritional 
programme] , and had this baby. You can imagine. 
Karen: Really? And she had fertility problems? 
Sarah: Yes. And she had to [inaudible] , plus all the other stuff they tell you not to 
do like not drink, and get fit, all the rest of it. All of that [...] can't not help [...] 
and I thought, "Well, again, this isn't going to harm us." So we went along and 
had the test [a hair strand test for nutritional deficiencies] . They take your hair 
from under there [pointing to the back of her head]. And they make, they design 
you this programme [of diet and supplements] . It was kind of about me 
persuading [husband] not to drink [both laugh]. He's very sceptical about these 
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things, but because I was keen to do it, he went along with it. And so we did it, 
and it must have been the beginning of the year by the time it didn't work out, but 
we felt absolutely fit and healthy at the end of it. 
For Sarah, the decision to try the Foresight programme is legitimated by her friend's 
successful experience, and she is also careful to stress the positive outcomes of 
following the programme — being fit and healthy — which justifies her initial position 
that it can't hurt to try. The engagement with Foresight is also presented as performing a 
secondary function of curtailing her husband's alcohol consumption, meaning that she 
is able to endorse the nutritional approach in that it is a means of achieving an outcome 
that is broadly accepted without necessarily endorsing the whole philosophy of 
Foresight, which is fundamentally opposed to IVF. 
There was only one case in the course of the interviews where the male partner had 
taken the initiative in seeking out alternative therapies, and he had sought the help of a 
Chinese herbalist in order to treat his low sperm count. More generally, the male 
partners either participated on the initiative of their partners, by taking supplements 
(which were provided for them), or on medical advice by making lifestyle changes such 
as cutting down on tobacco or alcohol, wearing loose underwear or not taking hot baths, 
although compliance rates with these recommendations were low. The reluctance of the 
male partners to engage in measures intended to improve sperm quality is considered in 
more detail in Chapter 6. However, what is of interest here is that where the female 
partners had used alternative therapies, this was frequently met with scepticism by their 
male partners: 
Tim: I like things to add up, so if they don't add up... If ...I can't understand how 
waving hands over bodies is going to help people. I mean, that's simplistic, but I 
...Obviously, I think for some people there's a stroke of luck. 
Jeff We 'ye got a couple of witches' brews out there. 
The women interviewed were highly aware of the taint of desperation that the use of 
alternative therapies exposed them to, and in a number of cases, this motivated them to 
keep their use secret from their partners. The reason most commonly given for keeping 
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it secret was simply not to appear "silly", but this reveals a far greater concern that they 
will be judged unstable and desperate by their partners, who might then choose to 
exercise a veto on further treatment on the grounds that it had got out of hand 80 . 
Melanie, who suffers from polycystic ovaries, had tried a broad range of therapies 
including a hypnotherapy, a Chinese herbalist and crystals, most of which she did 
without telling her husband, Paul: 
Paul: Reading between the lines, you might have realised that I'm not a believer 
in anything like that [alternative therapies] 
[...] 
Melanie: A lot of this I've told Paul since. I did it off my own back 
Karen: Oh, right, so you didn't know she was doing this? 
Melanie: The crystals, I didn't tell you. And the Chinese one, I didn't tell you 
about. I think I might have told you once I'd started. 
Paul: I know you went to the hypnosis. I honestly can't remember about the 
others. 
Melanie was very selective about which therapies she told Paul about, since he already 
had teenage children from a previous marriage and he was not as keen to pursue 
treatment as she was. Knowing that he was very cynical about alternative therapies, she 
was careful not to give the impression of desperation. In general, the doctors were also 
not told, in part because most of those who had used alternative therapies had tried them 
before seeking medical help, or in order to achieve a sense of purposeful activity whilst 
on waiting lists. However, those participants who were using alternative therapies in 
tandem with medical treatment, did not share that information with their doctors, partly 
to avoid appearing desperate, and also to avoid casting any doubt over their 
commitment to IVF in the eyes of the medical staff 81 . 
Counselling 
The availability of independent counselling to all patients is a condition of a clinic's 
HFEA license, although it is not mandatory for the patients, except in cases of the use of 
80  See Chapter 6 for a further discussion of this issue. 
81 	i It s also quite likely that the desire not to be seen as desperate by me may well have inhibited some of 
the participants from telling me about alternative therapies they had tried. 
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donor eggs or sperm, and in some cases where a GP has raised concerns relating to the 
welfare of any children that result from the treatment. Some clinics also run support 
groups, and there is also a wide range of national organisations providing support and 
advice. However, rather than being embraced as a useful resource, counselling was 
interpreted by the majority of the participants as indicative of desperation and mental 
instability and was therefore avoided: 
Karen: How about support groups, sort of general support groups or 
counselling? 
Melissa: No, I'm not like that. 
Karen: Did you ever make use of any of the support groups? 
Courtney: No. 
Karen: Why was that? 
Courtney: I don't need them. I'm normal ...probably. 
Being normal, or not being "like that", is essential to the construction of the self as not 
engaging immoderately with TVF, with counselling seen as evidence of social failure 
and therefore of unsuitability for parenthood. This perception of counselling as being 
only for those who are unstable was inadvertently reinforced by medical staff, who 
usually would recommend (or in one case, insist 011 82) counselling following one of the 
patients becoming very upset or angry. The attitude of the doctors is crucial here 
because those seeking treatment are acutely aware of an image to which they feel they 
must conform in order to be approved (Cussins 1998). If patients feel that they will be 
considered unstable and therefore unsuitable for treatment if they seek counselling, then 
they are unlikely to engage with it. Furthermore, in the case of the clinic through which 
the participants were recruited, the independent counsellor's office was located outside 
of the clinic itself (although on the same floor of the hospital), which isolated her from 
the day to day work of the unit and located her as literally peripheral to the treatment 
process. It is important to note that very few of the participants expressed scepticism 
82  Charlotte became angry when she was told that she would have to take one of the hormonal drugs for 
an extra five days in order to fit into the clinic's timetable. Concerned about the long-term effects of the 
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towards counselling in principle for those who needed it, with that need characterised 
by social isolation and personal weakness. Several of the participants seemed unsure as 
to the purpose of counselling, and saw it simply as an unwelcome and unproductive 
opportunity to "get upset", or to be told what they already knew: 
Alice: [...] sometimes I thought I'd like to [see a counsellor], and other times, I 
thought I was upset enough on my own without talking about it and making myself 
worse. I think, because I had to talk about it at work when I didn't want to, I 
didn't want to go somewhere and talk about it and get upset on purpose. 
Courtney: [...] I don't think whatever you say to a counsellor is going to change 
the way you feel, apart from you're shouting at someone different! I just don't 
think they can change what's going on. No-one can turn round and say to you, 
"Take this and you'll be okey-dokey." I just don't think they can change it. 
Only two of the participants, both female, expressed a general support for counselling as 
potentially beneficial to everybody, and had made extensive use of it throughout their 
adult lives. One of these, Anne, was a social worker 83 , and the other, Denise, had 
become a fully qualified counsellor herself following her decision to end treatment. 
Another problem cited in the interviews was simply having access to appropriate 
counselling, although it could be argued that problems of access also provided a 
convenient "excuse" which brought an uncomfortable line of questioning to a close. The 
clinic offers independent counselling, but few women want to return to the clinic after 
having made the decision to stop, and there was also some confusion about whether 
those who had stopped treatment, or who were thinking of stopping, would have to pay 
for counselling84 . Cathy, a psychiatric nurse, sought counselling through her GP after 
suffering from depression following the decision to end treatment, but was referred to 
the community psychiatric nurse — a colleague — and decided against pursuing it; and 
Rachel was seeking a counsellor to help her to stop treatment, but her GP referred to a 
drugs, an argument with the consultant ensued, and he refused to treat her until she and her husband had 
met with the counsellor. 
83 Anne's husband did not take part in the interviews. 
84  There is no charge for the counselling, and in the light of this research finding, the patient information 
leaflet which introduces the counselling service has been amended in order to make this clear. 
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counsellor who was trained in providing relaxation techniques to enhance fertility. This 
indicates a lack of understanding on the part of GPs about counselling and the 
counselling needs of patients. 
Social support in the form of networks of family and friends, as well as from partners, is 
recognised as an important aspect of coping with TVF (Adler, Keyes et al. 1991), and 
the presence of social support networks was frequently cited in support of the decision 
not to make use of counselling services. However, it is also important to note that this 
assertion was not necessarily matched with a great deal of social support in practice, 
either because it was not sought, or because it was not available. This was not an 
uncommon paradox, and one interpretation of this is that the social networks provide a 
more general sense of being valued, and therefore that the extent to which family and 
friends were involved in the TVF specifically does not necessarily reflect the degree to 
which they perceive themselves as being supported 85 . It is also important to note that 
keeping the treatment secret is not necessarily an issue of shame, but more likely a 
desire for privacy (Klock 1997: 168). Many of the participants expressed their 
frustration at having to tell doctors, friends and colleagues every detail of their attempts 
to conceive, since, as Anne succinctly put it, "all they have to do is have sex." 
The pursuit of parenting alternatives  
Domestic adoption of very young children within the UK is relatively rare. 
Contemporary social policy aims to assist the mother to keep her child rather than to 
encourage her to give it up, as was the norm in the 1950's and 60's. Domestic adoption, 
then, generally refers to older children, and often to children who have had very difficult 
early lives and who have disabilities or behavioural problems. Furthermore, the 
adoption process itself is lengthy and frequently perceived as intrusive and judgmental, 
running the risk of a fmal judgement by social workers that they are not fit to parent. In 
addition, while approval for adoption was perceived as offering a prized endorsement, 
there was also a fear of being approved and then being unable to love the child 
completely, having invested so much time, energy and money into being a biological 
parent: 
85 Also, many of the participants described how involving others can actually generate more 
responsibility for the person undergoing treatment, managing other people's stress and inability to cope 
with the grief of others. This issue is addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Beth: [...] I'd feel like I'd failed. Do you know what I mean? If I didn't feel 100% 
committed to that child, bringing it up as my own, then I think that I would feel a 
failure, and I know that.. .you can love somebody, but not in the same way [as if it 
were your biological child]. 
The construction of adoption as an act of desperation was a common explanatory 
strategy regarding the decision not to adopt: 
Melissa: I think, erm, much as I want children, erm, I think it's ....you have to sort 
of go back to why you want children, and I don't want children just for the sake of 
children. I wanted my husband's baby. And I don't want a baby or a child at any 
cost. And seeing [husband's] sister and her husband go through the adoption 
process, I couldn't go through with it. 
Karen: Really? FVhat about it? 
Melissa: It's just all that sort of preparation and all the different classes and the 
things you have to go through. It's just... it's too much. It really is. It obviously 
proves I don't want a baby that badly. And I know [husband] isn't keen on 
adoption either. 
Melissa rejects the idea of herself as wanting a baby "at any cost", and highlights 
instead the centrality of her relationship with her husband in the desire for a child. It is 
his child that she wants, not a child, and this is reinforced by her assertion that this is a 
view that he also shares. She supports her decision by displaying her broader 
knowledge, referring to the experience of her sister-in-law, who had adopted two 
children, both of whom had had very difficult early lives. This claim to insider 
knowledge of the realities of adoption legitimises the decision not to proceed. Another 
strategy was the use of the "horror story" of adoptions which had failed or which 
destroyed families, either in relation to specific friends and acquaintances, or more 
apocryphal terms. 
While the rejection of adoption was frequently cited as demonstrative of a continued 
sense of perspective concerning the desire to be a parent, it could also be argued that 
this discourse is being used to side-step the significant (and unfair) pressures on 
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involuntary childless couples to adopt (Sandelowski 1993; Braverman 1997; Franklin 
1997). Many of the arguments that couples apply in order to justify access to IVF, such 
as the strength of the parenthood motivation, or the ability to provide a loving home, 
often open them up to questions as to why they have chosen not to adopt, since there are 
clearly plenty of children currently living in care who could benefit from adoption into 
just such an environment. However, this is to ignore the significant challenges of taking 
on troubled or disabled children, not to mention the need to undergo a lengthy and 
intrusive assessment process. Sandelowski, in a chapter potently titled "Tick...Tock" 
(Sandelowski 1993: Ch.10), highlights the liminal space in which those entering the 
adoption process find themselves as they work through this process and then wait for a 
suitable placement. Katy and Tim were in the middle of this process when I interviewed 
them, and Tim remarked wearily, "it just goes on and on.. .much like IVF really." 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the ways in which the participants managed 
competing discourses of nature and technology. I have argued that the desire to locate 
the self as normal is the fundamental goal of this management task, where "natural" and 
"normal" are treated synonymously. The primary discursive move in the accounts is to 
naturalise the technological aspects of IVF. This constitutes an extremely fragile 
resolution of the tension between reproduction and technology, and one which requires 
constant maintenance. Although nature and technology appear at particular moments, 
and particularly within the dominant discourse, to be interchangeable, it is precisely the 
fact that nature and technology are not the same thing that necessitates this discursive 
management. While what constitutes the natural can be discursively renegotiated to 
include particular reproductive technologies, the social acceptability of those 
interventions, and therefore the extent to which they can be subsumed into the natural 
domain, is defmed against the (unnatural) technological. It is nature and not technology 
which predominates as the legitimising domain for the unsuccessful engagement with 
IVF. This analysis has implications for the feminist study of technology, particularly in 
terms of other medical technologies which intersect with normative femininity such as 
cosmetic surgery (Davis 1995; Davis 1997; Morgan 1998; Gilman 1999), or surgical or 
medical interventions into obesity (Cooper 1998; Ackerman 1999; Beauchamp-Parke 
2002). In particular, it offers a means of understanding the technological "creep" 
towards increasingly sophisticated interventions through the normalising effect of 
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precedents, and suggests the need to consider who the beneficiaries of that 
normalisation process are and how it is achieved. 
The second point which this analysis highlights is that, in spite of its current prominence 
as a means of theorising the relationship between nature and technology, the cyborg 
emerges in the context of this research as idealistic and distant from the lived experience 
of those confronted with the task of managing that relationship. There are many aspects 
of the accounts that lend themselves to the interpretative language of the cyborg. In 
particular, the accounts reveal a flexibility in the boundaries between nature and 
technology, with technology being drawn into the natural domain. The very malleability 
of those boundaries exposes their normative constructedness, undermining the nature-
technology dichotomy which they are attempting to manage through the narratives. 
However, although the participants in this study can be described as cyborgs in their 
fusion of machine and organism, they are unwittingly so, and conformity, not 
blasphemy, is their primary goal. 
Significantly, then, while Haraway would "rather be a cyborg than a goddess" (Haraway 
1991: 181), this offers little assistance in finding ways to think about those who would 
rather be goddesses, no matter how disruptive that aspiration may be to the normative 
standards along the way. From this perspective, it is important to remember that the 
cyborg is an idealistic political fiction, in pursuit of which a seemingly infinite range of 
imagined discursive resources are available. This recalls Braidotti's warning about the 
figuration of the nomad, which she argues is predefined by political consciousness and 
security in its boundary location. The majority of the participants in this study were 
constrained by a more limited stock of resources with which to make sense of their 
experiences, retaining what Haraway describes as "the mundane fiction of Man and 
Woman" as the most, rather than the least, desirable outcome. 
A close analysis of the dilemmas confronted by those experiencing IVF failure reveals 
that the aspirations and discursive achievements of the participants are far from 
mundane, however. The negotiation of the relationship between nature and technology 
in the accounts results not in more or less successful acts of assimilation into a static 
norm, but actually enacts a reworking of the categories themselves. This reworking is a 
product of the very specific and ambiguously liminal location of the participants in 
133 
relation to the dominant discourse, which they are at once within and outside. In this 
context, they can be described, in Elspeth Probyn's terms, as "outside belonging" 
(Probyn 1996) — a site of "ongoing betweennness" (ibid.: 6) which offers "immense 
political possibilities" (ibid.: 9) in its capacity to both capture and to propel the 
movement not only between categories, but also of the categories themselves. These 
small movements lack the spectacular gestures of the cyborg, yet produce new ways of 
understanding the material and the social contexts within which IVF failure is 
experienced, and reflect the status of those undergoing treatment as constrained agents 
in the IVF process rather than passive victims. This is particularly important in relation 
to radical feminist argument against the new reproductive technologies, reflecting 
instead the diffuse patterns of resistance, agency and constraint in the micro-level 
operations of biopower. 
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Chapter 5: Coping with Consumption  
IVF is big business in the UK. There are currently 116 86 clinics in the UK licensed to 
provide fertility treatment, with 75 of those licensed to perform IVF and donor 
insemination (DI), 29 providing DI only, 9 licensed only to store sperm, and 3 holding 
research licences 87 . Of the 75 clinics performing IVF, 28 offer fee paying services only, 
while the remainder offer a combination of fee paying and non-fee paying services. 
However, the National Health Service (NHS) is unable to meet the demand for TVF, and 
the limited availability of health authority funding means that over 80% of all IVF 
cycles in the UK are privately funded (Challoner 1999: 58) 88 . The relative lack of 
publicly funded treatment automatically places IVF out of reach of many who would 
seek it if it were readily available through the NHS. Indeed, the most common 
experience of IVF is most likely not of treatment failure, but of not being able to have it. 
The funding of IVF is currently decided by individual health authorities, leading to 
postcode prescribing. This is a contentious issue 89, and at the time of writing, the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) 9° is developing guidelines for the 
national standardisation of treatment provision 91 . However, this does not necessarily 
equate to an overall increase in treatment provision, which remains a relatively low 
priority in a climate of NHS rationing. A recent report by the British Medical 
Association (BMA) categorised fertility treatment alongside tattoo removal, gender 
reassignment, and drugs for baldness and impotence as draining resources away from 
essential services, and therefore, as candidates for exclusion from NHS provision92 . 
Furthermore, even for those living within a health authority which is able to fund 
treatment, extensive qualification criteria prevail, including maximum age limits (for 
86 As of 31 August, 2000. These are the most recent statistics currently available. 
87  www.hfea.gov .ulc 
88 See, for example, Pfeffer 1993; Franklin 1997 for a detailed discussion of the expansion of fertility 
services in the private sector in the context of extensive health service restructuring under Margaret 
Thatcher. 
89 Arguments about postcode prescription are not confined to fertility treatment, as has recently been 
highlighted in debates about nationally inconsistent access to beta interferon — a drug which many claim 
lessons the symptoms of MS. 
90  www.nice.org.uk 
91 Interestingly, the project to develop the guidelines is being conducted under the clinical theme of 
"Women's and Children's Services", highlighting the extent to which IVF specifically, and reproduction 
generally, are considered to be female activities and concerns. 
92  www.guardian.co.uk, 7 February, 2001 
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women), current family size and constitution, body mass index (for women) and 
relationship status. For those who do meet the stringent criteria, waiting lists for health 
authority funding often stretch to two or three years, providing a further incentive to 
turn to the private sector in the intervening period in order not to compound any existing 
fertility problems with the age-related decline in fertility, or to avoid older new 
parenting. 
The previous chapter described the way in which the participants identified themselves 
as "patients" receiving medical care as a strategy for justifying the engagement with 
IVF. However, whether treatment takes place in the private or the public sector, the 
reproductive endeavour simultaneously becomes an act of consumption. This creates a 
fundamental problem for those seeking treatment in that the redefinition of the IVF 
patient as a consumer contravenes normative standards of parenthood in general, and 
motherhood in particular, through the introduction of commercial exchange into the 
reproductive process (Layne 1999a: 3). The ideological selflessness of motherhood, in 
particular, does not sit easily with the individualism of consumption, and this chapter 
will explore the ways in which the participants both claim and resist their status as 
consumers in their accounts. 
There are two features to discourses of consumption which make this perspective 
particularly relevant to this thesis. Firstly, consumption is strongly marked by gender, 
both in terms of what is consumed, and by whom. Shopping, in particular, is 
constructed primarily as a female activity and responsibility (Bowlby 2000; Scanlon 
2000), and importantly, as an arena within which women are unable to exercise control. 
Rachel Bowlby argues that periodic female madness in relation to consumption — in the 
sales, for example — is constructed as a facet of normal femininity, in contrast with the 
stability of male sanity and reason (Bowlby 2000: 124). This parallels the understanding 
of the female hormonally regulated body as cyclically (dis)ordered, in comparison with 
male hormonal stability (Oudshoom 1994: 146). However, the normally disordered 
consumption of sale shopping is constructed as distinct from the compulsively disorder 
behaviour of the kleptomanaic "lady" shopper (Ableson 2000), or the shopaholic. It is a 
fine gendered balance to strike. 
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In the context of IVF failure, this perception of women as lacking restraint and prone to 
excess in relation to consumption gains particular salience in terms of "knowing when 
to stop". When treatment is successful, the number of cycles undergone is easily 
established as "just enough", but when treatment fails, the boundary between enough 
and too much remains obscured. For those who choose to stop treatment, this boundary 
has to be discursively fixed, either retrospectively in order to facilitate closure around 
the experience of IVF, or in the future, in order to bolster an argument for further 
treatment when the end of treatment has been unwelcome and imposed. This chapter 
will explore the ways in which the gendering of the IVF consumer intersects in the 
accounts with the wider social and cultural discourses of both consumption and 
infertility, and will consider some of the implications of these interactions. 
The second important aspect of consumption in the context of this study is the 
understanding that consumption is not so much a reflection of pre-existing identity, but 
creates identity (Probyn 2000; Scanlon 2000: 101). IVF plays a fundamental role in 
establishing an individual or couple as infertile. If infertility is to be understood as 
defined by the active desire for a child (as discussed in Chapter 1), then TVF constitutes 
purposeful activity towards the resolution of the problem of childlessness. It can be 
seen, therefore, that IVF establishes a couple's credentials as infertile, marking out their 
difference from those who have chosen to live without children. However, the 
perceptions in the wider social context of particular acts of consumption are not fixed 
and containable, and the engagement with IVF can equally be received by others as 
desperate, self-indulgent, pitiful, or even murderous 93 . Similarly, the decision to stop 
IVF can be understood as an act of either weakness or resolve. 
From this perspective, it is clear that even when treatment fails, those undergoing IVF 
are never back where they started. Both the experience of infertility and the identities of 
those undergoing treatment are marked by the unsuccessful engagement with IVF, and 
this chapter will explore the ways in which a range of possible identities conferred by 
unsuccessful IVF and its failure are managed by the participants in an attempt to control 
the ways in which that engagement is understood by themselves and others. It is also 
important to note that the participants are never only located within consumer culture, 
93  For example, the so-called "pro-life" lobby would argue that 1VF is murderous in creating "life" 
(embryos) and then destroying those not used. 
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and the chapter will consider how consumer discourse interacts with traditional health 
discourses in this process of discursive management and negotiation. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section addresses the participants' 
concerns about the uneasy fit between the reproductive endeavour and the introduction 
of financial exchange into the process; the second section considers the ways in which 
the participants identified themselves as "sensible shoppers" in order to distance 
themselves from the suggestion of excess; and the third section highlights some of the 
ways in which the unsuccessful engagement with IVF is distinct from other forms of 
consumption. These three sections focus primarily (although not exclusively) on 
privately funded treatment, including self-funded treatment in NHS hospitals. The 
fourth section focuses specifically on the problems of being a consumer of public 
resources in the engagement with IVF. 
Bringing money into it 
For many of the participants, simply bringing money into the reproductive endeavour 
was problematic. The interviews revealed a pervasive discomfort around the financial 
issues which result from the decision to pursue IVF, even where that treatment was 
performed within an NHS context. At the heart of this discomfort lies the perceived 
disjuncture between reproduction, which is constructed as natural, selfless and morally 
privileged, and the marketplace, which is understood as a corrupt and impersonal arena 
thriving on individual self-interest. This is not, of course, to argue that consumption in 
relation to parenthood is always constructed negatively. In fact, it is hard to escape the 
advertising messages which equate consumer goods for children in general with acts of 
caring. Instead, the negative representations of consumption relate to spending money 
on the self— a distinction that becomes blurred in the context of IVF, particularly when 
that treatment fails. 
The inescapable centrality of money to the experience of IVF emerged as a source of 
both embarrassment and tension in the accounts: 
Susan: I mean [ ...] apart from the cost implications, which sounds awful, but on 
the other hand, you think, at what point [...] you know, you get a bonus, or you 
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come into some money, or you earn a bit of extra money and you're thinking "Ah! 
Treatment!" 
Susan is embarrassed to have even raised the possibility of cost having played a role in 
the decision to withdraw from treatment and feels that it reflects negatively on her. 
However, it is also apparent that her concerns over money relate not only to the absolute 
sums that they have spent, but also to the fact that their own relationship towards money 
had changed, and all their disposable income had come to be valued only in terms of the 
treatment it could buy. She was particularly horrified when, after her friend had had a 
new kitchen fitted, on hearing the price, her reaction was immediately to quantify the 
sum in terms of treatment cycles: 
Susan: And I'm thinking, "God, I could have had three treatments with that!" You 
know, and you, I thought, I don't want to be like that. 94 
For Courtney, the prominent role of money in the provision of IVF caused the attention 
of the providers to drift away from the patients and onto the money they might make 
from them: 
Courtney: I know that if I go through IVF again, I've got to pay, but I want them 
to look at me, not my money, because unfortunately, it is all to do with money, 
which it shouldn't be. (my emphasis) 
Courtney's treatment cycle was self-funded at the NHS hospital, and she recalled 
handing over the money in the corridor, "just like we [were] in a back street". The 
sordid appearance of the transaction did nothing to quell her concerns about the sullying 
effect of financial exchange on the reproductive process. 
However, for some, the large sums involved in undergoing IVF in a private clinic were 
not just distasteful, but were potentially corrupting: 
94  This brings to mind a conversation with a friend working in health journalism, who described "the hip" 
(replacement) as the most common unit of currency in health discourse — as in, "You could do 75 hips for 
that..." 
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John: [...] treatments like ]VF, where it's done almost on the basis of people's 
desperation, I think.., can leave themselves wide open to abuse by other 
unscrupulous people. 
John saw private medicine, in general, as offering a perfect opportunity "to fleece 
people that were in a desperate situation", perceiving the inevitable financial and 
professional self-interest of the practitioners as incompatible with the motivations of the 
patients, particularly when they were vulnerable. John's articulation of his suspicions 
highlight a key gender difference which emerged in the accounts. While the female 
participants' concerns focused primarily on the ways in which the involvement of 
money disrupted the construction of the reproductive endeavour as natural, normal and 
fundamentally altruistic, for the male participants, value for money and not being taken 
for a ride emerged as primary concerns. In John's case, this also worked as a strategy 
for distancing himself from the decision to proceed with treatment that had ultimately 
failed, constructing himself as knowingly sceptical, but participating for the sake of 
Cathy, his wife. 
The suspicion that both Courtney and John express towards the corrupting or distorting 
influence of money over the delivery of IVF is also extended to GP services by Nancy 
and Martin. Their GP had been supportive of their IVF treatment, and had provided the 
necessary drugs. However, after the practice had become fund-holding, they were 
refused further drugs: 
Nancy: We never would have got them again, because they edged him out, didn't 
they. I think that's why — because he was so interested infertility. 
Martin: He seemed like the old school. 
Nancy: Obviously, the ones that are there now are interested in their pockets. You 
know, fertility drugs cost a lot of money. 
Nancy and Martin contrast the "old school" ethics of their doctor, who they experienced 
as patient-focused and supportive, with the newly structured practice guided by their 
interest "in their pockets". It is this fear of the capacity of financial incentives to cause 
treatment providers to lose sight of their patients' own priorities that makes treatment 
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within the NETS so appealing, even where this treatment is self-funded, since only a 
fraction of the cost at private clinics was charged, simply to cover costs: 
Nancy: So I was quite happy to go to [the NHS hospital] because they were doing 
something because they wanted to do it, rather than just a money-making venture. 
This preservation of the purity of motives and the construction of TVF provision as 
altruistic rather than self-interested was a repeated feature of the interviews, and the 
introduction of money beyond the covering of costs was perceived as potentially 
damaging to that. This is particularly true where TVF has failed, since as described in 
the previous chapter, the naturalising presence of a baby is absent to counterbalance the 
discomfort which exists around the transaction itself. This is significant because it runs 
counter to the usual expectation of private health care (and the purchase of other 
services or products) that a higher price guarantees a higher quality of service or care. 
The interviews revealed two incidents of obviously unethical practices. Alice had paid 
an expensive private clinic to perform assisted hatching95 , but after the egg collection 
procedure, the consultant announced that he would not do assisted hatching and would 
require an extra £700 on the spot in order to perform ICSI. This all happened while 
Alice was still coming round from the anaesthetic, but her husband paid the money 
immediately, since they were both afraid that the doctor might dispose of eggs that had 
been collected if they did not do as he wanted. The second case was in a private clinic 
that Denise and Graham attended. Denise reported that the egg collection procedure was 
excruciatingly painful, and that clinic itself was "like an office block [...] You just went 
in and laid on the couch. It didn't seem sterile even." This took place before IVF was 
subject to BFEA legislation, and the clinic was subsequently closed down following 
complaints and a critical television documentary. Denise and Graham felt they had had 
a lucky escape, since many women contracted infections through treatment at the same 
place. 
95 Assisted hatching is a procedure where a hole is drilled in the zona pellucida — the outer "shell" of the 
egg — weakening it. It is thought that the eggs of older women have thicker than average zona, meaning 
that it does not break as easily as it would normally do at about 5 days after fertilisation (Winston 1999: 
126). The procedure was not widely available when Alice was seeking treatment, and this was the only 
accessible clinic. 
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But even though these were the only reported incidences of blatantly unethical practice, 
the majority of the participants assumed dishonesty in the self-presentation of clinics, 
including those operating within the NHS. In particular, the use of statistics in 
promotional or informational material was considered highly suspect: 
Angela: I'm not a great believer in statistics. I feel, because I used to work in a 
bank, and I always felt that the statistics men can sort of you know, tweak them 
wherever they wanted to [both laughing]. So, I'm not a great ...I don't have a lot 
offaith in statistics. 
A large majority of the participants were unaware of the standardisation of core 
statistics such as the live birth rate per cycle that all clinics are obliged to provide as part 
of their licensing under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 1991, and it 
was widely assumed that chemical pregnancy rates 96, or even fertilisation rates, are used 
in order to create the illusion of greater success than was actually being achieved. 
Furthermore, it was widely believed that the need to be able to publish competitive 
success rates, both to bolster professional reputations and to maintain a healthy bottom 
line, was a deciding factor in decisions determining whether patients for whom 
treatment had failed would be allowed to return for further cycles of treatment. When 
Liz discovered that the words "Poor performer" had been written in large letters across 
her medical records, her immediate reaction was that the doctors examining that record 
with a view to offering further treatment would not possibly accept her on the grounds 
that she wasn't going to "make their league tables look any better". Robert Winston's 
remarks at the Millenium Festival of Medicine in London in November 2000 would 
seem to support this suspicion. He described the tables showing success rates as 
"fundamentally flawed and useless", suggesting that clinics modify the figures, and turn 
away women who are judged unlikely to be successful 97 . 
While the financial aspects of 1VF were perceived by many of the participants as, at 
best, distracting the practitioners from the goals and priorities of patients, and at worst, 
leading to outright corrupt practices, money was also (and perhaps more significantly) 
seen as having the potential to corrupt the consumers of rvF. As in the case of the 
96  Temporarily raised hormone levels indicative of a pregnancy, but not sufficient to sustain it. 
97  vvwvv.netdoctor.co.uk, 8 November, 2000 
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providers of treatment, this perceived corruption, or risk of corruption, was seen as 
residing in the risk of losing sight of the higher goal of reproduction as a fundamentally 
natural activity. These fears were voiced in particular in reference to the dramatic and 
salacious media coverage of extraordinary stories of post-menopausal motherhood, 
unusual family structures, intra-familial and inter-generational donorship and surrogacy 
arrangements, and catastrophically large multiple pregnancies. In such stories, those 
seeking treatment outside of the conventional social reproductive norms are constructed 
as commodifying babies, and reportage is traditionally redolent with the rhetoric of 
consumerism — designer, convenience, tailor-made — all of which construct the 
engagement with WE as indulgent and whimsical. Treatment in these contexts is 
privately funded, often at great cost, frequently transcending national borders in order to 
avail themselves of a less regulated treatment environment. In addition, those 
undergoing treatment are frequently accused of actually trying to make money by 
attracting media attention. The IVF baby emerges within this discourse as the perfect 
accessory, the ultimate impulse buy, and when the first IVF baby born using an egg 
which had been frozen and thawed in March 2001, "pro-life" campaigners warned that 
it would lead to "babies on order", which can be "picked off the shelf at any time" 98 . 
For most people without any direct experience of IVF, these media images form the 
basis of their knowledge, and therefore, the participants found their own engagement 
with the technology tarred with the same brush in the eyes of those around them, in 
spite of the fact that their own treatment had failed: 
Matthew: But some people looked at [those stories] and started... "They're 
disgusting, paying for this, and paying for that." And I just think it gave IVFers, 
in general, it gave them a bad name. 
Susan: [...] People sort of "Oh, it's an accessory. People that just want IVF — it 's 
an accessory. You've got the car, you've got the house, you want children, so you 
just go off and have IVF." And it's not like that 
98 Daily Mail, 12 March, 2001 
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Beth: [..1 Tailor-made babies — they just ...anyone can go now — the 60 year old 
woman can go and have IVF, and the woman up the road who just wants a couple 
of kids can go and have IVF. It sort of put a bit of a slur on it, didn't it. 
The primary concern here is not the behaviour of those who have transgressed the 
reproductive normative standards per se but instead, it is the way in which that 
behaviour is judged to have marked their own engagement with FVF, exposing them to 
unfair criticism. The participants defended themselves indignantly against being 
indiscriminately lumped together with those whose engagement with treatment was 
remarkable for its deviation from the normative standards. The involvement of money 
complicates the efforts to construct a distinction between just wanting a child, and the 
morally legitimate pursuit of treatment since it carries with it the culturally recognised 
suggestion of selfish indulgence, as well as exposing the class distinctions in access to 
treatment in terms of purchasing power. 
Ironically, the argument that money corrupts the reproductive endeavour is 
counterbalanced, particularly for women, by the characterisation in popular culture and 
discourse of childlessness as a fundamentally selfish existence. Consequently, while the 
willingness to pay for treatment can expose people experiencing infertility to 
accusations of the selfish distortion and commodification of reproduction, the decision 
not to pursue treatment can also be read as unwillingness to make the sacrifices 
necessary to achieve the natural state of parenthood, leaving the individual to indulge 
selfishly in more conventional consumerist acts: 
Melanie: And I wanted to give her a good shake, because she won't pay for IVF 
treatment. She thinks it ought to be free, and so she's had all the same emotions 
that I went through — all the being desperate for a baby. But she'll spend £2000 
on a holiday, or X amount here. It just annoys me —you can't want something that 
much [...] 
Although assumed by Melanie to be able to pay based on the fact that she had taken an 
expensive holiday, Melanie's sister had chosen not to, apparently on political grounds, 
and this was a source of anger and frustration to Melanie, who was highly critical of her 
spending priorities, assuming a correlative relationship between the degree of desire for 
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a child and the willingness to pay for IVF to resolve that unfulfilled need. However, 
whilst expressing her frustration, the telling of her sister's story also shores up 
Melanie's presentation of herself as possessed not only of a powerful drive to have a 
child, but also as being determined to act on that by making the necessary sacrifices, 
financially, physically and emotionally, in order to attain that goa199. More generally, 
this highlights the fact that each act of consumption takes place within a situationally 
specific and contextually determined moral framework and is subject to the disciplinary 
surveillance of others. 
Beth expressed her own frustration at the suggestion that expenditure correlates with the 
desire for a child: 
Beth: And people say to you, "If you wanted it that bad, you'd borrow £10,000 
and go and do it", but it's not as easy as that! 
Beth desperately wanted to pursue further treatment and was depressed and frustrated 
that she was unable to do so without taking financial risks that were unacceptable to her. 
Her health authority would not fund a second cycle, and with an adult son from a former 
relationship still at college and her partner recovering from a long and serious illness 
and therefore not able to contribute financially to the household, there was little 
possibility of her being able to raise the money to return to treatment in the foreseeable 
future. For her, the idea that her reluctance to get into unmanageable debt reflected an 
insufficient desire for a child was highly offensive and caused her considerable distress 
at a time when her involuntary childlessness was increasingly dominating her life and 
relationships 100 . 
The accounts (and particularly of those participants who were living without children) 
revealed a marked sensitivity to the appearance of other forms of consumer spending, 
fearing that they would appear self indulgent and selfish, and that others would suspect 
them of having chosen to live without children rather than having had it forced upon 
them: 
99 After two miscarriages and a number of failed IVF attempts, Melanie and Paul went on to have a 
daughter through a surrogacy arrangement with her other sister. 
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Claire: [...] I can say, "At least I tried" So there can be no stage in the future 
when I might say to myself "Oh well, if only I'd tried, it could have been 
different." Erm...it's almost like I can say to society, "Look, I tried to be the 
typical female, I tried to be the mother, you know, but it conspired against me, so I 
now have the right to go off and spend my money on nice holidays or whatever 
and don't need to feel guilty." 
For Claire, the freedom for her and her husband to enjoy the advantages of living 
without children can only be enjoyed for as long as others are aware that she "tried to 
be the typical female". In this sense, IVF performs a confessional function (Foucault 
1978: 62), whereby the non-conformity of childlessness (and the (stereotyped) 
associated lifestyle) receives social sanction. However, the need for confession exposes 
the moral status afforded to parenting, and particularly mothering, relative to other life 
choices. It is also important to note that the assumption that the alternative life path 
once treatment has failed is "nice holidays" or other forms of consumption is a false 
one. Naomi Pfeffer notes that the infertility counsellors she interviewed saw debt 
counselling as central to their work (Pfeffer 1993: 230), and even for those who do not 
get into debt, their childlessness does not necessarily equate to a large disposable 
income. Conversely, several of the female participants in this study had spent many 
years in low-paid, casual employment, expecting to leave or work part-time once they 
had become pregnant. Consequently, the experience of unsuccessful IVF had 
opportunity costs, as well as direct financial costs, which impinged on their future 
earning capacity. 
This section has demonstrated the ways in which the introduction of financial exchange 
into the reproductive endeavour is highly problematic for those who engage with it, 
since it is perceived to mark that endeavour in a pejorative way, either by corrupting the 
delivery of treatment, or distorting the priorities of those who receive treatment. Even 
those who construct themselves as free of that distortion perceive themselves and their 
engagement with IVF to be tainted in the public eye by the less "pure" encounters of 
others with treatment. Consequently, a marked feature of the accounts is the 
113° As described in Chapter 3, these tensions reached something of a crisis between the two interviews. 
Beth left her partner, and I subsequently lost touch with her. 
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construction of the self as a recognisably rational and moderate consumer of IVF, and 
this is achieved primarily through the discourse of the "sensible shopper", which is the 
focus of the following section. 
The Sensible Shopper 
Competition is the cornerstone of enterprise culture, and is perceived as guaranteeing 
maximal choice and value for money for the consumer. The glossy brochures 
distributed by the private clinics appear at first glance to conform to this discourse. The 
pages of the brochures are redolent with glistening technology and pristinely white-
coated medical staff interspersed with smiling families and plush soft furnishings. At 
first glance, buying IVF is no different to buying an attic conversion or a holiday — you 
solicit brochures, review what is on offer, make a decision as to which offers the best 
value for money according to the priorities you have drawn up, and then you make your 
purchase. As Rachel described it, "...it turned out to be a little bit like buying double 
glazing, because there's so much on offer, and you get so many glossy brochures... 5,101. 
The purchase of IVF confers not only a product, but also an identity on to the consumer 
— an identity which is characterised by the commitment to parenthood (and therefore, 
social conformity), and also by being discerning and thorough in the process of 
consumption (and therefore, fit to parent). However, when treatment fails, this also 
raises the possibility of the wrong selection having been made. Shopping for WF, then, 
is a big responsibility, and this was a responsibility that fell almost exclusively to the 
female participants. 
It is important to note that the proliferation of choice which the brochures seem to offer 
is deceptive, not least because many potential patients will automatically be excluded by 
financial constraints. In this context, the shopping discourse is already an exclusive one 
and not at all representative of the wider experience of infertility. Furthermore, 
depending on the geographical location, those seeking treatment may simply not have a 
wide array of clinics from which to choose. There is a concentration of clinics in the 
London area, which has 18 of the 75 licensed clinics, and 10 of these offer non-fee 
At the beginning of this project I wrote to all the NHS and private clinics in the region asking for 
information about their fertility services (and not disclosing myself as a researcher), and received thick 
information packs and booklets by return post from the majority of private clinics, and these were 
followed up for at least a year with regular invitations to presentation evenings. While this could not be 
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paying as well as fee paying treatmentm . Therefore, those living within reasonable 
travelling distance of the metropolitan centres have a greater range of treatment 
providers from which to choose, compared to other less well-served areas. Furthermore, 
while limited access to clinics (either geographically or financially) can constitute an 
absolute constraint in terms of being able to undergo IVF, the limitation of treatment 
options impacts upon the power relations between the customer and the clinic — a 
relationship already marked by the asymmetrical doctor-patient power dynamic If the 
patient is able to withdraw her custom and seek treatment elsewhere, then, potentially, 
she is able to exercise more control over the treatment process. Anne, for example, was 
able to insist on having the egg collection performed under a local anaesthetic rather 
than a general, against clinic policy — a victory which she put down to "being a private 
patient", and therefore, in principle at least, able to take her custom elsewhere. 
However, the same request by Alice (whose bad experience with a clinic was described 
in the previous section) was given short shrift by her expensive private clinic, and she 
was unable to withdraw her custom because this was the only accessible clinic able to 
perform assisted hatching. Consumer choice in the context of IVF, then, is not 
universal, and nor does the status of consumer necessarily disrupt the doctor-patient 
power dynamic 
These caveats notwithstanding, the familiarity of the consumerist discourse and its 
centrality to contemporary UK society offers those who pay for IVF treatment a readily 
intelligible means of negotiating the tension inherent in the introduction of commercial 
exchange into the reproductive process. There are two key aspects to the discourse of 
"shopping sensibly": (1) getting a bargain, and (2), not spending more than you have or 
can manageably borrow. 
Getting a bargain 
Even where IVF treatment is health authority funded, it is never entirely without 
financial cost, if only in travel expenses, loss of earnings for time taken to attend the 
clinic, or, as in the case of several of the participants in this study, as a result of "treats" 
of short holidays or favourite foods and drinks to ease the disappointment of treatment 
described as a hard sell, the marketing was swift and efficient, and I was left in no doubt that these were 
first and foremost businesses. 
102 www.hfea.gov.uk  
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failure. The cost of undergoing IVF can extend from minimal up to several thousands of 
pounds per cycle in the private sector, depending on the exact procedure involved 103 . 
Consequently, in order to increase their competitive edge and attract patients, private 
clinics have begun to offer treatment packages using the familiar marketing technique of 
the special deal, offering three cycles for the price of two, or no baby, no fee packages. 
However, in the finest tradition of the special offer, conditions apply, and, generally 
speaking, the packages do not include the cost of the drugs that are integral to the IVF 
process (although these costs may be covered by the patient's GP), and there are often 
age restrictions which maximise the chances of success for the clinic, thereby 
minimising the risk of having to provide treatment at a loss. 
However, the most common "bargain" made use of by the participants in this study 
came in the form of schemes within NHS clinics which provide treatment at cost, 
meaning the treatment costs were reduced to less than £1000 per cycle, which represents 
excellent value in comparison to the cost of services within the private sector: 
Angela: this was the friend that I mentioned earlier, and she said that [hospital] 
were doing a special offer at the time [laughing] for £500... 
Sharon: [...] and I remember reading something in a magazine, and it... well, I 
can remember it — it said, "Cut price IVF", and of course, my eyes sort of went 
straight to it, and [hospital] was offering a cycle of £530, which we had been 
paying about £2000 up at the [private clinic] , so to us, that was a big difference. 
In these accounts, neither participant was actively bargain-hunting, but instead have an 
eye for a bargain which they can opportunistically snap up — the art of the good shopper. 
The ultimate bargain, of course, is the health authority funded cycle, which often 
appeared unexpectedly after a long period of waiting: 
Sarah: Because we had a letter saying, you know, we've got some spare, end-of-
season IVF's [both laughing] [...] 
103  In this study, the most expensive single cycle of treatment totalled approximately £5000, although this 
was unusual, and the total cost included money that the participant reported to have been demanded in 
unethical circumstances mid-cycle. £2-3000 is more usual for a cycle of treatment in the private sector. 
z- 
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The use of the language of the supermarket sale in the context of the discovery of cheap 
or free IVF treatment was deliberately and humorously incongruous, often provoking 
laughter. However, this incongruity points to a more general discomfort surround the 
introduction of money into the IVF context and the identification of the purchase as a 
bargain, and therefore not to be turned down, is an important strategy in resolving that 
tension. Where the intention was to carry on with treatment in any case, even if it meant 
paying privately, taking up the bargain treatments simply becomes a matter of 
economics — why pay more when you can pay less? 
Martin: Just to clarify though, er ...it wasn't that we couldn't afford to carry on 
with the [private clinic] , it's just that here was a hospital giving us the same 
treatment for ...a quarter of the price. And it was as simple as that. Would you go 
and buy a pair of shoes for £50 or £10? It was as simple as that. 
Martin values his role as the breadwinner and provider and is careful to assert that they 
didn't need the cheap treatment, and nor is he being mean in choosing to pay less rather 
than more. His illustrative rhetorical question about the more mundane shopping task of 
buying shoes makes it clear that the choice about IVF is "as simple as that" — the basic 
rules of careful shopping apply, and the cheaper option is the only logical choice when 
the treatment is fundamentally the same. This is interesting from the perspective of 
comparison with other consumer experiences where you might expect suspicion about a 
bargain. The experienced shopper, after all, always looks for the catch and reads the 
small print. However, this is not to suggest that the participants had not done their 
research, but rather, reflects their judgement that the core product remains the same in 
the bargain offers as in the more expensive versions. This willingness to accept cheaper 
treatment at face value partly reflects the concerns mentioned earlier about the 
contaminating effects of financial exchange in the reproductive process. From this 
perspective, cheaper IVF is less not more risky. However, another important aspect is 
the fact that the vast majority of irresistible bargains came out of the NHS hospitals, 
whose reputation was based on the provision of free (and therefore, uncontaminated) 
treatment. Bowlby also notes that getting a bargain, even where money is no object, is a 
"great social leveller" (Bowlby 2000: 122), thereby alleviating some of the tension 
around the privilege of being able to access private treatment. 
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However, from the perspective of the decision to end treatment, these offers proved to 
be something of a double-edged sword, since although they provide the means of 
pursuing treatment which may otherwise have not been affordable, cheap or free 
treatment also constitutes a strong incentive to pursue further treatment, even where 
tentative decisions to stop had already been made: 
Cathy: The first one was the one that we got for £500, that we went through, three 
embryos were implanted and it was a failure. And then we decided then, that was 
it, no more, give up, didn't we. And the very night we talked about it... this one 
night, we were both sitting here. The next day, I get a letter through the door — it 
was literally the next day — "you have got a free cycle from [health authority]." 
They put the health authority's name in a hat — we got a free cycle. We paid for 
our own drugs, but the cycle was free, and so, we looked at it, because you don't 
look a gift horse in the mouth after all these years. 
One of the key problems identified in this study with health authority funded treatment 
cycles was the sudden and unexpected announcement of treatment provision often two 
or three years after first applying. In many cases, this was a welcome surprise — an 
unexpected fmancial saving on treatment that was due to be undertaken regardless of 
health authority funding — but for others, this necessitated a return to treatment that 
would otherwise not have taken place, since the patients cannot run the risk of 
unsettling regrets in later life, wondering if whether that cycle might have been their 
lucky one, if only they'd tried. Therefore, it can be seen that where health authority 
funding is unpredictable, it can protract the process of learning to live with involuntary 
childlessness. Even predictable funding can create its own problems however, and in 
one of the US case studies described by Yakov Epstein and Helane Rosenberg, the 
female partner wanted to carry on with treatment until all three of the cycles that were 
allowed by their insurer had been used up (Epstein and Rosenberg 1997: 141; see also, 
Britt 2001). 
Living within your means  
The second strategy by which the participants identified themselves as sensible 
shoppers became apparent in the frequent assertion that they had not spent more money 
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than they had available, or could manageably borrow. The assertion that they had used 
what was essentially disposable income, even where that disposability resulted from 
rationing expenditure elsewhere, shores up the representation of the self as rational and 
controlled with regards to the treatment. This representation was achieved in the first 
instance by contrasting their own financial management of IVF with that of the 
caricatured unwise, compulsive consumer of TVF, whose inability to limit treatment to 
within their fmancial capacity has led to financial ruin: 
Alice: And I've heard of people who've second mortgaged their homes and get 
into debt over it, and I thought, I don't want to get onto that slippery slope. 
Jane: [private hospital] was a good one. 
Brian: And so was their price ...and that was something that's got to be 
considered as well. I mean, people remortgage their houses. 
The unwise, compulsive shopper is an incarnation of desperation who has much in 
common with the desperate, infertile woman who emerged in the previous chapter as 
the irrational Other, and her purpose in the accounts is to serve as a foil to the rationality 
and moderation of those being interviewed. The compulsive shopper is always female in 
the accounts (as in popular culture), with the rationality of the male partners taken as 
given. The female participants, then, have to actively demonstrate their own control 
over their IVF consumption by defining themselves against the desperate Other 104 . 
This rationality is further confirmed by the assertion that the money that was spent was 
essentially going spare and did not impinge on necessary household expenditure: 
Claire: I mean, we knew it was going to be expensive, but we knew that we were 
in the fortunate position that we had the money to spend, and you know, that was 
a choice we were able to make... we didn't have exotic holidays that year, but you 
know, fair enough. 
104 	. 	. An irrational, uncontrolled male counterpart to rationality did emerge in the accounts, but in relation 
to violence and child abuse, rather than money. 
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Liz: And, you know, at Christmas time or something, if someone gave us some 
money, we would say, well, we'll put that in the baby fund. You know, it seemed a 
positive thing to do with it rather than say... well, go off to Marks and Sparks and 
buy some new curtains. 
Melissa: [...] we probably didn't have as big a holiday, or as many holidays as 
we would have done, but I mean, I hardly see that as a sacrifice. You know, I 
mean, we were quite fortunate [...] 
The financial sacrifices that are cited are deliberately frivolous — holidays and soft 
furnishings — suggesting not only that the money was disposable, but that the decision to 
spend that money on IVF marks a shift away from the dangerous self-indulgence of a 
life without children, confirming the commitment to the socially sanctioned institution 
of parenthood. They are literally investing in parenthood. The demonstration of that 
commitment is particularly important when that parenthood has never been realised, 
since it confirms the distinction between voluntary and involuntary childlessness that 
the participants are eager to maintain — a distinction which easily becomes blurred by 
the decision to stop treatment. 
Cathy and John did get slightly into debt in the course of their 1VF treatment, but Cathy 
made it clear that that borrowing was for living expenses, rather than for the WE itself: 
John: I think there were sums that got borrowed. 
Cathy: What we borrowed was borrowing because of living [...] Not for IVF. The 
IVF was paid for, but then the living went down the tubes, so borrowing came 
from that [...]. And we didn't spend as much on IVF as people do. We were 
fortunate in so far as the GP paid for my drugs [ ...] 
Even though it is clear from their account that Cathy and John had to borrow money 
because they had spent money on ni-F, Cathy makes a clear distinction between 
borrowing for IVF and borrowing to live which distances them from the suggestion of 
immoderation in their spending on IVF. This also confirms the priority claim that IVF 
had on their funds, affirming their commitment to parenthood. This is further affirmed 
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by the comparison with the spending of others, and the reminder that what they had 
spent had been subsidised, and therefore constituted a good deal. 
It is important to note, however, that it is getting into unmanageable debt that is the 
stigmatised position, rather than borrowing per se. In fact, the acceptability of 
borrowing to fund IVF is demonstrated by the provision of lines of credit by many of 
the private clinics. Naomi Pfeffer describes this as" a marketing ploy that [puts] rvF on 
a par with consumer durables such as videos and stereo equipment" (Pfeffer 1993: 
174) 105 . The alliance of IVF with other forms of consumption normalises the purchasing 
of treatment (and by implication, the treatment itself), although this also normalises the 
expectation of borrowing to fund treatment, further blurring the end point of treatment. 
Another important justificatory strategy in defence of IVF expenditure is the 
comparison with their imagined expenditure if they had been able to have children: 
Michelle: I mean, it is expensive, but the way I looked at it was ...children are 
expensive, and if we had children, I would probably have given up work anyway, 
so in the mean time, I'm working. You know, I'm earning a salary, so if I want to 
spend that money on trying to have a child, or we decided that's how we're going 
to spend it, so... that's what we did. 
By allying the expenditure of trying for a child with that of having a child, Michelle 
demonstrates not only her awareness of the expense of children, but also that she would 
have left work to care for those children, establishing herself as conforming to the 
values of the institution of motherhood. She also sets out the money they are spending 
on treatment as doubly available, since it is not only money that they are not spending 
on children, but it is also money that she would not be earning, were they to become 
parents. Her right to spend the money as she pleases is asserted through the fact that it is 
her salary — a rather half-hearted individualistic stance which is quickly then moderated 
105 The Harley Medical Group now offers gift vouchers which can be redeemed against cosmetic surgery 
procedures, and were marketed as Christmas gifts (Metro, 17 December, 2001). It is not inconceivable 
that the same scheme could be applied to fertility treatment in the private sector in the future. Indeed, 
many of the participants received monetary gifts from relatives at Christmas and birthdays to put towards 
treatment, indicating this as an acceptable site for gifts. 
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by the transition from the first person to the collective "we" to highlight their joint 
decision-making. 
Interestingly, while in general terms, and particularly in the context of starting 
treatment, the participants reported their expenditure as essentially disposable income, 
in the context of stopping treatment, expense was frequently cited as a factor. Of course, 
in many cases, expense is an absolute constraint, although this was only true of a small 
number of the participants in this study. However, even for those who could, in theory, 
have afforded more treatment, it became clear that it became less and less possible to 
manage the necessary financial and lifestyle sacrifices alongside repeated treatment 
failure: 
Sharon: Well, we just saved, and didn't go on holiday. Everything was our IVF, 
wasn't it. We couldn't have that — it's IVF. Like, if we wanted a three piece 
suite... that was IVF money. I mean, everything revolved, for those few years, it all 
IVF. It was all we ever did really. That was our whole life. 
Jane: We just didn't...we lived in a house for years and it was in quite a state, and 
we just had to leave it in a state, because we couldn't afford it. [...] And you used 
to do extra work, didn't you, getting part time in...a bit of decorating on the side 
to get enough money. 
The discursive contradiction between the assertion of the disposability of income and 
the claiming of financial strain reflects the fact that while those funds were technically 
disposable, this was frequently at the expense of all other extraneous expenditure. 
Consequently, many found the strain of not being able to go on holiday, or treat 
themselves to new clothes or furniture becoming increasingly wearing. In the case of 
Sharon, she also cited concern about her son from her previous marriage, who she felt 
was being unfairly denied family holidays and other treats as a result of their 
commitment to IVF, and in Jane's case, the IVF expenditure was affecting their ability 
to maintain their house, as well as placing a substantial burden on her husband, Brian, in 
terms of maintaining two jobs. What is apparent here is that the availability of the 
money is less significant than the relative value attached to it, particularly as treatment 
progresses through a number of unsuccessful cycles: 
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Nancy: As it went on, we did get the value of the money a bit more, and you 
weren't very happy with the job that you were doing. And we were thinking, well, 
it's a lot of money. 
Matthew: Well, our money was going on the IVF, so we couldn't afford to go on 
holiday. They were having holidays, and they were coming back and saying, "Oh, 
look, she 's pregnant!" And that hurts, because it was like...they're getting the 
best of both worlds! 
For several of the participants in this study, the value for money in continuing treatment 
began to fall away as the necessary financial sacrifices became harder to bear, as did the 
successive treatment failures, gradually shifting the cost-benefit analysis less favourably 
away from continuing treatment. 
It is interesting to note at this point that while people were very willing to talk about the 
costs of treatment, particularly when they had got a bargain, they were much less 
willing to talk about money more generally. Only just over half of the participants were 
prepared to include their income on an initial questionnaire, and questions about the 
organisation of household fmances were generally evaded. I initially put this down to a 
facet of Englishness — of it being perceived as rude to talk about money. However, as 
the interviews progressed, it became clear that this reluctance said far more about their 
fears of being judged as having spent too much or too little on treatment relative to 
income. 
While IVF is clearly located within consumer culture, it is, in many ways, not a regular 
consumer experience and the "sensible shopper" discourse becomes increasingly 
unsustainable as the treatment failures mount up. While the pointing up of similarities 
with other shopping experiences is useful as a strategy for normalising the decision to 
spend money on rvF, the incongruities in the analogy become increasingly difficult to 
suppress, as the next section will demonstrate. 
Disrupting Consumer Identities 
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The treatment of infertility in the UK is curiously positioned in relation to health care, 
with health authorities and private health insurers willing to conduct tests to establish 
the causes of infertility without necessarily being willing to fund fertility treatments 
such as IVF. Consequently, regardless of who eventually funds a particular treatment, 
most patients seeking treatment begin with a visit to their GP, who usually organises 
preliminary tests to assess spelin quality, the presence of particular hormones at 
different stages of the cycle, and perhaps an ultrasound scan to check for conditions 
such as polycystic ovaries or uterine fibroids. As the tests become increasingly invasive 
and treatment is entered into, the NHS is less and less accommodating, with long 
waiting lists for investigative laparoscopic surgeries and limited funding for treatment. 
Consequently, for those who can afford to pay, private treatment increasingly becomes 
an appealing option. Particularly in their early engagement with IVF, this transition in 
their own status from patient to consumer was obscured, often undergoing tests 
privately, for example, but on referral from their GP. Consequently, it is apparent from 
the interviews that far from being sensible shoppers from the outset, several of the 
participants were initially completely unaware of their potential status as consumers, 
and therefore, of the possibility of shopping around: 
Jane: So there were so many hospitals involved [in providing IVF] , but we didn't, 
we were so naïve really. 
Brian: Well, we got wrapped up in [hospital] and that was it. 
Jane: What was the be all and end all, and we just went with that. But now, 
perhaps looking back, we might have looked into it a bit more, and financially. 
But as each treatment came along, we just... 
Brian: We just went for it. 
Jane: We just went for it. 
Brian: Blindly. 
Accustomed to health care provision which has little opportunity for patient initiative 
and where there is a clear process to follow, Jane and Brian, along with many other of 
the participants, found themselves on a well-trodden path that ended up at IVF, which 
their health authority would not pay for. Consequently, their GP referred them to 
[hospital], and throughout their treatment, they remained only faintly aware of the 
thriving private sector IVF industry — something which was a cause of considerable 
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regret to them having stopped treatment, since they were left wondering whether they 
could have done more. This stands in contrast to the surveying of brochures and the 
bargain hunting of other participants, and can be explained in part by the extent to 
which their treatment had been conducted entirely in an NHS context (although funded 
by themselves at cost). As in many NHS hospitals, patients who are considered to have 
an extremely small chance of success will often not be allowed to undergo further 
cycles if one or two cycles show very poor results, particularly in terms of egg 
collection or fertilisation. However, Brian and Jane achieved very positive results l°6 on 
each cycle, conceiving their son on their fourth cycle. It was only when Jane's egg 
quality began to decline with age that the consultant suggested that they might want to 
consider going elsewhere — a suggestion that Brian continued to feel angry about: 
Brian: Then, after all that, they tell us that, well, "Go to the place down the road, 
and they might be able to do something different for you." So why didn't they tell 
us that before? 
Because many of the participants were unfamiliar both with IVF and with purchasing 
health care, shopping for treatment is a skill that had to be acquired. Some were 
fortunate to be instructed as to the necessity of shopping around by the GPs or 
gynaecologists: 
Nancy: And he said, "You can find out about different clinics, in different areas of 
[city]." [Private clinic] were doing some, weren't they — that was private. There 
was a string of different clinics that were doing it privately. And he said, you 
know, "The prices do vary considerably. Ask for all that information and go from 
there [...] " 
However, for the most proficient shoppers, the skills were developed as their 
involvement with treatment progressed, gradually developing networks of friends and 
family who would spot articles in newspapers and magazines about new or cheap 
treatments, researching new techniques in medical journals, and subscribing to support 
106 It was common among the participants to categorise cycles of treatment as having gone well or badly, 
even where those cycles had failed. This related to the number of eggs produced, the quality of the eggs, 
and the number and quality of the embryos following fertilisation. 
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organisations and networks such as ISSUE. Katy and Tim - both highly proficient and 
rigorous IVF shoppers - drew up a short-list of clinics where they were considering 
seeking treatment, and then test drove to each clinic both to gain a visual impression of 
them, but also to gauge their accessibility, in anticipation of the stress of repeated visits 
by car. Others shopped for clinics which could perform specific techniques or which 
were willing to treat older women. 
The second way in which purchasing IVF differs from more conventional consumer 
experiences is that, particularly for the participants in this study, there is frequently 
nothing to show for the money: 
Sharon: And it's the fact that you're paying out, and you've got nothing at the end 
of it. It's like if you're paying a couple of thousand pounds out for a car, you've 
got a car, or a holiday or whatever. You've got nothing to show for this couple of 
thousand pounds you've just spent, you know. Just nothing. 
Getting nothing for your money is very threatening to the constructed identity of the 
sensible shopper, since having nothing to show for the expenditure is suggestive of 
wastefulness rather than caution. Martin was particularly exercised by this, almost 
wishing that his daughter, conceived spontaneously after stopping IVF, had been the 
product of IVF: 
Martin: I still feel a bit cheated that we didn't get pregnant. It's my personal 
feeling that... why did we have to spend so much money for it to happen naturally? 
At the end of the day, [...], I would rather have got [her] by IVF in the end [all 
laughing] 
It is important to note here that when his daughter was born, he made it very clear to 
everybody that she was not an IVF baby. This apparent contradiction reflects two 
aspects of masculine identity — that of being a good provider who doesn't waste money; 
and that of being virile and fertile, and not needing technology to become a father. This 
latter aspect of masculinity will be considered in more detail in the following chapter. 
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Another way in which the IVF consumer experience can be seen to differ is in the 
absence of any correlation between expenditure and the quality of the object of 
consumption. In the purchase of a car, for example, the more money spent, generally 
speaking, the better the car. However, in the case of IVF, it is not the quality of the 
treatment itself, or the better chance of a positive outcome, that was described as being 
paid for in the purchasing of private treatment, but rather, a better treatment 
environment: 
Claire: [treatment at an NHS hospital] was quite nice, yeah. Erm, but I mean, the 
main difference was just what you'd expect — the difference between a privately 
and publicly funded hospital. You know, the plush carpet and the nice decorations 
as opposed to clanky linoleum floors and a more basic set-up. But the underlying 
care — I wouldn't say there were any dramatic differences. 
Liz: [...] but I think, you know, the actual treatment was the same as what you 
would get in any other clinic. It just not such salubrious surroundings. 
The belief that the treatment in an NHS context is equal in the opportunities it provides 
for achieving pregnancy, if not in personal comfort, to that in the private sector is 
crucial to the participants' understanding of having done everything possible to achieve 
pregnancy, as well as being central in the construction of "bargain" treatments as 
sensible shopping rather than selfish unwillingness to pay. Furthermore, it dispels the 
potential feelings of guilt among those who were able to seek treatment in the private 
sector, suggesting that they did not achieve any advantage over those in the public 
sector in terms of the chances of becoming pregnant. In fact, the decision to seek private 
treatment could be presented as an act of sacrifice rather than advantage, stepping out of 
the NHS to give someone else a chance, and paying so that someone else didn't have to. 
The treatment provision within NHS clinics was frequently described as a "conveyor 
belt" — "Get her out, there's another one coming in" (Len) - and the accounts were 
littered with references to the cramped conditions, the corridor which doubled as a 
waiting area, and the lack of recovery time allotted to patients after procedures. 
Interestingly, the vast majority of these stories were told as humorous anecdotes rather 
than serious complaints, and tales of having to hold up the leg of a broken bed (Susan 
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and Matthew) or clear books and files off a bed before an examination (Rebecca and 
Jeff) were told as shared jokes, drawing on a well-established social understanding of 
the NHS as resource-starved. Within this discourse, the doctors were victims too, 
uniting the patients and the doctors in a joint struggle: 
Charlotte: It's not their fault. It's nobody's fault. It's just the state of our health 
service, ifyou like. 
In contrast, the experience of private treatment was characterised in the accounts by a 
succession of small luxuries: "tea and biscuits" (Katy), "posh settees" (Sharon), "tea on 
a little tray with a serviette" (Philip), and "the most expensive cucumber sandwiches" 
(Graham). Just as the participants made it clear that the quality of the NHS treatment 
should not be judged by the environment in which it was provided, the same applies to 
the private treatment, and in their accounts, this parade of little luxuries is presented as 
nothing more than window dressing, with little bearing on the product itself. 
However, the differences are not entirely cosmetic, and aside from the more luxurious 
experience, being able to undergo treatment privately provides significant advantages. 
Firstly, those who can afford private treatment do not have to endure the long waiting 
lists that characterise NHS treatment, particularly when that treatment is health authority 
funded; and secondly, patients at private clinics can arrange appointment times at their 
own convenience, including outside of office hours, meaning that the treatment itself is 
easier to keep secret if they wish to do so. It is also significant in terms of making their 
schedules manageable, and avoiding the loss of working hours, particularly for those in 
casual employment, or not using up valuable paid holiday. 
These differences aside, the belief that treatment in an NHS context is essentially the 
same as private treatment had a number of dissenters among the participants. Beth 
compared her health authority funded treatment protocol to that of her sister-in-law who 
had had treatment at a private clinic, and realised that the drug regimen was different: 
Beth: And all her drugs were different to mine as well, and somebody said to me 
that, "Oh, yeah, you get the old shit that they used to use 10 years ago. They don't 
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use those drugs now. They give it free just because it's the old stock that they've 
got in the cupboard." 
Differing drugs protocols between clinics is common, but the cash-strapped reputation 
of the NHS allowed the seed that had been planted in Beth's mind to cause her to 
question the whole cycle of treatment she had received at the hospital. Katy and Tim's 
doubts were less specific, but focused primarily on Tim's concerns that the conveyer 
belt style delivery of treatment, followed by a long walk to the car because there was no 
parking provided, and a long drive home simply wasn't "the best start for an embryo in 
Katy's body." This continuing doubt resulted partly from the fact that Katy's sister had 
had twins by rvF in a private clinic, where she had been made to lie down for several 
hours after the embryo transfer. These lingering doubts point to the difficulties those 
seeking treatment face in achieving closure around treatment — a task that is made even 
more difficult by the burgeoning IVF industry, which seems to offer endless treatment 
possibilities in infinite combinations. 
So far, this chapter has focused primarily on the problems faced by those who seek 
treatment in the private sector. However, the section that follows will look in more 
detail at receiving treatment within the NHS, which, ironically, even where it is free, 
does not release the patients from the problems of introducing financial exchange into 
the reproductive process. 
NHS Provision  
There are a number of fairly self-explanatory reasons why, from the patients' 
perspective, treatment in an NHS context, either health authority funded, or provided at 
a significantly reduced cost, is preferable to having to seek treatment in the private 
sector. Firstly, and most obviously, there is a strong financial incentive. Secondly, as 
has already been described, treatment on the NHS is perceived as relatively innocent of 
the risk of treatment providers being "in it for the money", thereby avoiding the 
contamination of the reproductive endeavour by financial ambition. And thirdly, 
treatment within the NHS not only legitimises infertility as an illness to be treated, but 
also normalises IVF itself as a mainstream medical technology, relieving the patients to 
some degree of the stigma discussed in the previous chapter of introducing technology 
into the reproductive process. However, treatment with the NHS is not unproblematic, 
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particularly with regards to the use of public resources which are currently subject to 
significant rationing. 
Tracy: But people are dying from cancer and they can't fund that. It is very 
difficult, and to be honest, I'm quite glad I'm out of it. You know, in a way, you 
think, "Well, I'm off that cycle now." You know, when you say ...people 
"Well, can I save someone dying, or bring a new life into the world?" I'm glad 
it not my dilemma. 
Sarah: [ ...] if it's at the expense of a person getting cancer treatment, [funding 
IVF is] probably not [justified], but if it's something that the NHS can handle and 
it is handled efficiently... it difficult. Erm ...sometimes I think, yes, because we 
benefited from it. I don't know. 
For both Tracy and Sarah, having had NHS-funded IVF is problematic, and both are 
relieved that they no longer have to confront that dilemma in the pursuit of treatment. 
Cancer treatment is used here as the deserving "Other" against which IVF is to be 
judged — a regular feature of the accounts, reflecting the both the status of cancer as a 
social health priority, and the perceived failure of the NHS to manage essential services. 
As has already been described, those experiencing infertility, and women in particular, 
readily fmd themselves accused of selfishness, whether they have treatment or not. 
Consequently, many of the women interviewed were extremely sensitive to the issue of 
the legitimacy of their claim on NHS resources, particularly since their treatment had 
failed, and readily agreed that the case for providing IVF at the expense of treatments 
for cancer or heart disease was relatively weak. However, many were also quick to point 
out that a considerable number of other non-essential treatments were offered with 
respect to which it could be argued that IVF had an equal or superior claim to funding: 
Melanie: [...] you can have a bunion done on the NHS — so why not such a 
serious thing as infertility? 
Angela: [...] You know, you can terminate a life on the NHS, but to create one, 
you can't. Well, how does that work? 
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The issue of abortion services was a particularly sensitive one for the participants, for 
obvious reasons, although no-one actually opposed the provision of terminations per se. 
Instead, what was difficult to tolerate was that IVF did not rank at least equally with a 
termination in NHS priorities. 
Whilst acknowledging the limitations to the claims for IVF as an NHS service, given 
the very real threat against even the limited provision that currently exists, the 
participants offered a substantial catalogue of reasons why continued, and even 
expanded, provision was justified. Firstly, it was argued that the NHS is a resource to 
which they had contributed and to which they therefore should have access: 
Stephanie: I think I've paid into the NHS since I was 17. I very rarely have had to 
use doctors, hospital — why shouldn't I be able to? You know, neighbours of mine 
are probably up the doctors every day with nothing wrong with them, so I think 
there should have been something for me. 
For Stephanie, there is a terrible injustice in the failure to provide her with IVF on the 
NHS after her years of contributions and careful and responsible use of services, 
conceptualising national insurance contributions in terms of an individual savings plan 
on which you were entitled to draw, rather than as a system of welfare. For Cathy, the 
injustice lay not in being unable to draw on her financial investment in the NHS, but in 
being unable to draw on her physical investment as an employee of the NHS: 
Cathy: I work for the NHS — why can't I get something done on the NHS? If I've 
got to have something done, why can't I get that done? 
Cathy also felt very strongly that the cause of her infertility — endometriosis — had been 
repeatedly misdiagnosed, extending the period over which the reproductive organs were 
being damaged by the disease before its effects were finally treated. Consequently, she 
felt that her GP, who she held responsible for this delay, should at least provide her 
drugs for the treatment, as he eventually did. 
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Perhaps the most common justification for the provision of treatment on the NHS was 
an economic one, in that failure to treat infertility has a series of knock-on effects that 
could bring significant future costs: 
Melanie: [ ...] If they're not treating infertility, they're going to be treating the 
depression that's caused. 
Susan: But I don't know — in the scheme of things, ifyou added up all the anti- 
depressants people get, I mean, what is the bigger cost —funding a couple for 
IVF, or funding, you know, funding the rest of it? If it's all coming out of the pot — 
the marriage splitting up, then having to have counselling, losing your job ...I 
don't know. 
The vision of the experience of infertility as destructive which we have already seen in a 
number of guises — the desperate woman, the compulsive IVF consumer — is used this 
time as an expression of affinity between infertility sufferers, rather than as a foil to 
reflect the normality of the participant and their parenthood aspirations. Indeed, 
investment in WF is understood not only as valuable to those experiencing infertility, 
but also to the rest of society who must otherwise bear the costs. The engagement with 
IVF in this context is posited as productive, even when it fails, functioning as a sort of 
stepping stone towards achieving some form of resolution around involuntary 
childlessness. There is some evidence to support this in the interviews, with women in 
particular speaking very highly of IVF, and of having to have tried in order to achieve 
any form of closure around the experience of infertility. However, the financial 
argument offered by Susan is less convincing, since none of the negative outcomes that 
she envisages, with the exception of depression, are medical, which weakens the 
argument that it will save the NHS money to offer treatment. 
Over and above the more general case for blanket NHS provision of IVF, given the 
reality of rationing of resources within the NHS, the participants were careful to 
legitimise their own claim to what resources were available. The one point upon which 
all the participants were agreed was the injustice of discriminatory access to treatment 
on the basis of postcode: 
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Nancy: I mean, we were there with people — we were paying, some were getting it 
through their ...because they lived sort of 30 miles away, they were getting it on 
the NHS. I pay exactly the same taxes and all that, and that's wrong, without a 
doubt. 
The issue of equal contributions but unequal access was a regular feature of the 
interviews, and particularly those whose health authority did not fund treatment nursed 
a strong sense of injustice on this issue. However, and perhaps not unsurprisingly, 
locational criteria aside, when asked to suggest possible criteria for treatment, given the 
limits on funding, most were careful to centralise their own circumstances as most 
deserving, thereby legitimising the claims they had made on public resources: 
Nancy: it's probably a biased one, but I would say that you got to start looking 
for people who were in the position we were. 
Katy: I think everybody should have their chance, but I don't think people should 
sell eggs, or there's all that publicity about — what is it? — the, erm, in America, 
isn't it, choosing your own sperm and stuff to get the best baby. 
Tim: Designer babies. 
Katy: I think it should be constrained to people that are in, you know, our 
situation. 
In the case of both Nancy and her husband, Martin, and Katy and Tim, "our situation" 
refers to their conformity to the normative reproductive standards in terms of age, 
sexuality, material circumstances and desire to parent. Furthermore, they see their age at 
the time of seeking treatment as placing them within a range where conception by IVF 
is still statistically feasible, making them a good investment from an NHS perspective. 
This situating of the self as the ideal candidate against other less deserving candidates 
was also identified by Kathy Davis in her study of state-funded cosmetic surgery in the 
Netherlands, where prospective patients perceived themselves as suffering intolerably, 
against the self-indulgent whimsicality that led others to seek surgery unnecessarily 
(Davis 1995: 76). 
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However, in the case of Alice, the justification of her claim to funding is made slightly 
more complicated by the fact that, as a woman in her mid-forties at the time she was 
receiving treatment (and still seeking treatment at the time of the interview, at 47), she 
actually fell well outside of health authority age criteria, and also beyond what most of 
the participants in this study considered to be a reasonable age at which to be pursuing 
further treatment. Alice began by addressing this issue of the provision of treatment for 
older women: 
Alice: But sometimes I've read of women who — I don't know say 27, 28— who've 
had 1VF because they've been trying to conceive for 3 years and haven't managed 
it. They had IVF on the NHS ....well, they've probably got another 15 years that 
they could have ....Okay, I'm not saying that they should have to wait 15 years for 
a baby, but technically, medically and naturally, there's more chance that they 
will conceive naturally when time running out for people of my age. 
Alice's case turns on its head the argument that those with the best chance of success 
should receive treatment, arguing for a different set of priorities — that those who are 
running out of time should take precedence. However, she then goes on to strengthen 
her relative claim to treatment by arguing that personal investment, effort and 
commitment should also play a role. She told a story of seeing a young pregnant woman 
in the street just after one of her cycles had failed. The woman had a baby in a 
pushchair, and another child by her side, and she was smoking: 
Alice: [...] it would be nice to think that women that tried to look after themselves 
were perhaps given a bit better treatment... well, not better treatment, but given 
more of a chance, and I mean, for I know, that woman could get married again. 
There she is with three kids by three men 107, but couldn't have one with the next 
one, probably smoked all her life, and gets funding just because she happens to be 
33 or whatever. 
Alice had taken considerable measures to maximise her chances of conception, such as 
losing weight, taking supplements, and avoiding the consumption of any food or drink 
107 Alice did not know whether or not this assumption was true, and she is projecting the characteristics of 
a stereotyped "welfare mother" onto the woman in order to make her point. 
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that could possibly damage a foetus, and she felt very strongly that these efforts should 
have been acknowledged in the weighing up of her case for treatment 
Conclusion 
The analysis presented here has significant implications for the provision of the 
provision of health authority funding for IVF. The uncertainty which currently 
surrounds the funding of treatment means that those seeking treatment are unable to 
plan alternative futures. There were several cases in this study where participants (in 
every case, these were female) postponed retraining or a return to education, or turned 
down job opportunities "just in case" the health authority funding appeared. In other 
cases, the unexpected arrival of funding caused a reversal of the decision to stop. I 
would argue that a great deal of this uncertainty could be forestalled by establishing 
prompt, reliable, predictable funding. However, this is not without costs, particularly in 
terms of the compulsion which is then generated for patients to use up the full allocation 
of cycles, suggesting some value in offering only a very limited number of cycles. This 
is clearly an area where more research is needed, and a focus on those who would 
qualify for funded treatment but who have chosen not to pursue it would be particularly 
illuminating in this regard. 
The identification of the IVF patient also as a consumer raises interesting questions 
about what is being consumed in the engagement with IVF. Of course, accessing IVF 
constitutes access to a range of practices and procedures which may, or may not, 
facilitate conception. However, when treatment fails, the participants are also marked by 
that engagement in ways that require careful management. In this context, patients can 
be seen not only to have purchased the product — access to the rvF procedure — but also 
a particular identity. The fact of having engaged with IVF, even when it has failed, 
serves to validate the participants' claims to normative reproductive values, establishing 
a distinction between their own childlessness and that of those who have either chosen 
to live without children, or who would like children but are not prepared to make the 
necessary sacrifices to achieve that. In this context, the consumption of IVF creates a 
particular form of infertility, where infertility is understood as the active desire for a 
child. However, as the end of the line in terms of available treatment, this may also 
function as a means of achieving closure around treatment, and retains its utility once 
treatment has ended, as a validating discourse and an affirmation of the thwarted 
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intention and desire to reproduce. Paradoxically, then, the consumption of IVF can also, 
potentially at least, facilitate the end of the identification as infertile. 
The meanings conferred by the consumption of IVF are inflected by the specific context 
within which that engagement takes place, the amount of treatment undergone, and the 
individual circumstances of those seeking treatment. The accounts reveal an astute 
awareness of the risk of being perceived as having consumed to excess, or too 
parsimoniously; as having selfishly used scarce public resources wastefully, or as 
having reduced reproduction to a commodity. The management of these negative 
implications in the accounts reflects not only the extent to which reproduction is 
normatively determined, but also the degree to which the engagement with IVF is 
subject to disciplinary surveillance by others and by the participants themselves. 
One of the effects of this is to locate reproduction firmly in the public domain, in 
defiance of its conventional construction as located within the private. This marks a 
curious reversal of the public and private along gendered lines, with women — 
conventionally inhabiting the private domain — located firmly in the public as both the 
patient and the consumer of IVF. It is her consumption that is subject to surveillance, 
in expectation of her slipping over into excess. Conversely, as neither the patient nor the 
consumer, the male partner's engagement with IVF remains largely invisible from 
scrutiny and out of the public domain. This finding reflects wider feminist theorising on 
reproduction, which has highlighted the extent to which its constructed location in the 
private domain disguises the surveillance and regulation to which reproduction is 
subject. What this analysis shows is that even when IVF fails and treatment is ended, 
this surveillance continues, and the accounts reflect the ongoing need to manage the 
perceptions of others of both their engagement with treatment and of their ongoing 
childlessness. Consequently, while IVF failure can be seen to be virtually invisible in 
the dominant representations of the technology and from the perspective of the 
providers of treatment, those for whom treatment fails remain highly visible at the level 
of social relations. 
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Chapter  6 Taking Responsibility  
When IVF treatment succeeds, the achievement is constructed as belonging to medical 
science and its practitioners, as this excerpt from the fmal entry of Leah Wild's IVF 
diary in The Guardian demonstrates: 
It took 10 people to make my babies. The Professor of the Assisted Conception 
Unit, the Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) co-ordinator, the 
embryologist, two cytogeneticists, the team offour doctors who specialised in 
reproductive medicine, the consultant obstetrician, and my boyfriend who 
provided the basic material l08 . 
The most striking aspect of this account is that she has written herself out of the process, 
not even acknowledging her share of the "basic material". Everyone, it seems, can take 
the credit except her. 109 This construction ignores not only the significant intervention 
into women's bodies that the procedure involves, but also the extensive emotional and 
practical labour which IVF entails, most of which takes place outside of the medical 
environment. In spite of the fact that a significant portion of this work is not necessarily 
gender specific, in this study it was the women who took on responsibility for this 
labour. Responsibility here refers not only to the taking on of particular duties, such as 
information gathering or giving injections, but also to the moral accountability for those 
actions and their outcome, and in this study it was women who took on responsibility 
for treatment and its failure. More importantly, while the dominant discourse obscures 
this burden of responsibility on women and does not credit them with achievement 
when treatment is successful, women are written back into the IVF narratives when 
treatment fails and are constructed, implicitly or explicitly, as culpable for that failure, 
absolving both the technology and its practitioners, and also the male partners, of that 
responsibility. 
The construction of reproduction (and the failure to reproduce) as women's 
responsibility has a long history, particularly when things go wrong. Women have been 
108 The Guardian, 18 April, 2001 
109 I owe this point to Maureen McNeil, who used this material in her presentation Auto and Techno: 
Telling Tales at the "Cyborg Lives? Women's Technobiographies" conference at the University of East 
London, 15 June, 2001 
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constructed historically as passive reproductive vessels, carrying the man's child (Bordo 
1993: 90; Stonehouse 1994). As Emily Martin's analysis of contemporary discourses of 
conception demonstrates (and as discussed in Chapter 2), the modem medical 
understanding of the reproductive process still continues to be viewed through this lens, 
with eggs passively waiting for the masculine, active sperm. Conversely, the birth of 
children with disabilities, the failure to conceive, or the conception of too many girls, 
for example, has traditionally been laid at women's door (Stonehouse 1994: 35), and it 
can still be seen that although women continue to be constructed as passive receptacles 
in the reproductive process, they are also subject to a significant burden of care and 
responsibility for the welfare of a foetus. This is evidenced by the growing number of 
foetal protection cases in the US, where women have been accused of deliberately 
harming their foetus, for example, by drinking alcohol or taking drugs (Bertin 1995; 
Gallagher 1995). In order to achieve the successful outcome of a healthy, "normal" 
baby, women are increasingly pressed not only to avoid actions which are potentially 
harmful to the foetus, but also to take positive action in the form of scans and genetic 
testing, as well as changes in diet and lifestyle which are deemed to maximise the 
chances of a healthy baby. By not taking available measures, the women themselves 
become at fault for the birth of a child with an illness or disability (Lupton 1994: 154). 
The contemporary health discourse of individual responsibility is fundamental to this 
new dimension to an old story. Apparent in both alternative and conventional medical 
contexts, this discourse argues for the capacity and responsibility of the individual to 
achieve positive health through monitoring, prevention, self-awareness and self-
treatment (Sontag 1978; Coward 1989; Lupton 1994; Stacey 1997). This trend is 
inextricably linked with funding issues, and when Liz Kendall of the Institute of Public 
Policy Research urged people to admit that they have "not only rights to good quality 
health care but responsibilities to the health service", this was with the stated goal of 
cutting GP waiting lists without having to make further substantial financial 
investment110 . The discourse of responsibilities points to the moral imperative to be 
healthy, and the implicit suggestion that ill health is to some extent deserved. It is in this 
context that it becomes possible to debate whether or not to offer heart surgery to 
people who have not demonstrated a commitment to stopping smoking, and candidates 
www.netdoctor.co.uk/news, 17 June, 2001 
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for Orlistat, a recently approved drug to tackle obesity, have to prove their commitment 
to weight loss by demonstrating a weight loss of 2.5kg, and increased physical activity 
for a period of at least one month before being able to receive the drug 111. 
Lupton describes self-control and self-discipline with regards to the body as "the new 
work ethic" (Lupton 1994: 31), and public censure awaits those who lack the self-
control to live up to the moral imperative to strive for health. For example, Cooper 
describes the way that overweight people are constantly subject to the disapproving 
attentions of the "plate watchers" who police their eating with verbal and non-verbal 
comments. This, in turn, leads overweight people to police their own behaviour when 
shopping for food or eating in public (Cooper 1998: 24). Those experiencing infertility 
are equally closely disciplined, finding themselves subject to constant unsolicited advice 
about how to get pregnant, or criticism at having left it too long, not trying hard enough, 
being too fat, or too thin, or simply just not managing to achieve an appropriate level of 
relaxation. 
One of the key features of the discourse of individual responsibility for health is that it 
is profoundly gendered, and while individuals may be responsible, this responsibility is 
not necessarily uniformly distributed. While men can be seen to take increasing 
responsibility for their own well-being in terms of exercise and diet (Watson 2000), it is 
also the case that the expression of emotional or physical weakness still constitutes a 
transgression of conventional constructions of masculinity (Moyhihan 1998). One of the 
results of this is that women, in their roles as carers, are still considered to have a 
primary role in male health care, resulting in book titles such as When The Man You 
Love Won't Take Care of His Health (subtitled, Practical Ways To Help Your Bullet-
Proof Man to Live Longer) (Goldberg 1999). This also suggests why it might be that 
more women than men contact the Macmillan Cancer Relief prostate cancer helpline 112 , 
for example. 
This chapter will consider the distribution of both moral and practical responsibility 
within the couple undergoing IVF, and the ways in which conventional interpretations 
of the gendered body, social roles and emotional scripts provide a framework for the 
vvww.nice.org.uk 
112 The Guardian, 10 April, 2001 
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lived experience of IVF that is disproportionately disadvantageous to women. This is 
not to argue that there is a deliberate or malicious intent on the part of the men to 
offload the responsibility onto their female partners. Instead, this should be seen as the 
consequence of dominant constructions of gender identity, offering a limited range of 
repertoires through which the experience of IVF and its failure can be made sense of. 
The chapter will focus on the ways in which women's responsibility is constructed and 
experienced, from the perspective of: (1) the IVF process; (2) past behaviour; (3) letting 
people down; and (4) IVF as woman's work. The final section will consider the ways in 
which this burden of responsibility impacts upon women's self esteem, and how this 
can inhibit the process of withdrawing from treatment and creating a positive future 
without (biological) children or the desired number of children. 
The IVF Process  
'While the IVF process is hailed when treatment succeeds, it can also be seen to shift 
responsibility onto women over the course of the treatment process, and when treatment 
fails, it is the woman who is left feeling responsible. This occurs at two key points in the 
process: firstly, egg collection; and secondly, once the embryos have been transferred. 
"Poor performer"  
When treatment fails, the presumed inherent instability of the female body, coupled 
with the fact that it is the female body which is the focus of intervention, makes women 
a prime suspect in the inevitable search for explanations. Consequently, the 
apportioning of blame on to women, by doctors, partners and the women themselves, 
for the failure of particular aspects of the treatment process, if only implicitly, was a 
regular feature of the interviews. This was particularly true in the context of the process 
of collecting eggs. As suggested earlier, Liz was horrified to see that "Poor performer" 
had been written across the top of her medical file when she went for her third cycle of 
treatment: 
Liz: I thought, well...I was just sitting there thinking.. .gosh, they can't...I feel 
labelled! You sort of... like a school report — could do better, you know. 
Many of the women for whom the hormonal treatment had not produced the desired 
results expressed the failure as belonging to them. Jane commented that she never "did 
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that well with the eggs", and others described themselves as producing "crap eggs" 
(Stephanie), or being "rubbish at producing eggs" (Jenny). The medical technology 
itself remains unblemished in these accounts, and the participants drew instead on the 
discourse of failed productivity within themselves — a discourse that has also been 
identified in accounts of menstruation and the menopause (Martin 1989; Martin 1990). 
The Long Wait 113  
There is a two week wait between embryo transfer and the confirmation of whether or 
not the woman is pregnant. During this period, except for the use of self-administered 
hormone pessaries to maximise the chances of implantation, there is no further medical 
intervention. This period marks the fact that there is a temporal distinction between the 
conclusion of the IVF procedure, which ends with embryo transfer, and the IVF 
process, which extends well beyond the embryo transfer, whether the treatment is 
successful or not. The embryo transfer process is more commonly described by the 
participants as putting the embryos hack. This is an important element in the 
construction of IVF as fundamentally natural, with the embryos portrayed as back 
where they belong, allowing the natural process to pick up where the temporary medical 
intervention left off. However, this not only exonerates the medical procedure, which is 
seen as having done its part, but it places the responsibility entirely onto the woman: 
Karen: [ ...] When the treatment failed [...] where did you see the failure lying? 
Anne: [pause] ...well, in me, really [...] you know, we had three goes. We'd had 
three good embryos put back each time, and the chances were, you know, they 
were saying at that time, about 30%. So, rationally, I thought it should have 
worked. And so I thought the failure was something to do with me [...] 
Anne's case is particularly striking because following sperm tests and failed 
fertilisations, both Anne and her husband believed that the fertility problem lay with 
him, and yet she was still subject to profound feelings of guilt and responsibility. It is 
also interesting to observe that her sense of responsibility grew during her engagement 
with IVF, as the natural age-related decline in fertility began to be reflected in her egg 
quality. 
113  Leah Wild uses this phrase in her IVF diary in The Guardian (30 August, 2001), which she in turn 
took from the clinic handbook. 
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For many women, the sense of responsibility once the embryos had been transferred 
was enormous, causing constant concern once the cycle had failed that something they 
had done, or not done, during that two week period could have somehow dislodged the 
embryos. It was not uncommon for women to be afraid to go to the toilet after the 
embryo transfer in case the embryos were washed away, and many took the two weeks 
after the transfer off work to rest. This was accompanied by the careful policing of diet 
and attempts to manage stress, which was perceived as inhibiting implantation, although 
paradoxically, several women found that the self-imposed rest period left them with 
time to dwell on the fate of the embryos creating the very stress that the rest period was 
intended to limit Others kept working simply to provide an alternative focus and source 
of self-esteem, which was perceived as more valuable in the long term than the 
precaution of resting at home. 
These precautionary measures (or disciplinary techniques) aim to maximise the chances 
of pregnancy, but in doing so, they also served to pre-empt future feelings of guilt with 
regards to treatment failure. This reveals a degree of scepticism towards medical 
assurances that it is impossible to influence the outcome of treatment either negatively 
or positively once the embryos have been transferred, drawing instead on common-
sense knowledges of the importance of rest and relaxation in achieving pregnancy. One 
of the doctors I spoke to routinely told patients laughingly that they could go bungee 
jumping and it wouldn't make any difference, but the majority of the participants 
disregarded these assurances and focused instead on the measures that they perceived as 
potentially effective in maximising their chances of conception. This can be seen as a 
strategy for naturalising the engagement with IVF by creating a distance between 
themselves and the medical context. It can also be understood as an attempt to assert 
predictability over the seeming randomness of implantation, as well as offering 
welcome activity and a sense of purpose. However, this scepticism towards the 
assurances was also fuelled by the knowledge that while women being treated in NHS 
clinics were sent home immediately after the embryo transfer, in private clinics, women 
were made to lie down for several hours before leaving. Furthermore, women are 
bombarded with messages from both the alternative and conventional medical fields 
about the importance of pre-conceptual nutrition, environmental hazards and so on with 
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regards to early pregnancy 114 . In this context, the decision to err on the side of caution is 
hardly surprising, since the failure to take all possible steps would leave open the 
possibility of future regret that more had not been done. 
This rigorous self-policing implies that a successful outcome may be within the remit of 
the individual woman, however. Frank describes this assertion of control, as 
characteristic of the disciplined body — that is, where the body is perceived as 
dissociated from the self, and as something to be managed and controlled in order to 
assert predictability (Frank 1995: 41). This was reinforced by the women's partners and 
other relatives, who chastised them for "doing too much", or for failing to be positive. 
Interestingly, Frank describes disciplined bodies as making good patients (Frank 1995: 
42), although in this case it is clear that the patients disregarded medical assurances in 
some cases and that bodily discipline was determined not only by medical discourses 
but also other common-sense discourses. However, this deviation from medical advice 
could only take place because none of the measures taken were perceived by the doctors 
as actually endangering a successful outcome. Instead, they were simply regarded as 
having no positive value, and therefore, the participants saw themselves as having 
nothing to lose, and everything to gain. In this sense, they are still being good patients, 
even by disregarding medical advice, since they are doing more than is required. 
The importance of positive thinking and relaxation played an important role in the 
accounts of the two week waiting period, drawing on the long tradition of assuming that 
women can influence the outcome of pregnancy by the force of their imagination or 
mood. Women's dreams or imaginings were traditionally believed to be the cause of 
deformity or "monstrosity" in babies (Stonehouse 1994: 35; Braidotti 1996) 115 , just as 
the mental excitement of studying was argued by the Victorians to inhibit reproduction 
(Rowold 1996). The contemporary parallel to these discourses is that of stress: 
114 A recent news article reported a study that concluded that electro-magnetic fields could cause early 
miscarriage, and that pregnant women should avoid "microwaves, hairdryers and public transport 
operated by electricity" (www.netdoctor.conkinews, 17 June, 2001). 
115 In 1726, the satirical artist, William Hogarth, portrayed a woman giving birth to a litter of rabbits in 
response to the story of Mary Tofts, who, it was claimed, had seen two rabbits while out in a field, which 
she had tried to catch. It was said that the failure to catch the rabbits caused her to miscarry, and 
afterwards, she could only think about rabbits. She began to produce animal body parts, including a 
rabbit's liver, cats' legs, and then a litter of nine rabbits. Hailed initially as proof positive of the influence 
of the imagination during pregnancy, it was later shown that (unsurprisingly) the whole story was a fraud, 
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Martin: [...] because all the way through it, you get the people who do know 
[about their infertility], like your friends, your boss... by boss — "Take her on 
holiday", "Get her drunk", "Make her relax". 
Nancy: And you think, I've been there, done that. 
Martin: "Tell her to stop work" was a big one. 
Karen: Really? 
Nancy: And we did consider that, but I didn't. 
Martin: But I did. I told you to pack up work, because... she wasn't in a 
management position of any description, but she seemed to be somewhat stressed. 
And er ...I just felt, well, let's find out. Let's give it a year and find out. But 
Nancy's answer to that was, "What's the bloody point?" Because we could end 
up without a job, without a year's salary, and without a baby. 
Martin recounts the pressures from others with resignation, finding himself trapped 
between the competing discourses of his friends and of Nancy, particularly about 
continuing to work. Even though conventional values of masculinity converge to place 
responsibility onto Martin for resolving the "relaxation" issue, by getting her drunk, or 
taking her on holiday, it is Nancy's decision to keep working that closes the discussion. 
Martin remains torn between his suspicion that his workmates may be right about the 
need for Nancy to stop working and his need to respect Nancy's reasoning for 
continuing, thereby distancing himself from the responsibility for the decision. The 
freedom with which others give "advice", and the store set by the importance credited to 
stress in infertility, reveal the extent to which the self-discipline to which women 
subject themselves in the two week waiting period is also produced by the surveillance 
and judgement of others. When working is widely perceived as creating stress which 
would inhibit pregnancy, Nancy's refusal to stop work in the face of pressure from 
Martin constitutes something of a risk for her, although it is a calculated risk, since 
stopping work also has significant costs. However, the retrospective telling of the story 
and the animals and body parts had been inserted into her vagina ready for eminent doctors to "deliver"! 
(Uglow 1997: 118-119) 
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is risk free because they did go on to conceive spontaneously — a success that Martin 
attributes to her having relaxed after deciding to stop treatment. 116 
Significantly, although some of the male partners accepted responsibility with regards 
to overcoming what were seen as female problems of stress, even where male factor 
infertility was implicated, there were few cases where the connection between 
behaviour and fertility was made and acted upon by men, even though sperm quality is 
related to behaviours several months prior to the treatment. Several of the men were 
recommended to take simple steps to improve their sperm count and quality, such as not 
taking hot baths, wearing loose underwear, abstaining from alcohol and smoking, and 
taking supplements. However, the compliance rate was low 117 , which contrasted sharply 
with the women who policed their own behaviour (and were policed by others) 
rigorously even where there was doubt as to whether it made any difference to the 
outcome: 
Alice: And [they said] don't have hot baths, which he loves, so he still has hot 
baths. And erm...they talked about sort ofputting a bag offrozen peas on 
appropriate areas [both laugh]. And he did try a dash of cold water once, and he 
said, "Never again!" I won't show him this transcript! But he does ...Still, I 
think.., sometimes he'll come out of the bath and say, "Cor, boiling hot, that 
was! " And I say, "Don't tell me!" Because to me, that's like saying, "You won't 
get pregnant in 6 weeks' time" [...] And I said to him a couple of times, and he 
was going, "No, no, no. the doctor doesn't know what he's talking about." 
Karen: Was he just disregarding the advice? He just didn't believe the advice? 
Alice: no, and he didn't see why he should change, just on the doctor's say-so. 
Even though it's come up in programmes since, but he just doesn't change 
anything, so I just think, "Well, it's down to me then." You know, "I'm the one 
that's got to do everything — you just carry on as you were before." 
116 The jury is still out over whether the alleviation of stress can increase the chances of conception. 
However, Domar argues that behavioural therapy to assist in the management of stress should be 
considered of value in its own right in helping women to cope with the stress of infertility and treatment 
(Domar 1997). 
117 This finding is supported by Lee, who notes the low compliance among his patients with sperm 
improvement regimes, although he-does not speculate as to why this might be (Lee 1996: 20) 
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Firstly, this marks the extent to which sperm quality continues to be judged both by 
doctors and patients by the capacity to fertilise an egg, and little remains known about 
the role of sperm quality in embryo development and implantation. Consequently, with 
the development of micro-manipulation techniques such as ICSI, where fertilisation is 
facilitated through the injection of an individual sperm into the egg, male culpability is 
further reduced, while female responsibility continues unabated. Of the few men who 
did make dietary and lifestyle changes with the goal of maximising sperm quality, all 
but one did so at the instigation of their female partners, with the women gathering 
information as to what could be done and supplying the supplements for the men. 
However, this should not be understood in terms of the male partners not caring about 
the outcome of the treatment. Instead, it reflects the fact the belief, both in the medical 
and the wider social context, that fertility is a static absolute for men, whereas women 
are subject to constant change. This presumption is exemplified by Sandra Leibltun and 
Dorothy Greenfeld, who describe one of their case studies as involving "an infertile 
couple where the wife is diagnosed with "unexplained infertility" (my emphasis) 
(Leiblum & Greenfeld 1997: 91). 
Only one man actively sought out alternative therapeutic treatments for sperm count and 
quality on his own initiative. Interestingly, in this case, while the fact that the fertility 
problem was assumed by both the male and female partners as predominantly male 
factor played a part in this initiative, it also became clear during the interview that the 
couple — Anne and her husband (who was not interviewed) — did not have a traditional 
division of labour in the household, and both were working part-time in order to share 
equally the care of their baby daughter whom they had adopted from China following 
failed IVF. They were both committed to counselling and therapy, both as a couple and 
individually, as a valuable personal development resource, and Anne stated a clear 
commitment to equity within the relationship as a fundamental principle. Tellingly, in 
spite of this commitment and his willingness to accept responsibility for the infertility 
which they both believed lay in his low sperm count, Anne still found herself subject to 
profound feelings of guilt and responsibility, revealing the potency of the association of 
women with reproduction, and the powerful effect of IVF in shifting responsibility onto 
women. 
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Secondly, this points to the continuing association of fertility and virility in men, and 
where virility is seen as central to masculine identity, undertaking a sperm improvement 
regimen constitutes a direct challenge to the masculine sense of identity. This threat to 
masculine identity was taken very seriously by the participants, and with some good 
reason, since while female infertility was generally met with sympathy (and less 
desirably, pity) and while surveillance constitutes a normal part of femininity, male 
infertility, or the suspicion of it, exposed men to considerable cruelty and ridicule: 
Beth: I sent [partner] a card on Valentine's Day last year, saying "To the world's 
greatest lover" and there's a friend of mine in here, who actually has 4 children 
[...] and her boyfriend said, "Oh, how come I didn't get a card saying, "Greatest 
lover "? " and she said, "You've got children to prove you are." 
Matthew: I was actually at a meeting, conference kind of thing [ ...] and it was 
sort of said, "I could come round and see your wife". 
The questioning of male potency or virility came primarily (although as Beth's story 
illustrates, not exclusively) from men, and occurred most commonly in the work place, 
providing a powerful incentive to keep the treatment secret where possible. Offers to 
stand in, unsolicited advice on sexual technique or getting their wives drunk to relax 
them, and jokes such as presenting men suspected of being infertile with Jaffa (seedless) 
oranges or pots of seedless jam were commonplace, and this "humour" was generally 
perceived as unwelcome and humiliating. Where it was not experienced directly, the 
awareness of the possibility encouraged men to be circumspect about confiding in 
others. In response to this risk, Woollett notes that in the treatment context, men 
experiencing fertility problems are repeatedly assured by doctors and their partners that 
their infertility does not reflect on their masculinity, although no such assurances are 
offered to women who are infertile (Woollett 1992: 169). 
Jeff was a notable exception to the way in which these comments were perceived, 
accepting the constant jokes of his work mates as evidence that he remained one of the 
lads. 
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Karen: [...] You also said that your mates, your workmates [...] you were taking 
a bit of stick... 
Jeff: Just a bit! 
Karen: How did you feel about that? 
Jeff Great! 
Karen: Why do you say that? 
Jeff: Because that's what the lads are like at work... on site... because I would 
have done exactly the same to them. It's all accepted. It's understood. [...] It 
wasn't a secret, it wasn't hushed up. That's a way to deal with it. 
However, in Jeff's case, the joke depends precisely on the assumption of his colleagues 
that his fertility is not in doubt, drawing on the tacit assumption that it is the female and 
not the male body that is liable to fertility failure. Even where the treatment was known 
about by friends and family, if not by colleagues, male silence allowed this assumption 
of female factor infertility to go unchallenged: 
Anne: No, he didn't talk about it anything like as much as me, and he wouldn't 
say, you know, he wouldn't tell people about the cause. He 'd just let people's 
assumptions go... I think he just couldn't bear to talk about it. 
This was particularly frustrating for Anne since in private they both accepted that the 
fertility was a male factor problem, yet she was torn between not wanting to pander to 
values of masculinity that she did not support and wanting to protect her husband. This 
complicity was common among the female partners of men whose fertility was in doubt 
— a finding also described by Russell Webb and Judith Daniluk (Webb & Daniluk 1999: 
13). Angela, for example, described her and her husband as "a pair of old duffers", even 
though the fertility problem appeared to lie with her husband's low sperm count. Where 
the opposite case was true and female factor infertility was diagnosed, there was only 
one case in this study where the male partner insisted on sharing the blame in the way 
that the women did when the situation was reversed, and even then this was only 
between the two of them in private. 
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Where female factor fertility was implicated, several of the male partners actively 
promoted this information in order to avoid their own fertility being called into 
question: 
John: [...] Now, it's like, "Do you have any children?" I say, "Well, no, 
unfortunately, my wife couldn't have any. We 've tried. We couldn't." 
John expressed this unselfconsciously, until challenged by his wife, Cathy, later in the 
interview. Martin, on the other hand, adopted a more reflexive approach: 
Martin: But one of the funniest aspects about telling people, especially from a 
male point, is that you let people know that, without really realising, the next bit a 
male person throws in is, "There ain't nothing wrong with me." [...] 
Because ...you don't want people to think, "Oh, he can't have a baby. There's 
something wrong with him. He 's not up to it." So it becomes a very male ego sort 
of situation... that you're prepared to tell people that you've got a problem, but 
you want to quickly make sure that they're aware that it ain't you. 
The eagerness of both John and Martin to establish clearly to friends and family where 
the fertility problem lies does not occur in the context of blame or resentment towards 
their partners. Instead, this should be seen as reflecting the importance of emerging 
from the encounter with their sense of masculinity intact, where masculinity is 
dependent on its association with virility. 
Given these concerns, it is not surprising that the provision of sperm proved to be an 
extremely sensitive topic in the interviews, and very few of the male participants were 
prepared to discuss it in anything other than the most cursory terms. Where it was 
discussed, this was generally done using humour: 
Jeff The bloke actually has quite a good time through the 1VF! 
Jeff uses humour to downplay any embarrassment, effectively closing off the 
discussion. One of the functions of this is clearly to change the topic of conversation, 
but it also reflects his desire, common to many of the men, not to detract from the 
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considerably greater intervention endured by his partner. However, the use of humour 
masks the pressure which the male partners are under to "perform", not only in terms of 
masculine identity, but also because the failure to produce a usable sample at the right 
time can lead to the cycle being abandoned. It is important to note, however, that this 
latter anxiety can be relieved by freezing a sperm sample in advance as a "safety net" 
(although this does have a slightly lower success rate (Winston 1999: 10)), suggesting 
that the anxiety related more closely to the "performance" itself, rather than its 
implications. 
In spite of the "performance" anxieties and the embarrassment of the male participants, 
their sense of responsibility for the treatment outcome remains minimal, and once a 
usable sample has been produced, their responsibilities are considered by all the actors 
to have been met, with subsequent failures attributed to egg rather than sperm quality. 
This is particularly relevant when it is noted that for the last two years, the number of 
cycles using ICSI has grown disproportionately in relation to "standard" WE With 
ICSI, even a very poor sperm sample may be capable of fertilising an egg, which 
suggests a lessening of male responsibility with the female burden of responsibility left 
unchanged. 
Past Behaviour 
While the previous section focused on the possibility of blame in the context of the 
treatment process itself, many of the women also felt that the blame for their continuing 
infertility was the result not only of something that they may have done, or not done, in 
the course of the treatment, but also of past behaviours. Andrea Braverman observes 
that "many [therapy] patients feel that they are being punished through their infertility, 
which adds to their sense of being bad or defective" (Braverman 1997: 223), and the 
interpretation of illness and infertility as moral punishments has a long cultural 
history118. Treatment failure caused several of the participants to resurrect prior events 
in seeking an explanation for that failure. Many years prior to her experience of 
infertility, Sarah had terminated a pregnancy that had resulted from a brief and 
118 See for example: Davis on the beliefs of physical deformity as a corporeal manifestation of the 
relationship between God and man (Davis 1995: 15); or Stonehouse on beliefs of the origins of infertility 
(Stonehouse 1994: 35). 
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unsuccessful relationship, and she speculated that her subsequent infertility could be 
"divine retribution": 
Sarah: I'm not even sure I thought it was anything physical. I just thought it was 
kind of my just desserts in a way. 
Others perceived themselves as having waited too long to try to conceive, or as having 
not been proactive enough during the often protracted period of tests and referrals which 
precedes IVF. There is a strong moral aspect to the assessment of past events Anne 
described this poignantly: "It's almost like you've done something wrong. You don't 
deserve a child." Interestingly, although Anne blamed herself for not trying to conceive 
earlier, it later became clear that it was her husband that had postponed trying, not her. 
A common strategy to counter these feelings of guilt was comparison with others by 
drawing explicitly on the idea of the unfit mother, comparing themselves favourably 
with others who were judged far less deserving yet were still able to have an apparently 
unlimited number of children. For the male participants, the figure of the violent and 
abusive father took the position of unworthy Other. In the case of the female 
participants, the tabloid figure of the hyper-fertile teenage welfare mother featured 
regularly in the accounts. This was frequently accompanied by assertions of what they 
as a couple have to offer a child, both materially and emotionally. However, as a coping 
strategy, this could be seen as something of a phyrric victory, since it preserves intact 
the normative standards of deserving and undeserving motherhood that are so 
problematic for women for whom treatment is unsuccessful. 
Letting people down  
The fact that many of the women felt responsible for the failure of the treatment 
prompted another significant source of guilt — the feeling of having let people down. 
This reflects women's social role as the maintainers of social relationships, and 
manifested itself most frequently in concern about being unable to bestow fatherhood 
on the male partner: 
Denise: I felt so tremendously guilty that I'd deprived him of having children. 
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This sense of personal failure at not being able to give a child to the partner is also 
reflected in male accounts of infertility (Webb & Daniluk 1999), although as described 
above, this burden of guilt is more likely to be shared by the female partner, particularly 
where IVF is involved, than when the infertility is perceived as lying with the female 
partner. 
The dominant representations of IVF are of treatment as a discrete event involving just 
the couple. However, as discussed in the previous chapter, this ignores the fact that 
reproduction takes place in a much wider social context, and the repercussions of IVF, 
particularly when it fails, affect a wide range of people. The role of the prospective 
grandparents is particularly pertinent here: 
Mary: [...] It's quite difficult [for my mother] because, you know, it kind of 
challenged her ideas of where she would be in terms of one day having 
grandchildren. 
Many of the interviewees were keenly aware of their own parents' desires to be 
grandparents and felt responsible and ashamed for denying them that pleasure. Indeed, 
this was frequently cited as a reason for continuing treatment. Just as many of the 
female participants described being unable to participate in conversations among female 
friends and relative because of their child focus, this was also reflected in the experience 
of several of the participants' mothers who were unable to share proud stories and 
excitement about grandchildren with their friends. There were also several cases where 
not only the prospective grandparents, but also other relatives or friends had paid for 
treatment cycles, and while this contribution was perceived as supportive and generous, 
it could also add to the perception of having let them down when the cycles failed. 
The women undergoing treatment were not the only ones to feel guilty: 
Tracy: [...] I think the worst person, the person who took it worst, was my Mum. 
She was very much like, "Did I do this to you?", which is very strange. And I 
didn't, I hadn't realised it was playing on her mind [...] So she was very much 
like, "Is it something I did?" and having her youngest two daughters have 
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problems, I think she sort of somehow thought that she'd eaten something wrong! ! 
[laughing] 
Tracy's mother was unable to accept as coincidence the fact that two of her daughters 
had (unrelated) fertility problems, and looked to herself as the possible source of blame, 
revealing the potency of the construction of female responsibility for the outcomes of 
reproduction. The experience of infertility also generated guilt in relationships between 
women of the same generation. Melissa's sister, to whom she is very close, suffered 
from post-natal depression after the birth of her daughter: 
Melissa: But I think it was a little to do with the fact that she just felt so guilty. So 
I felt guilty! So we all felt guilty! 
The discomfort felt by other women when they became pregnant placed further 
responsibility onto the female participants to put other people at ease and allow them to 
not feel uncomfortable about their own pregnancies. For many of the women, there 
were times when this task was too difficult to cope with, which could cause problems 
within relationships. In the middle of Susan's treatment, her sister-in-law became 
pregnant, and wrote to tell them the news: 
Susan: And I just thought, "I can't face picking up the phone", because I knew 
her well, and I knew I wouldn't be able to not cry. I thought, "I've got to wait till I 
feel... "Congratulations! I'm so pleased for you! When's it due?" You know, 
without sort of blubbering, because I didn't want to make her feel worse. And then 
we had that message [from her mother-in-law] on the answering machine, saying, 
"Oh, [sister-in-law] is really upset because you haven't been in contact with her, 
and she feels dreadful, and I don't think it would have hurt if you picked up the 
phone and said congratulations." 
It is women (and not men) who are expected to be excited by the announcement of a 
pregnancy or to coo adoringly over a new baby, and the failure to put others at their ease 
by performing that role is a potential source of relationship friction for which the 
woman experiencing infertility can be made to feel responsible. Consequently, 
difficulties in coping with ether people's pregnancies and babies can be experienced as 
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a personal failing, and a number of the female participants expressed their surprise and 
shame at their negative feelings towards other people's pregnancies and babies: 
Jenny: [...] I remember when she [her friend] had her child, and I could not 
believe it. This was not like me at all — I'm not that way inclined. And I couldn't 
believe it, and I had to tell her, "I'm sorry, I can't come and see you." 
Many women also felt that they had let the doctors down: 
Melissa: You contact [the hospital] to tell them whether you need a blood test or 
not [to see if you are pregnant]. You know...so I kept putting that off 'cause it 
seemed really daft to actually phone and say, "Actually, no, it's not worked." You 
sort offeel a bit, not quite a failure, but, you know, like you've let them down. 
As has already been described, IVF is constructed by the patients as a team effort where 
all the parties are constructed as equally and altruistically committed to a positive 
outcome 119 . This leads women to feel responsible to the doctors when treatment fails. 
Furthermore, particularly in an NHS context, the fact that limited resources had been 
used on them when someone else could have used them successfully compounds the 
sense of guilt. 
Many of the women experienced a profound sense of abandonment when treatment 
ended unsuccessfully, and the empty space that was left was very difficult for many to 
cope with after the intense activity of the treatment: 
Susan: But you felt as though you were doing something. That was the ...that 
wasn't too bad because you felt as thought you were doing something. But it was 
the waiting... but when all of a sudden... You'd had all this input and people 
scanning you and people injecting you, and then there was this, like, stop ...and 
then it was the... when it didn't work, you're just left [ ...] It's like when someone 
119 In her IVF diary, Leah Wild describes her disappointment when, during her pregnancy, she sent 
Christmas cards to the staff of the clinic, but did not receive one in return (The Guardian, 24 January, 
2001). 
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dies, that's the worst bit, isn't it, when you sort of like, well, when nothing 
happens. It all just sort of stops. 
Precisely because the IVF process is period of intense activity, particularly for the 
women, it gave many of the participants a sense of positive action often after years of 
tests and waiting lists. While most clinics offered follow-up appointments or 
counselling, none of the participants received any acknowledgement of their grief from 
the hospital — for example, a card or a telephone call - which conflicted sharply with the 
construction of treatment as a benevolent, joint venture 120 . This led several of the 
women to suspect that the clinics no longer had any interest in them because they did 
not offer any prospect of contributing positively to their success rates, compounding 
their sense of failure. 
IVF as woman's work 
One of the less acknowledged aspects of IVF is the extent to which it involves a 
considerable amount of work on the part of the patient, who has to attend appointments, 
gather information, make decisions, and organise work schedules around hormone 
injections and scan appointments. As Susan protested, "...it's not like a picnic, where 
you take a couple of tablets". As the patient, and therefore the focus of much of this 
activity, the woman is inevitably heavily involved. However, it also became clear in the 
course of this study that even those aspects of the work associated with treatment which 
men could take on still fell predominantly to the women. IVF, it seems, is woman's 
work. Four key areas of non-gender-specific work performed predominantly by women 
were identified in the course of this study: information gathering; the use of alternative 
therapies; decision-making; and the giving of injections. 
Information gathering 
In every case in this study, it was the woman who first visited the GP to discuss the fact 
that conception had not occurred: 
120  I witnessed this disjuncture at the clinic one afternoon, while I was sitting in the area reserved for the 
clinic staff, folding letters to be mailed out to potential participants. The receptionist came down to 
announce that one of the former patients had brought her IVF baby in to show the staff, and the doctors 
began to debate amongst themselves who should go, with each arguing that they were too busy until one 
eventually went out to see the baby. This is not to suggest that the doctors are uncaring, but that the 
emotional involvement of the doctors in individual cases is inevitably limited, and a positive (or negative) 
treatment outcome will inevitably be experienced differently between doctors and patients. 
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Michelle: I think men generally don't like to sort of go and discuss their own, like, 
ailments and problems. You know, they're not very good at going to the doctor 
and having check-ups. They'd much rather not think about it and hope it will go 
away, whereas I think women are much more the opposite, so it was definitely me 
that instigated going and finding out about it, you know, what we could do 121 . 
The initial GP visit was generally made along by the women at the "finding out" stage. 
This is a reflection, firstly, of the assumption that it is the woman's body that is at fault, 
and both male and female participants expressed the expectation that the female partners 
would simply be given fertility drugs which would sort the problem out with no further 
intervention. However, this also marks the beginning of a pattern that is repeated 
throughout treatment where women recall themselves as the instigators and organisers, 
and the men appear to have tagged along compliantly: 
Paula: I would get the information and I'd leave books "Have you read this? 
Just read this, this page, this paragraph!" 
Robert: But I did. 
Paula: Yeah, you did, but it tended to be as it got close to treatment rather than 
...As each step of the process came up, then you would sort offind out what the 
process was. Sometimes, you know, "We're going to the hospital tomorrow. This 
is what's going to happen." No, it wasn't quite that bad, but.. .yeah. But you 
didn't sort of like, if I'd brought information home, you didn't sort ofjump to find 
out what it was. 
Paula developed strategies to entice Robert to read the information she had collected, 
boiling it down to key pages and paragraphs in order to minimise the effort it would 
take for him to read it, thereby maximising the chances that he would. Robert was taken 
aback by her suggestion that he was unwilling to participate in the information 
gathering task, arguing that he did read what he was asked to. The key point here is that 
it was material that was collected and condensed for him by Paula, and he never actively 
sought out information. Alice's husband refused to look at any information relating to 
121 See, for example, Moynihan 1998 ; 
/1 
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specific clinic visits until they were on the train going to the clinic, and this last-minute 
reviewing of the pending procedure always increased Alice's nervousness. She recalled 
a brewery sign reading "Take Courage" that was visible from the train that she would 
look to for inspiration as she answered his questions. For other women, the information 
gathering task was a reflection of their own research skills, and they took pride in their 
ability to collect and distil information. Both Jeff and Rebecca accepted Rebecca's 
ability as a "great chaser of things" — a skill that was confirmed when she found out 
about a new tubal surgery technique, which she subsequently underwent, conceiving 
spontaneously the following month. 
Susan and Matthew were one of the only couples where this division of labour did not 
apply. Instead, it was Matthew who took responsibility for seeking out information 
which they both read together — a division of labour that enabled Susan to take a break 
from the organisational labour involved in her job: 
Susan: If I was here on my own, I'd be fairly organised, but I don't have to 
because you're quite a scurrier, and you'll go to the library and you'll find stuff 
out.. .And you're "I've been on the Internet, I've rung up, I've done this, I've 
found out this, this and this," and you're quite...And then I'll come home and I'll 
read it all. 
Matthew was also very involved in the setting up of the research interviews, and in 
providing feedback on the transcripts — more so than any of the other men. It is also 
important to note that this arrangement for gathering information is not an exact reversal 
of Paula and Robert's situation, since Susan would readily sit and read all the 
information that he had gathered. This reflects their wider commitment to a non-
conventional division of labour within the household, where they rejected what they 
described as "pink jobs and blue jobs" in favour of a more flexible arrangement. 
Alternative and complementary therapies  
Although most of the women had at some point in their experience of infertility 
experimented with supplements and dietary changes, only a few pursued a wider range 
of alternative therapies more seriously. However, with the exception of Anne's 
husband, as described earlier, the dietary and lifestyle changes were always instigated 
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by the female partners. Sarah and her husband followed a preconceptual nutrition 
programme, which she sought out and her husband "went along with" and "stopped 
drinking alcohol and all those things". She accounted for her role as the instigator in 
terms of the wider division of labour in their household: 
Sarah: But that's only because I do [take responsibility] when it comes to matters 
of health anyway. That's my job in this marriage. Not my job, but that's the way I 
am. There are certain things, you know, that we will do. One of the things I will 
do.. .1 make sure that our health is as good as possible. 
Sarah takes a slightly defensive tone, recognised a conflict between her own 
construction of their relationship as based on equality and the disproportionate burden 
of responsibility which she took on in the engagement with IVF. This is a strategy 
which Carolyn Dryden, writing in the context of the household division of labour within 
marriage, describes as an attempt to "balance the books of fairness" (Dryden 1999: 
ch.3) in order to retain the integrity of the construction of the relationship as based on 
principles of equality. 
Decision-making 
Since it was primarily the women seeking out information and instigating the treatment 
process, it is not surprising that the responsibility for decision-making with regards to 
treatment fell predominantly to the women: 
Melissa: To be honest, in the end, I feel I did make the decision [to stop], but I 
feel that he was behind me 100%, so there's not...1 haven't got that to worry 
about, and don't worry about that. 
Alice: Well, [husband] left it up to me really. He said he'd do whatever made me 
happy, so if I wanted to go for it again, I could. You know, he wouldn't stop me. 
In reality, the freedom to determine whether the treatment would continue or not proved 
to be something of a mixed blessing, since it is a decision that affects not only their own 
future, but also that of their partners, families and friends. A few of the women 
expressed concern that in years to come the decision would be thrown back at them by 
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their partners in anger, but more generally, they found themselves torn between wanting 
control over the situation, but feeling burdened by the responsibility: 
Claire: I think he never got as sort of embroiled in it emotionally as I did. I mean, 
he's a fairly typical male in that sense [...] And I think he was very much 
prepared to go with what I decided, which was nice in some ways, although on 
other occasions, I think it would have been nice to share the responsibility of the 
decision more. I mean, he probably thought he was being helpful by saying, 
"Look, you know, I won't cloud the issue. You ...whatever you want, I'll do it." 
But of course, that dumped the whole responsibility on my shoulders. 
However, what is also clear is that the women's decision-making power is not as 
absolute as it appears, with several of the men wielding an unspoken (and occasionally 
explicit) veto over the decisions of their female partners. As in the case of Alice above, 
her husband's agreement not to "stop" her clearly expresses his capacity to do just that. 
The male veto (although used very rarely in this study) is represented as the assertion of 
rationality over the uncontrolled female engagement with IVF: 
Melanie: I think Paul set the boundaries [to treatment] 
Paul: well, I mean, to be honest, you would have carried on for ever and a day 
wouldn't you, so I suppose somebody's got to sort of set the boundaries. It just 
not realistic to carry on for ever is it... with fertility treatment. 
The reality of IVF is that although the responsibility for the treatment and its outcome 
falls predominantly onto the women, the treatment cannot proceed without at least the 
co-operation of the male partner, most obviously in the provision of sperm and perhaps 
in the use of shared funds. Particularly in those cases where the woman desired to 
continue with treatment for significantly longer than the man, the potential of the male 
partner to veto further treatment by withdrawing co-operation hung over the decisions 
that the women made: 
Rachel: So I was half thinking in my mind that he just... he wasn't going to 
participate then. And if he doesn't participate, then you can't actually go through 
with it. 
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A few of the women perceived the threat of the veto very strongly and actively 
implemented strategies to minimise their partners' grounds for refusal, such as attending 
appointments alone unless a sperm sample was needed 122, taking responsibility for 
information gathering and arranging appointments, and in one case, paying for 
treatment out of her own savings. Others were careful not to become upset in front of 
their partners, or force them into long discussions about it, for fear of appearing overly 
emotional. 
While an absolute veto over further treatment was relatively unusual, a veto of the kinds 
of treatment involved was more common, and this emerged particularly in the context 
of the use of both donor eggs and sperm: 
Alice: No, I think he was quite happy to leave it up to me. If I thought something 
was going to be worth going for, because he hadn't read up on it or anything, i f I 
thought it was going to be good, then he was quite happy to go along with that. 
The only thing we have had is this thing about donor eggs, and also surrogacy. 
He wouldn't entertain that. 
At the age of 47 and entering the menopause, Alice had already been told that the use of 
donor eggs was now her only option. Consequently, her husband's rejection of the use 
of a donor is tantamount to a refusal to continue with treatment. However, although 
Alice is unwilling to tackle him directly for fear of alienating him, she was encouraging 
him to consider a new technique which would use the donor egg as a container for her 
own genetic material. The treatment was being carried out experimentally in Italy and 
she was ostensibly considering recruiting a donor in order to be accepted onto the 
Italian programme However, it soon became clear that Alice did not actually expect to 
be accepted to try the treatment. Instead, she was hoping that once the egg donor had 
been recruited, he could be persuaded to relent and agree to conventional treatment 
using the donor egg directly: 
122 It is important to note, however, that not attending appointments should not always be read as male 
disinterest. For some, this was a means of playing down the significance of appointments, and for others, 
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Alice: [...] We might be able to talk him round if we get to the hospital 
appointment and they come up with all the reasons why it's better to try that [a 
donor egg] than to try with my own eggs and fail a third time. Erm ...he might be 
persuaded to do it, and of course, knowing that this thing [the Italian treatment] is 
in the offing, there is a possibility that might make him feel happier about going 
on the waiting list [for a donor]. 
Alice allies herself with the clinic staff in her plans to further her cause, hoping that the 
case for donor eggs would be more persuasive coming from them. In this study, 
however, there were no cases where the female partner attempted to persuade a partner 
who was refusing to use donor sperm, reflecting the sensitivity around masculinity and 
fertility. 
Other forms of discrete, and not so discrete, persuasion emerged in the course of the 
interviews: 
Karen: When did you make the decision to move on to adoption? 
Katy: Erm...it was ...well, it was something that we've talked about for a ...when 
I say we've talked about it, I've kept throwing it into the pot. 
Denise: And I could manipulate him. I could cry. 
Perhaps the most extreme act of resistance in this study was the decision of one of the 
women to take fertility drugs without her partner's knowledge and timing sex to 
coincide with the period of enhanced maximum fertility 123 . However, this was 
exceptional, and most opted for a "soft sell" approach, such as becoming upset, or not 
allowing an issue to be put aside. 
the male partner would have lost pay to attend — money that they would need to cover the cost of 
treatment 
123 The participant phoned to tell me this the day after the second interview with her and her husband, 
during which her husband had repeatedly told me how he considered his family to be complete. She 
ascribed her decision to pursue further treatment secretly to our first interview, during which she had 
realised how much she wanted. another child. This raises significant ethical issues both in terms of the 
complexity of the interviewer / interviewee relationship, but also in the writing up of the research, and the 
decision to include this material was not an easy one because of my concerns about protecting her 
confidentiality. 
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While it is possible to interpret the male veto as an expression of authoritarian male 
power (and a few of the women did perceive it as such), an alternative interpretation is 
that it allows men to make a decision for the couple that is both more difficult and less 
socially acceptable for the women to make. By drawing on the traditional model of 
gender relations where men are defined as rational and women as emotional, the male 
partner is able to defend his assertion of the veto in terms of protecting the female 
partner from the physical and emotional effects of treatment on her, thereby facilitating 
the withdrawal from treatment without either partner breaching conventional gender 
roles. However, while this strategy can successfully extricate the couple from the IVF 
treadmill, it is ultimately dependent on construction of gender that is highly 
conventional — a construction which offers little space for the woman to imagine a 
positive future for herself without children. 
Giving injections  
One of the most obvious aspects of the treatment process (other than the provision of 
sperm) where the male partner can take an active role in IVF is the injections. The 
injections have to be given according to a strict timetable, and although some private 
clinics still encourage patients to visit the clinic daily to receive them, this is an option 
which is highly inconvenient for the woman, particularly if the clinic is not nearby. 
NHS clinics generally do not administer the injections, and patients have to either self-
administer them or fmd someone else to do it for them. The most convenient and 
discrete option is to self-administer the drugs. In this study, approximately half of the 
women were injected by their partner. Of the remainder, a small handful preferred to 
inject themselves, and the rest had to seek out friends, relatives, GP practice nurses or, 
for those working in medical environments, colleagues. For several of the men, the 
giving of injections was simply out of the question, citing their squeamishness about 
needles: 
Cathy: I can't give myself an intro-muscular injection. No, I can't do it myself 
John is ...can't even talk about it [...] 
Karen: So you never did them yourselves? 
Cathy. He did, actually. He did eventually. He did give me one. And he had to 
have a cup of tea afterwards and a lie down. 
John: I have a hatred of needles. 
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The squeamish hatred of needles was accepted by the women, and there were no cases 
where they had tried to persuade their partners to give the injections. In counselling 
couples in conflict over the male partner's "needle-phobia", Epstein and Rosenberg 
advise: "Your job is not to cure his phobia, but to find someone to give you injections" 
(Epstein & Rosenberg 1997: 136-7). At one level, this acceptance is understandable in 
that few people would want to be injected by someone who was reluctant or unsure, and 
the priority is to get the job done. However, it also reveals a more fundamental 
assumption that the arrangement of the injections is the woman's job, and where the 
man can't or won't do it, the role for finding an alternative person to do it falls to the 
female and not to the male partner: 
Alice: [husband] wasn't keen, but he said if I couldn't do it — because I had to go 
sort of right round the back — then he'd have a go, but he didn't want to unless it 
was absolutely necessary. 
Alice did not press her husband into doing the injections, and because of her concern 
about doing them herself, she was forced to ask GPs, the doctor at her workplace and 
finally her neighbour, a nurse, for help. This forced her to breach the secrecy which she 
wished to preserve around the treatment. 
Self-esteem  
One the key reasons why the issue of responsibility is important in the context of 
stopping treatment is that the subsequent feelings of guilt and failure impact negatively 
on self-esteem. This, in turn, can limit the choices women perceive as open to them. 
This erosion of self-esteem begins long before the experience of IVF, with the repeated 
"failures" to conceive challenging women's self-confidence. In this study, this was 
particularly apparent in ways in which some of the women felt (or were made to feel) 
incompetent when trying to keep temperature charts 124 : 
124  Early on in infertility testing, women are often advised to keep temperature charts in order to see 
whether they are ovulating. The temperature has to be taken first thing every morning, and if the woman 
is ovulating normally, the chart should show a spike in the middle of the month. 
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Susan: I used to feel a complete failure because I was taking my temperature and 
it wasn't going up and down. I was thinking, "I'm obviously doing it wrong," and 
I tried and tried. I went back [to the doctor] and I thought, "I'm not stupid. I'm 
an intelligent woman. I can't get it to... "And then, after all that time, I went to 
the hospital and had the blood test and he said, "Oh, it 's as we thought, you 
know, you're not ovulating." 
Sarah: [...] my GP, when I told him we'd been trying for ages, and he gave me 
one of those temperature charts. We'd been doing that for a year, and he said, 
"Oh, rubbish, you're doing it on the wrong days!" — in a very unsympathetic 
manner, and as f I was an idiot. 
In Sarah's case, in common with many women, she had tried using the temperature 
charts for some time before approaching her GP, although she found her medically 
unsupervised efforts summarily dismissed as incompetent. Unsurprisingly, the 
subsequent, supervised charts showed the same results. In Susan's case, she was 
following her doctor's instructions, although he had clearly not explained fully what she 
should expect — that is, that he suspected that she may not be ovulating and therefore 
that the temperature would not go up and down. Consequently, Susan's confidence was 
undermined in the earliest stages of the testing process in spite of her own self-belief. 
The treatment itself also affected women's self-image: 
Susan: But it wasn't even just the fact that you felt dreadful. It was the fact that 
your body's been pumped full of all this stuff, and suddenly the drugs just stopped 
and you're just left. My hair was all — it's not much better now [laughing] — my 
hair was all like, sort of horrible, my legs were sort of blotched and horrible. And 
I just thought, "Oh, god, I look a right old wreck." 
Several of the women found that a combination of stress and the drugs had led them to 
gain weight during and immediately after the treatment, and others, like Susan, found 
that the drugs had affected her hair and skin condition, in addition to the scarring caused 
by repeated injections. This highlights the fact that IVF is a physical, corporeal 
experience which literally (particularly in the short term) as well as discursively marks 
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the body. In a culture which values physical appearance as an essential expression of 
femininity, this creates an additional burden for women whose feminine identity is 
already under threat as a result of not having conceived. 
For some of the women, their confidence was undermined to the point where it 
impacted on the choices that they made after stopping IVF, particularly in terms of 
employment. Susan made a conscious decision to pursue a more ambitious career path 
following the decision to withdraw from IVF, since she had remained in her old job 
only because it would have been well-suited to part-time work when she became a 
mother. However, her reaction to not getting the first job she was interviewed for after 
stopping demonstrates the extent to which her confidence had been undermined: 
Susan: And I remember sitting in the office getting feedback from this guy and I 
was just sobbing, and I thought, "Oh, my god, no wonder he doesn't want to give 
me the job!" [mimics hysterical sobbing] It's just the thought of it... this is what 
I'd decided to do. This was the direction my life was going to go, and at the first 
attempt, you know, at 20, 30 something...33, I'd failed an interview. I'd never 
failed an interview in my life! I mean, that sort of knocked by confidence. I 
thought, "That's it. Nobody will want me. I can't do that. I can't be employed 
anywhere." 
Fortunately, Susan was able to recover from this further blow to her confidence and to 
secure a new and challenging job, but it also demonstrates the potential of infertility and 
IVF to impinge on women's self-belief. However, it is also important to note that it is 
not only self-confidence that limits women's career prospects. Many women 
undergoing fertility treatment stay in unchallenging and unsatisfying careers for many 
years in the expectation of either leaving to have a baby, or of having a baby and 
returning part-time. Furthermore, many stay in order to qualify for enhanced maternity 
and other benefits from which they would be excluded if they were to change jobs and 
then become pregnant. Consequently, many women for whom IVF fails can find 
themselves without the qualifications and experience to take on a more challenging job, 
and lacking the material resources to undertake retraining As increasing numbers of 
women take up IVF as an option, this might be a factor which will need to be taken into 
account in studies of gendered work patterns. 
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One area where the erosion of women's self-esteem consistently manifested itself is in 
the need for reassurance from their partners — a need which was not always met, leading 
to tension: 
Jeff: Oh, you get all that, "Why don't you go and find another woman?" — all that 
sort of thing [both laugh] 
Karen: Did you have that kind of...? 
Jeff A couple of times, when you were really blue, didn't you. That's just pure 
emotion, more... 
Rebecca: I suppose you think...I knew he could have children, er ...with somebody 
whose bits were all in working order, so I suppose, you know, you think, you want 
to make sure they want to be with you for you. 
Denise: I did have very emotional days. 
Graham: Little things blew up into big things. 
Denise: But it wouldn't come out directly, like I said, about not being able to have 
children. [...] But I think I would really push you to the limits sometimes, 
wouldn't I? In terms of needing to know that he loved me and it didn't matter. 
Graham: Yeah, that it didn't matter. 
Denise: That he loved me anyway. I think I did push you — in arguments, I'd be 
quite cruel. 
Graham: I think the divorce rate for IVF is quite high. If you can survive that, you 
can survive anything. 
[ 
Denise: So I'd test him. And when I talk about [his] integrity with you now —you 
stuck through it all. 
Jeff described the male role in WF as being a "handholder", suggesting that "all you can 
do is try to be emotionally strong". Within this discourse, the desire of the women for 
reassurance from their male partners is something to be "stuck through", placing the 
responsibility for the discord onto the women for feeling insecure unnecessarily. 
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One framework through which this relationship discord was explained was that of the 
well-established discourse of women as emotionally vulnerable to their hormones. 
Hormones are conventionally assumed to make women unpredictable, moody and 
aggressive, particularly in the context of menstruation and pre-menstrual syndrome, 
(Laws 1990), post-natal depression (Nicolson 1998) and the menopause (Ussher 1992). 
Consequently, many women fear that they will be unable to control their behaviour 
whilst on the hormonal drug treatments for IVF, and perceptible mood changes were 
readily ascribed to the hormones by both the male and the female participants. Cathy 
described being on the hormones as "like having PMT permanently", and she and her 
husband, John, argued fiercely at the time, even to the point of separating for short 
periods of time, and later considering divorce. However, John's account also 
inadvertently problematises the hormonal explanation: 
John: Totally irrational rages. I mean, erm... but totally, totally irrational rages. 
And, you know, I've either ...I've had to walk out of the house, or as I said, punch 
various objects, rather than punch her. Erm...to be honest, the less time I spent 
with her, the better it was. 
As he was explaining, John pointed to a large dent in one wall where he had punched it, 
and he also told me that he had punched through all the doors upstairs, yet he saw no 
irony in the portrayal of her rages as "totally irrational" and of his as rational and even 
restrained. He assured me that "friends have said that they don't know how I put up 
with some of the mood swings", and this was supported by Liz, who described herself 
as having been an "irrational cow". 
In her study of post-natal depression, Nicolson argues that hormonal explanations 
ignore the physical trauma, uncertainty and stress of becoming a mother, and instead, 
they locate the problem within the individual woman rather than in the social context in 
which the experience of new motherhood takes place (Nicolson 1998). It would be 
equally possible to formulate a similar explanation for the "mood swings" that 
accompany fertility treatment, which is painful, intrusive and profoundly stressful, and 
yet female (but not male) stress and anger continue to be interpreted as hormonal 
responses, reflecting the persistence of the representation of women as martyrs to their 
raging hormones. This offers a means of bracketing off the relationship tension to 
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within the period of engagement with IVF, but this is achieved by placing the 
responsibility for those tensions onto the idiosyncratic female body — a discursive move 
which is both woman-blaming, and also which denigrates the physical and emotional 
stresses of IVF for the female partner. 
Consequently, while the majority of the men indisputably had nothing but the best 
intentions in their commitment to being supportive, the male supportive role was not 
always experienced as such by the women: 
Cathy: I mean, I think I found it very hard, because he's not a talker, and I think 
the reason that I did want to talk about it every night was that at least I'd get 
something out of him, whereas maybe I'd tried to talk about it one night and he 
didn't want to talk, so I tried again another night, so it did always feel as if I was 
talking about it, but at the end of the day, I wasn't getting the conversation I 
wanted, so I would keep on. I'm like that. I'm like that in my job. The reason I do 
well in my job is that I keep on at people, and I think that's, you know, the way it 
went, because he's not a talker. Jam. So I wasn't getting satisfaction, so I was 
constantly looking for satisfaction, which is probably driving him bananas, but 
also driving me bananas. 
For many of the women, "satisfaction" simply meant no more than seeing that their 
partners were equally upset and disappointed by the failure of treatment, but with men 
pursuing a "supportive" role of being strong and therefore not showing their emotions, 
there was a constant dissonance between the two strategies. Cathy's husband, John, 
agreed in retrospect that he had not been as communicative as he could have been: 
John: But really, I just saw [my role] as being there when I was needed, but the 
one thing I probably should have done while we were doing it was maybe sat 
down and listened a little bit more to Cathy. But I was in a position where I didn't 
want to sit there and discuss it every night, and that's what it was becoming. You 
know, and so it's like everything else. You don't mind discussing it when the 
subject comes up occasionally, but when it was every day, every week, for what, 
the best part of a couple of years or more, I think, from that point of view, I 
probably ...well, I did, I switched offfrom it, because I was, "Let's get on with it. 
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If we do it, we 're doing it." I think I probably said to Cathy on more than one 
occasion, "We're going through this. Let's get it done. But I don't see the point of 
sitting here talking about it every night." So I don't know — maybe I wasn't as 
supportive in the way that I might have been. [...] You do what you can. 
The male partners in the study were routinely described as "not being talkers", and 
Graham, who is discussed above, was even jokily known as "the Ice Man" in his family 
because of his reluctance to express his emotions. Carolyn Dryden describes male 
silence or withdrawal as a strategy for controlling and delimiting change (Dryden 1999: 
Ch.6), and therefore, this silence should not necessarily be interpreted as disengagement 
from the IVF process. However, the potentially relationship-damaging implications of 
this silence are diffused in the accounts by constructing the silence as a characteristic, 
rather than a strategy. "Not being a talker", then, acknowledges the man as unable to be 
more communicative and expressive of emotion as a facet of normal masculinity (see, 
Moynihan 1998), rather than unwilling — an important distinction which means that the 
relationship can be kept intact (Seymour 1999: 91). However, implicit in this is a 
division of labour where women talk, and men do without the recognition that for the 
women, talking is a form of doing. Once decisions had been made, few of the men were 
prepared to engage in "just" talking, and as a consequence, few of the women were able 
to receive the emotional support that they desired from their partners. 
This emphasis on male activity is interesting in the light of the analysis earlier in this 
chapter, since it is clear that it is the women who perform the work of IVF, even in 
those areas where the responsibility could reasonably be taken over by the men. 
Seymour suggests that this problem-focused approach, although generally seen as male, 
can be gender-appropriate for women when it is framed within a legitimately emotional 
context (Seymour 1999) — the desire for a child in this case. Where female positive, 
problem-focused action is limited to the context of reproduction, it can be seen that the 
responsibility borne by the women in the engagement with IVF continually orients them 
towards achieving parenthood and is in danger of placing women in a catch-22 from 
which they cannot extricate themselves. 
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Conclusion  
From a feminist perspective, the repeated recurrence in the accounts of female 
insufficiency as an explanatory framework for IVF and its failure is a very sobering 
finding. Equally shocking is the insight into masculine culture that this analysis offers, 
particularly in terms of the strong and enduring association between fertility, virility and 
masculinity. These two related findings have important implications for the feminist 
theorising of masculinity, gender relations and the body. 
The predominance of the association of virility, fertility and masculinity as the 
discourse through which the male experience of IVF failure was mediated highlights the 
profoundly limited discursive resources available to men to discuss these issues — 
limitations that undoubtedly work to deleterious effect for both the male and the female 
partners. It is possible the interview context brought this aspect of the male experience 
out disproportionately, particularly since the male and female partners were interviewed 
together. This may have inhibited the men in talking about their own grief at their 
frustrated fatherhood ambitions for fear of compounding the guilt that their partners 
already felt. In addition, the gender dynamic between myself and the male participants 
may have acted as a constraint. There is very little research that has been done on the 
male experience of fertility treatment outside of the context of male factor infertility, 
and the analysis presented here suggests the need for further research in this area. 
The concept of "hegemonic masculinity" (Connell 1995) offers one means of making 
sense of the apparent dominance of this discourse. Hegemonic masculinity is the 
normative masculine standard, and is defmed by the repudiation of the feminine other. 
Where virility and fertility are so closely associated with masculinity, then even the 
suspicion of infertility is threatening to the masculine identity. Just as the women in the 
accounts laid claim to normatively feminine attributes in order to demonstrate their 
conformity, the male response can be understood in the same context. It is important to 
note in this context that the absence of a discourse on fatherhood (as opposed to 
fathering) from the accounts does not necessarily reflect the absence of that desire. 
Instead, this reflects the fact that these accounts are not about the desire to parent, but 
rather, are about managing the status of not being a parent in the context of normative 
social and cultural standards within which parenthood constitutes "normality". 
Therefore, this analysis constitutes an important contribution in terms of understanding 
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the nature of "normal" masculinity in relation to those normative standards. 
Nevertheless, what is clear from the analysis in this study is that it is women who are 
disproportionately disadvantaged by the protection and maintenance of a particular 
version of this masculinity in the accounts, with material and emotional consequences. 
This highlights the importance of locating the study of masculinity firmly in the context 
of inequalities of gender relations. 
For the majority of participants in this study, gender relations in the context of the 
engagement with IVF emerged as highly traditional, particularly in terms of the 
emotional division of labour. This created a mutually unsatisfactory situation whereby 
the women experienced isolation and felt unsupported, and the male partners were 
unable to express support beyond a show of emotional strength. The apparent 
intractability of these emotional scripts after decades of feminism makes for sombre 
reading. The enduring nature of these traditional gender relations highlights the 
continued relevance of feminism to social analysis, and the pernicious nature of "post-
feminism", or "new feminism" in Natasha Walter's terms (Walter 1998). The fly leaf of 
Walter's book, The New Feminism, declares that "it's time to break the link between 
the personal and the political". However, the analysis presented here suggests that 
gender relations, as expressed at the personal, intimate, emotional level, remain of 
fundamental significance to feminist theory and politics, and that the work of feminism 
is far from done 125 . 
Finally, this analysis reveals an enduring construction of the female body as 
unpredictable and liable to failure. This construction results not only in the female body 
being rendered as an object of medical surveillance and intervention, but it also means 
that that body can be held responsible for the failure of those interventions. The analysis 
of discourse in this context functions as a means of recognising and understanding the 
materiality of people's lives, whilst acknowledging discourse as both reproduced by and 
productive of that materiality. The dominant discourse emerges from this analysis as 
entrenched, but not inevitable, and this analysis points to the fundamental importance of 
finding alternative ways of understanding the female body which move away from 
125 This is a finding that is not confined to the analysis in this chapter, and the seemingly intractable 
construction of women as naturally reproductive, as discussed in Chapter 4, for example, also points to a 
similar conclusion. 
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insufficiency and blame. Emily Martin's work on discourses of the immune system and 
the use of military metaphors is particularly instructive in this regard (Martin 1994: Part 
ch. 1), and there is an urgent need for a new vocabulary which facilitates the 
development of different ways of thinking about (and visualising) both male and female 
bodies. 
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Chapter 7: Seeking Resolution 
This final analysis chapter focuses on how the participants constructed their experiences 
after stopping treatment. It is important to note that the failure of what eventually turns 
out to be the final cycle of treatment does not necessarily coincide with the decision to 
end treatment, which may come several months or even years later, if at all. 
Furthermore, the recognition of the end of treatment, whether voluntarily or 
involuntarily arrived at, does not necessarily coincide with (or inevitably lead to) the 
transition from identifying as childless to childfree — that is, a life that has ceased to be 
defined by the lack of children. Consequently, the transition from being "not yet 
pregnant" (Daniluk 1996) to "not going to be pregnant" should be seen as a long, 
complex process rather than an identifiable transitional moment, and none of these 
transitions are assured. Furthermore, this should not be seen as a linear progression, and 
people move backwards and forwards between stages at different times of their lives. 
The decision to stop WE is highly problematic, and while those undergoing IVF 
emphatically report the need to have tried everything before being able to accept a life 
without their own biological children, it is not at all clear what doing "everything" 
actually consists of. Furthermore, while there are well trodden paths into WE, the routes 
out of treatment are more obscure. This is particularly true for women, given the 
plethora of negative associations and the paucity of positive role models for women 
living without children, either voluntarily or involuntarily (Morell 1994; Daniluk 1996; 
Daniluk 1997; Campbell 1999; Morell 2000). Ironically, even when WF is successful, 
the end of treatment is still not clearly marked, since the successful cycle may well 
provide the motivation to return to treatment to try for a second child to "complete" the 
family There is, therefore, no self-evident, identifiable end to IVF treatment, but rather, 
the point at which treatment ends is subjectively determined according to a wide range 
of factors, events and personal circumstances. 
However, the decision to stop treatment is just one step in the transition towards a life 
that is not defined by the absence of a child. In the engagement with IVF, the problem 
which is identified as in need of resolution is the absence of a child. The goal of IVF, 
then, is to resolve that problem through the birth of a baby. However, the decision to 
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stop treatment presents those for whom treatment has failed with a new problem, or at 
least an old problem with a new twist that was postponed by the engagement with TVF — 
that is, the problem of living without children in a social and cultural context where 
childlessness is considered abnormal. This is particularly the case for women, since 
normative femininity is closely bound up in motherhood. Therefore, the new problem 
which needs to be resolved is the discomforting visibility that the stigmatised difference 
of childlessness brings, although the extent of this visibility varies depending on age, 
race, class etc. The seeking of resolution, then, is not about diminishing or denying the 
desire for a child, but instead, is about the management of normativity to the point 
where they are able to enjoy the relative anonymity of "normality", or, in Elspeth 
Probyn's terms, of "belonging" (Probyn 1996). 
This brings the analysis back to Probyn's concept of "outside belonging" that was 
introduced in Chapter 2. Those for whom treatment fails fmd themselves occupying an 
ambiguous third space, since they are unable to conceive, but have stopped treatment, 
and are therefore neither unambiguously voluntarily nor involuntarily childless. 
Similarly, the desire or intention to reproduce is ambiguously located in relation to 
normative reproductive standards when that desire is expressed (through having sought 
treatment, for example) but not fulfilled. This third space is a site of "ongoing 
inbetweenness" (Probyn 1996: 6), and in seeking resolution to the problem of the 
visibility of not belonging, the participants can be seen to be both productive of and 
located between contradictory categories. It will be argued in this chapter that in seeking 
resolution, the participants not only move strategically between those categories, but 
that those categories are reconfigured in the process, thereby effecting a reconfiguration 
of their own location in relation to those normative categories. 
This chapter will explore the ways in which the participants manage reproductive 
normativity in order to establish themselves as normal without actually being able to 
meet those standards through biological parenthood, and will consider some of the 
political and theoretical implications of this seeking of resolution. The first section in 
the chapter will consider the ways in which the participants make use of the 
complementary discourses of "doing everything possible" and of the strategic role of 
discourses of fate in limiting the definition of what can productively be done; the 
second section explores three discourses which allow the participants to situate 
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themselves within the normative reproductive standards by claiming the conventionally 
maternal attributes of benevolence, fertility and the fitness to parent; and the final 
section consider the ways in which the participants laid claim to (and resisted) a 
childfree identity. 
Doing everything possible 
Doing what you can 
The need to have tried every possible means of achieving pregnancy before accepting 
childlessness is frequently cited by those undergoing treatment. However, for as long as 
people are embroiled in the treatment process, what actually constitutes doing 
everything is frustratingly unclear. Although the participants recalled this confusion 
over how and when to end treatment, for those who had definitely stopped treatment or 
who were edging towards closure around IVF, the argument that they had done 
everything possible regained currency in the context of the positive construction of the 
end of treatment: 
Karen: Are you glad you did it [IVF]? 
Katy: Yes. 
Tim: Jam, yeah. 
Karen: Why would you say that? 
Tim: Because if we hadn't had, we would never have known. 
Katy: I mean, it wasn't an option not to have a go. 
Tim: Because we had to do all we thought we could do to try and have a family, 
so if we 'd not tried IVF, we would just have thought, "Oh well, we haven't done 
everything we could have done." So at least our consciences are clear of that sort 
of ...alright, we 've tried our best. That 's it, we can't have a family. That's life. 
Katy and Tim had originally decided to undergo 6 cycles of treatment, although 
eventually stopped after 5 following Katy's emergency hospitalisation relating to 
ovarian hyperstimulation in response to the drug treatments. Even though they fell short 
of their original limit of 6 before stopping, they asserted with confidence that they could 
have done no more. Tim's insistence that their "consciences are clear" demonstrates the 
way in which IVF has a public, confessional (Foucault 1978: 62) dimension through 
which the intention and desire to parent is made clear in spite of the absence of a child. 
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The exoneration attained through IVF reveals the extent to which those living outside 
the normative reproductive standards are subject to the evaluation of others. 
Katy and Tim had recently been made especially aware of the ease with which their 
actions could be misunderstood, highlighting the need for this "confession". Even 
though they had not told anybody they were having treatment, Tim was appalled to 
discover that his closest friend had always assumed they did not want children: 
Tim: We had to tell my close friend I've known since I was 14. He was my best 
man — and he thought, last week, when we told him because we put him down as a 
sort of adoption referee, they all thought we didn't have children because we 
didn't want them. Which is quite astounding really, when it's a person we see 
every week and it's obvious ...he must have picked up a few bits and pieces, 
mustn't he? 
Tim is shocked that IVF and infertility do not speak for themselves — that they are not 
"obvious" — and that it requires active confession in order to confirm the parenting 
intention, and in order not to be confused with someone who has chosen to live without 
children. This comm-unication failure between Tim and his friend reflects, to some 
degree, masculine relations, as described in the previous chapter, and this assumption 
that people must know that they couldn't have (rather than didn't want) children was 
rarely replicated by the female participants, who were frequently questioned about their 
childlessness by others, and were therefore very aware of the need to manage the 
assumptions of others. 
There are three key aspects to the assertion that everything possible has been done. 
Firstly, it refers to having done everything that is reasonably, rather than literally, 
possible. Moderation in the engagement with IVF is socially sanctioned, and even 
required126 . Therefore, the assertion of moderation gives legitimacy to the decision to 
stop, which could otherwise be interpreted negatively as "giving up" or not being 
sufficiently committed. Therefore, even though Katy and Tim failed to reach the limit 
which they had set for themselves as "doing everything", the perceived risks of further 
126 As discussed in Chapter 4. 
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treatment to Katy's health made it unreasonable to pursue that goal. It is also interesting 
to note that throughout the interviews, Tim continually expressed concern that the long 
drive to the clinic may have impacted negatively on the outcome of treatment, and he 
wondered whether treatment more locally might have been more effective. This 
continuing doubt co-existed paradoxically with the assertion that everything possible 
had been done, emphasising the strategic role of the discourse in achieving closure 
around IVF, or at least demonstrating closure to others. 
The discursive use of the possible health risks associated with treatment is also worth 
noting here. Risk is used here as a future possibility, presenting the decision to stop as 
an act of reason and moderation. This provides a useful counterbalance to the need to 
prevent future regrets, but resists the possibility of harm already having been done, with 
Katy's health scare serving only as a warning of future dangers. Very few of the 
participants expressed concern about the potential health risks of IVF during the 
interviews, and it is unclear whether this was due to a lack of awareness of the ongoing 
debates about safety, or whether it was simply too disruptive to the claim of moderation. 
The risk of ovarian cancer is roundly disregarded by the doctors as unproven, and 
Winston attempts to set the record straight by asserting that "I would have no hesitation 
about giving them to my own family if needed" (Winston 1999: 21) 127 . 
Secondly, implicit in the assertion that everything possible has been done is the 
acknowledgement and acceptance of a degree of responsibility as a patient in the TVF 
process. Therefore, where those responsibilities or duties are accepted, "doing 
everything" requires that those responsibilities be met fully and capably: 
Denise: Yeah, there was lots of information. I had lots of sort of information and 
leaflets. And I suppose I became a bit of a veteran really. 
Graham: You got — after the first three attempts —you end up knowing more 
sometimes than some of the nurses. 
Denise: And I used to be better at drawing up the Perganol with no bubbles in it 
than my sister as a nurse. I got sort of quite good at the technique. 
127  Winston's assertion recalls the widely publicised gesture by Douglas Hogg, agriculture minister at the 
beginning of the BSE crisis in the UK, of feeding a hamburger to his young daughter in order to prove 
that beef posed no risk to humans —an assertion which later proved false. 
ii 
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As "veterans" of IVF after 12 cycles of treatment, Denise and Graham take pride in 
their acquired expertise, even exceeding that of the medical professionals in some 
aspects. For others, it was not acquired skills, but innate characteristics that made them 
good candidates for IVF: 
Claire: [...] obviously, you had to, there was this drug that you had to inhale — 
I'm trying to remember it all now you had to inhale for a while, and that was 
done on a sort of every four hours. But, you know, I'm quite good at doing that, 
like, like, I'm the sort ofperson who never forgot to take the pill when I was on 
the pill, and yet you get some people who can't remember from one day to the 
next. So I'm, you know, I'm sufficiently organised for that not to have been a 
problem. 
Katy: Yeah, I'm very, very focused in that I'm disciplined but I have to have 
everything just so. So, as long as everything's just so. So the fact that, you know, 
as Tim said, sort of as soon as the, getting the ampoule out and making sure 
there's no air in the needle, if a little spurt spurted out I'd be horrified. Whereas, 
subsequently, you know, they'd sort ofyou know, spurt out the end and I said, 
"Oh!" [horrified] and they said, "It's alright, they allow factors of you know, 
lost." And I'd been doing everything sort of [all laughing] — mustn't lose 
anything. It might make all the difference. 
Both Claire and Katy define themselves as good, responsible IVF candidates because of 
their good organisational skills and their ability to exercise discipline over themselves. 
Katy's self-deprecating story about the injections draws upon her lack of medical 
knowledge about the built-in excess, but it also highlights the seriousness with which 
she approached her responsibilities in the treatment process, and particularly her 
attention to precision and detail — a precision which actually exceeds that of the medical 
professionals. Of course, as the previous chapter described, this need for absolute 
precision reflects the responsibility she feels — "it might make all the difference" — and 
while the claiming of expert or veteran status demonstrates the meeting of those 
responsibilities, it leaves that burden of responsibility unchallenged. 
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The third aspect of having "done everything possible" is that of having persevered and 
overcome obstacles, demonstrating that they did not "give up" easily. The previous 
chapter described the role of persuasion, particularly on the part of the women towards 
their male partners, in overcoming obstacles to treatment. However, many of the 
participants also took more deceptive measures. The decision by one of the participants 
to take fertility drugs behind her husband's back is an extreme example, but small acts 
of dishonesty in order to work the system were widespread. These included: lying to 
GPs about the length of time they had been trying to conceive in order to get the ball 
rolling quickly; lying to social workers in the adoption process about contraceptive 
use 128 or about having stopped fertility treatment 129 ; lying about smoking in the 
(mistaken) belief that smoking would exclude them from treatment; inventing small 
recurrent health problems such as dental problems in order to justify regular absences 
from work to colleagues; and, in collusion with doctors, presenting fertility 
investigations as investigations for menstrual problems in order to secure insurance 
coverage for procedures 130 . The participants demonstrated no shame or embarrassment 
about these deceptions, which were understood as necessary responses to an unfair or 
prejudiced system which otherwise had the potential to thwart their endeavours. 
By arguing that they have done everything possible, the participants were actively 
embracing patient responsibility in IVF in order to demonstrate their own commitment 
to the socially sanctioned goal of parenthood, as well as using it to demonstrate their 
own status as good candidates for IVF because of their proficiency and perseverance. 
Furthermore, implicit in this discourse is the acceptance of the normative standards 
which define parenthood, and particularly motherhood, as the natural, inevitable and 
morally preferred life course. However, where individual agency is given such a 
prominent role in the treatment process, the failure of treatment is easily laid at the door 
of the patients themselves, as described in the previous chapter. Consequently, a 
discourse of fate emerged to highlight the extent to which that individual agency was 
128 Candidates for adoption are supposed to use contraception to avoid becoming pregnant in the early 
stages of adoption, which might be disruptive for the adopted child. However, as discussed later in this 
chapter, several of the women found that using contraception was actually disruptive to the resolution 
they had achieved around biological childlessness, and therefore, they preferred not to use it. 
129 Candidates for adoption are expected to have ended fertility treatment when applying for adoption. 
130 Most health insurers will not offer any coverage for either the diagnosis or treatment of fertility 
problems. This exemption is also used by insurance companies to refuse treatment for conditions such as 
endometriosis, where one consequence of treatment might be enhanced fertility, even though primary 
purpose of the treatment was pain relief, for example. 
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inevitably limited, thereby relieving the participants to some extent of the charge of not 
having done enough. 
Fate 
The concept of fate was a regular feature of the accounts, and is used here to refer to the 
"inevitable destiny or necessity" 131 . Variously named as fate, god 132 or nature, this 
inevitable destiny was understood in a non-religious context, and was credited with 
varying degrees of interaction and responsiveness. One of the key features of fate in the 
accounts was its readability - that is, the existence of signs to be followed: 
Lisa: So I had a laparoscopy and we decided that we didn't want to go ahead with 
IVF because I was okay. [We] kept trying, then I had a miscarriage. Then, lo and 
behold, through the post a month after the miscarriage, a letter from [hospital] 
saying, "We've got local authority funding for your first cycle of IVF". 
Simon: We thought that was sort offate, really. 
Cathy: It was fate that did it for us. We didn't go searching for it, to be honest. 
The first time we did, but not for the last two. 
Alice: But he [the doctor] just sort of stopped [during the egg collection] and it 
sounded like he threw down his tools, and the nurse had to actually beg him 
to... she said, "There's another follicle, do that one". And he's going, "It's not 
worth it." And 	burst into tears by this time. And she said, "Look, just do it. 
Do that one." And there was one in it. And again, I thought "Well, it's ...that's a 
sign as well. This is the one." But it wasn't. 
The narrative use of fate enables the participants to justify choices such as proceeding 
with treatment. This is particularly true of Lisa and Simon, who had postponed entering 
into IVF because of their reservations about "interfering with nature". Consequently, the 
arrival of the letter from the hospital gave them the impetus to proceed. Interestingly, 
Lisa realised later in the interview that there was actually a space of more than a year 
131 Chambers Maxi Paperback Dictionary (1992) 
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between the miscarriage and the letter from the health authority. This compression of 
the chronology in the narrative enforces the relationship between those events which 
they have identified as central to the decisions that they made. 
Cathy also uses a fatalistic discourse to explain the two unplanned cycles which they 
underwent. However, she is unable to sustain her passive role in this narrative, 
acknowledging that "a dog could have crossed the road and I would have gone, 'Oh, 
that dog's telling me something'. Ultimately, she accepts that the "signs" were simply 
a reflection of her own desires for further treatment, and she speculates that if she had 
not had to have a hysterectomy due to her severe endometriosis, she might still be 
pursuing lt. 133 
For Alice, however, the sips that she perceived took on a different aspect as her 
treatment failed and as her hopes of future treatment became increasingly frustrated by 
her age and gynaecological problems, interpreting them as evidence of fate (or perhaps, 
more accurately, Fate) as malevolent, cruel and deliberately misleading: 
Alice: I've still got folic acid in the bathroom. One of these mornings I'll think, 
"Oh, perhaps I will [take it] " and I'll start up again. 	I don't like giving up on 
things too soon, but there comes a time when you think, "Perhaps I'm just being 
daft". You know — fate's having a good laugh at me — "oh, there she goes, taking 
it again". 
Alice's interviews were littered with stories of fate laughing at her by offering 
promising but ultimately unproductive "signs", or persecuting her by surrounding her 
with other people's babies. She told a story about how, shortly after one of the cycles 
had failed, she had gone to her local supermarket — part of a large chain — which had 
just launched a "Baby Club". In the store, enormous cut-out baby heads had been 
suspended from the ceiling, literally surrounding her with babies. The banners read: 
"Have you joined our baby club yet?". "No, I blinking well haven't", she observed, 
132 Only one of the participants was actively religious (Christian), and infertility had caused another to 
lose her Christian faith. The remainder did not practise any religion. Where God is mentioned in a 
specifically religious context, it has been capitalised. 
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wryly. Fate here is cruelly vicissitudinous, and the signs that she earlier perceived as 
leading her towards a positive outcome are now reinterpreted as taunting her134 . It is 
important to note, however, that Alice's narrative is, in many ways, quite unique in this 
study in her persistence in the face of extremely unfavourable odds, and her inability to 
imagine a positive future without children. In particular, the malevolence which she 
perceived in the workings of fate was not evident in any of the other accounts. 
For others, however, the attribution of the failure of treatment to a higher purpose 
offered means of making sense of continued infertility. Beth, like Alice, remained 
unable to accept that she might not become pregnant, but instead speculated whether her 
treatment failure was preparation for a future life as an older mother of a child with 
disabilities: 
Beth: It's another ...time's ticking away. I'm 35 next month, and I keep thinking, 
"Have I got a job in special needs ...did I suddenly have a career change to 
prepare me for this later baby that I'm having in life, which is going to be Down's 
Syndrome?" All these things I've gone through — it's a preparation thing. It's 
preparing me for the worst. But your mind gets carried away with yourself 
doesn't it? 
Beth is not entirely convinced herself of this, acknowledging that her mind "gets carried 
away", but she retained a strong conviction in readable pre-destination and that 
everything happened according to a wider positive purpose that was not necessarily 
immediately clear. Like several of the participants, Beth had consulted clairvoyants, and 
tarot card readings had repeatedly predicted her future fertility. In fact, it was the 
prediction that someone would be contacting her about her fertility that motivated her to 
participate in this research project 135 . 
133 Another of the participants, Anne, used the 1-Ching ( a Chinese method of prediction using dice) to 
help her to identify what she wanted. If the 1-Ching came up with a prediction that she disliked, she would 
then have established what she really wanted and could act accordingly! 
134 Several of the women remarked that they had felt overwhelmed by babies during their treatment, and 
that they would see them everywhere, in real life and in advertising. 
135 Beth had visited a clairvoyant who had told her that in four months' time, someone would contact her 
about her fertility, and this would be a starting point for her to take action with regards to her infertility. 
She received my letter inviting her to participate in the project four months later, prompting her to agree 
to my request. I personally do not share her belief in prediction, but I am not including this story in order 
to deride her beliefs in any way. However, from a position of scepticism, I would argue that this 
demonstrates not only the vulnerability of those experiencing infertility, but also that it highlights 
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While Beth only had suspicions as to the reasons for her infertility, for Stephanie, this 
was already clear: 
Stephanie: [husband] can't have children. I've had a child. [Son's] on this earth 
to give [husband] the... because I'm sure my ex-husband has fathered umpteen 
children probably. 
Karen: Does he have contact with [son] ? 
Stephanie: No, but not through my fault. It's his choice. But erm ...so if you take 
that and work it through, me getting pregnant under the awful pressures I had has 
enabled [husband] to have a child, which is spooky. 
Stephanie became pregnant whilst on the pill early on in an abusive marriage that she 
left shortly after the birth of the baby. She attributed the fertility problems that she and 
her second husband subsequently experienced to his low sperm count, and her tubes, 
which had become blocked following an IUD-related infection. Her narrative brings 
these two situations together as complementary, offering a neat resolution to the 
problem of their infertility. This "spooky" set of circumstances is reinforced by her 
conviction that their infertility is pre-destined as a form of protection against disability. 
Her husband's family had a relatively high incidence of infertility, and this made her 
"suspicious that god, nature is saying that that line of people is not to be carried on." 
For others, there was no point in even speculating what the reason might be, whilst 
accepting that there must be one and that it was for the best: 
Sarah: I kind offelt that if god wasn't letting us get pregnant, there might be a 
reason for it [ ...] so I... maybe it wasn't religion, maybe it was fate, thinking, well, 
I'm not going to bash myself about the head doing something that fate isn't 
making... letting happen. There's a reason for it. I don't know what the reason is, 
but you know, let's trust in life. 
fundamental ethical issues in interview-based research with regards to the different motivations of the 
researcher and the researched. 
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Rebecca: I believed in my mind anyway, you know, I think that i f I was meant to 
have fallen pregnant, I'd have fallen pregnant. 
The assertion of an unknowable, but directed, greater purpose offers a framework within 
which to accept the ending of treatment without writing off that treatment as futile. 
Rebecca argues that she was "meant to have done all that [treatment]", since it was only 
by means of the treatment failure that it became clear that it wasn't meant to be. 
While the understanding of the world as fatalistically and purposefully organised 
predominated, a small handful of the participants managed to resolve their infertility by 
interpreting it as a facet of an entirely random and unpredictable world: 
Jenny: But it did shake me up a bit. But I don't sort of think, "Why me?" because 
I think, "Why not me?". You know, life is life, and you know, there's things 
happening for no particular reason. It just happens. 
That things "just happen" marks the recognition that the world is not necessarily 
organised on fair terms, where infertility is either warranted as punishment or is a part 
of a larger scheme for the greater good. As Michelle described it, "it's just one of those 
things," although for Jenny, the belief that "it just happens" was experienced with great 
sadness, since it reflected her loss of Christian faith as a result of her infertility and the 
loss of social support that her subsequent move away from the church resulted in. For 
Susan and Matthew, the acceptance of fate as random enabled them to dispel the 
suspicion that their infertility had been somehow earned, finally recognising that "the 
best people in the world aren't the ones that get, that have families". 
Meeting the motherhood criteria  
One strategy to remain within the normative reproductive standards without actually 
having a biological child that emerged in the accounts was to detach the socially valued 
attributes of motherhood from biological motherhood and then to lay claim to those 
attributes. There is no comparable discursive process in evidence in the accounts in 
relation to fatherhood, which suggests that this discursive strategy is not about the 
desire to parent, but the need to manage and negotiate reproductive normativity, the 
focus of which rests on motherhood. The strategy of laying claim to the attributes of 
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motherhood establishes the participants as conforming in all but actual parenthood, and 
three key attributes were identified: benevolence; fertility; and relating to children. 
Benevolence  
One of the key conventional attributes of motherhood and femininity is that of self-
sacrifice and benevolence. This is precisely why the suggestion of selfishness is so 
potent when directed against women who live without children, or women who have 
children but fail to meet the normative reproductive standards, such as older women, 
single mothers, lesbian mothers, or even working mothers, who are judged (in some 
quarters) to be insufficiently willing to sacrifice their own personal interests for the sake 
of their children. In this context, one of the key problems faced by those for whom WF 
fails is that there is nothing that marks them out from those who have chosen to live 
without children. Consequently, the accusation of selfishness sticks easily, particularly 
when the involuntarily childless couple are sufficiently affluent to be able to enjoy the 
freedom and increased mobility and flexibility that living without children can bring, or 
the female partner invests time and energy heavily into her career. 
In response to these pressures, the construction of the ending of treatment as an act of 
giving affirms the participant as conforming to key criteria for motherhood, even while 
being unable to reproduce. This desire to be seen as benevolent is exploited by the 
treatment providers with regards to participation in egg sharing and research 
programmes, where women are told that their contributions will help other infertility 
women, or people with serious illnesses. The newsletter of the Cromwell TVF and 
Fertility Centre (Spring / Summer 1998) offers a good example of this. The issue 
focuses on egg sharing 136 , which is described as a "dignified solution to the egg donor 
shortage in fertility treatments". The headline to the newsletter is a definition of sharing 
— "a very effective way of reducing risk without reducing supply" — that is cited as 
coming from a publication called The Origins of Virtue (my emphasis). The message is 
clear: the virtuous path for a woman lucky enough to have surplus eggs or embryos is to 
donate them to another woman. The same strategy is applied to the multiple cycle 
treatment packages, where women are told that if they conceive in the first cycle of 
136 In egg sharing schemes, a woman receives IVF for free if she agrees to give up an agreed number of 
the eggs that she produces to be donated to other women. 
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treatment, although they would have paid over the odds for that cycle, they would 
effectively be subsidising women who need more cycles to achieve the same results. 
This demonstration of benevolence is apparent in the accounts in two key areas: firstly, 
by giving someone else a chance to try IVF by ending your own treatment; and 
secondly, for those who already had children, by sacrificing the desire for more children 
in order to protect the interests of existing children. 
Giving others a chance 
IVF treatment that is performed in an NHS context, whether it is funded by the health 
authority or privately funded at cost by the patient, is widely recognised by those 
receiving treatment as making a claim on a limited resource 137 . While the vast majority 
of the participants in this study asserted that their claim on those resources was justified, 
this was frequently accompanied by considerable discomfort: 
Melissa: [...] but I did worry that I was using up vital NHS resources over 
something that wasn't going to kill me. And there 's, you know, people with 
cancer, people with heart trouble, you know. Cutting up the cake. But maybe that 
sort of infertility area really shouldn't get any money. That was really hard to 
cope with. 
In addition to the concern that the funding of IVF might detract from other more 
deserving treatments, the injustice of a distribution of health authority funding which 
was dependent on post-codes was a source of considerable discomfort to those who 
happened to live in an area where funding was available. However, the complex issues 
of "cutting up the cake" also offered the participants a means of translating the decision 
to end treatment as an act of benevolence to others who were also competing for those 
scarce resources. After a disappointing first cycle, where the embryos had fragmented 
soon after fertilisation, Paula and Robert were advised by the NHS hospital where they 
were being treated that if the second cycle had a similar outcome, they would not be 
offered any more treatment unless they agreed to the use of either donor eggs or 
sperm138 : 
137 As discussed in Chapter 5. 
138  This kind of last chance was marked in patient files with the letters "YC" — meaning "yellow card"! 
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Karen: And how did you feel about that? 
Paula: Oh, I thought it was a very fair thing to do. 
Robert: There are so many other people waiting for treatment. 
By acknowledging the needs of other prospective patients, Paula and Robert 
successfully turn the potentially disempowering imposed end of treatment, at least at 
that hospital, into an act of generosity. For Liz, the end of treatment was imposed by 
repeated poor results from the hormonal drugs which are intended to stimulate the 
growth of egg follicles. Assigned the label "poor performer" on her medical records, she 
believed that treatment had been subsequently refused because she would not be able to 
make a positive contribution to the clinic's success rates: 
Liz: [...] I felt very much like lam not going to make your figures look good at the 
end of the day, and another part of me thought, well, yeah... stand aside and let 
someone else have a go who would have a chance. [...] You do sometimes see 
women who, you know, had ten goes [...] so I thought that was a bit unfair. 
Someone else could have a go. 
By interpreting the end of treatment as an act of benevolence rather than something 
imposed by the doctors, Liz firstly reasserts her control over the process in contrast to 
the excessive number of cycles she ascribes to others; but secondly, she also marks the 
end of treatment as a positive and generous act on her part. This stand in stark contrast 
to the commercial motivations which she suspects to be behind the clinic's decision to 
refuse her further treatment. This discursive distancing of herself from the doctors 
recalls the need described in Chapter 5 for the participants to locate their engagement 
with IVF within an altruistic moral framework, rather than one motivated by financial 
gain. 
Protecting existing children 
7 of the participants in this study already had one child prior to the final, unsuccessful 
IVF cycle. Two of these were conceived through earlier IVF attempts, and the 
remainder were either conceived within that relationship prior to the onset of fertility 
problems, or were the product of earlier relationships. While one of these children was 
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almost in adulthood by the time his mother and her partner were undergoing WE, the 
remainder were relatively young at the time their parents were pursuing treatment, and 
the hope of producing a sibling for the existing child was frequently cited as an 
important motivation for pursuing treatment. However, concern about the possible 
loneliness or isolation of an only child was also balanced against concern that the 
engagement with IVF would impact negatively on that child, both in terms of the 
redirection of resources and the anxiety that repeated hospital visits might generate: 
Courtney: Poking and prodding... operation after operation... ever since 
[daughter's] been born it's "My Mum's in hospital, my Mum's in hospital" ...and 
I don't want that for her. [ ...] I don't want her to constantly keep worrying ... at 
school, "My Mum's in hospital again." I don't want that. 
Sharon: And the thing is, we could spent that [IVF money] on [son]. I mean, we 
was like forsaking holidays and things like that, to take him away on holiday, 
because ...oh no, that's our IVF money. [...] And the thing is, like, really, we 
weren't neglecting [son] , but he was sort of like pushed into the background 
because IVF was in the front. 
Consequently, while existing children were frequently cited as a reason for pursuing 
treatment, they featured equally prominently in the decision to stop, allowing those 
withdrawing from treatment to establish their credentials as appropriately caring 
parents, even while withdrawing from the possibility of the "complete" family that they 
desired. This was also apparent in discussions of adoption, where the potential 
disruption to existing children of introducing a child into the family who may have 
behavioural problems was commonly cited as a key reason for not proceeding. 
Fertility 
One of the most striking features of the interviews was the regularity with which the 
participants asserted the continued possibility of conception, even in those participants, 
like Sarah, who could be described as living a childfree life: 
Sarah: We never really made the decision not to try on our own — in fact, we still 
have unprotected sex. [...] It 's not that we decided not to have children. We just 
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don't see something happening. And if it does, great. But we 're not even expecting 
it to happen. 
Throughout the experience of infertility, including IVF, many of the participants 
complained about being regaled with stories of women who tried for years and years 
and then suddenly and unexpectedly conceived. These stories were told by family 
members, friends and especially doctors, as well as being reported in the press. While 
these stories were generally approached with scepticism and annoyance, the fact 
remains that for some people, this does happen, and so even after stopping treatment, 
for as long there is no pharmaceutical or surgical prevention of pregnancy, the 
possibility technically remains. In fact, one of the women in this study was embarrassed 
to have become one of those stories by conceiving spontaneously after 12 cycles of 
treatment. However, very few women in the study were actively pursuing the possibility 
of spontaneous pregnancy in terms of counting days of the menstrual cycle and timing 
sex to coincide with ovulation. The most notable exception is Alice, who continued to 
count days using an ovulation predictor, although in a heartbreaking note added to the 
interview transcript, she had modified her goals, suggesting that "even a miscarriage 
would be something — if I'm not meant to have children at all, at least we'd have had 
some hope and joy at the beginning, even if it was to be lost later, but we'll probably 
never even have that now." The majority, like Sarah, were simply not taking any steps 
to prevent conception and had ceased the scrutiny of the menstrual cycle that is habitual 
to many women trying to conceive. In fact, conversely, several felt that the use of 
contraception was actually disruptive of their gradual acceptance of the fact that they 
were not able to conceive, since its very use suggests the "risk" of pregnancy. 
For most of the participants, the label of infertility was extremely distasteful and 
suggestive of pejorative terms such as "barren". Therefore, rather than expressing a 
straightforward expectation of pregnancy, the assertion of the continued possibility, 
however slight, of pregnancy serves as a means of claiming the normality that fertility 
bestows. In particular, continued menstruation or ovulation were cited as indications of 
essential fertility, even where other reproductive health problems made conception 
impossible: 
Karen: Would you ident0) yourselves as infertile? 
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Susan: Well, yes. 
Matthew: Yeah. I don't think we've ever used the term as such. 
Karen: Right. What does the term mean to you? 
Susan: Well, you see, the thing is, people talk about sub-fertility, but having never 
had a child, and never actually being able to conceive, so I always consider that I 
was completely infertile, because I've never, ever ...although that not strictly 
true because I've produced eggs. 
Susan draws initially on the medical understanding of infertility as the inability to 
conceive. However, this is also modified by observing that she has produced eggs, 
preferring instead the category of sub-fertility. Others, and particularly those whose 
infertility was caused by blocked tubes, rejected the category of infertility entirely, 
arguing that it was simply a technical problem that prevents them from conceiving — 
what Claire described as a "transport problem", continuing to view her fertility 
essentially intact. 
This construction of a retained core fertility, in spite of the inability to become pregnant, 
constitutes a response to the way in which cultural and social values have constructed 
the (reproductive) body as integral to female identity. The fatalistic insistence that you 
can never say never enables women to conform to those ideals regardless of their actual 
capacity to reproduce, situating reproduction back firmly in the realm of unpredictable 
nature. 
Relating to children 
As has already been discussed, one of the key functions of the accounts of the end of 
IVF treatment is to assert the essential "normality" of the participants in terms of social 
and cultural values with regards to reproduction, even where they have been unable to 
achieve the most obvious display of that conformity — a biological child. Consequently, 
a key feature of the accounts in this study was the demonstration of the self as being fit 
to mother by highlighting other areas where those skills and attributes have manifested 
themselves in their lives post-IVF. This was particularly apparent with regards to 
relationships with other children: 
Sarah: [...] but I've got my god-children, and [husband] has got a god-daughter. 
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Karen: Are they near? I mean, do you see them? 
Sarah: Very near. I can borrow them. The two special ones,[god-daughters], used 
to live next door. In fact, we heard [god-daughter] being born! It was really 
weird. We heard all the awful language that was coming out of the house, and 
within hours we were round there. [...] so we borrow them for weekends, and I 
must say that a lot of my girlfriends at the same time as I had my miscarriage had 
a baby, so they are all around 7 years old, and younger, because those were all 
the first batch, and they went on to have a second...So I know a lot of children. 
And we kind of get the vicarious pleasure out of them [ ...] 
It is important to note that these are not substitute children for Sarah, and she has 
managed to construct non-parental relationships with them, which she values very 
highly. For many of those undergoing IVF, other people's pregnancies and children are 
hugely problematic, and many of the women reported being appalled by their own 
feelings of jealousy towards friends and family. Consequently, the reintroduction of 
children into their lives served for many as confirmation of their recovery, and their 
successful transition towards acceptance that pregnancy was no longer a realistic 
possibility for them. Susan and Matthew spoke with delight about a recent weekend 
they had spent with friends, who have three young children: 
Susan: They used to be our neighbours, and I mean, there was a time when I used 
to find it really, really hard, because she was sort of having her children — when 
she was living next door — she was having her children and sort of every time 
another treatment had failed, she was pregnant again. I mean, she's only got 
three, but, you know, it felt like that. You just go, "Every time! Oh, for goodness 
sake. She's having another one!" And this time, when we went down, you sort of 
said to me on the way back [ ...] and he said, "How did you find it?" and I said, 
"I enjoy it. It's nice."Igo  down...we go down, we really play with the children, 
but I don't have this awful... 
Matthew: This gut-wrenching feeling. 
Susan: This, "Oh, my god. Isn't it awful. I haven't got any of my own!" We just 
felt we could enjoy them, and play with them — because we haven't got children, 
they tend to think we can't be parents so we must be children like them. So we 
play with them, but then we wave goodbye! [laughing] 
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Susan identifies this playful relationship with the children as marking a definite and 
positive transition in her own attitude towards her inability to conceive, and something 
that had evolved out of the grieving process initiated by three failed cycles and the 
ending of treatment139 . Contemporary social and cultural values dictate that for women, 
the unwillingness to be around children, for whatever reason, is dysfunctional. Indeed, 
one of the most difficult situations many of the women faced during treatment was the 
pressure to admire and fuss over other people's new babies, particularly in the 
workplace, where colleagues tended to be less aware of the treatment. Ironically, 
however, it is at the point when they were most determinedly pursuing parenthood that 
the participants were least able to conform to this normative assumption that women 
will (or at least should) always love being around children. Consequently, the 
restoration of the capacity to relate positively to children marks a return to normality. 
However, the ease with which this constructed normality is achievable in practice 
should not be overstated, and many of the female participants reported the continuing, 
very literal social exclusion of not being a parent in a social world full of children: 
Michelle: But even like the other week [husband's] brother and his wife had 
some cousins down to stay for the weekend, and they invited us all round there for 
the Sunday. And when we got there, all the men were in the lounge, watching the 
rugby on TV, and all the women were sitting in the dining room, and they were all 
talking about their children. You know, "Is yours doing this yet?" And I just think, 
"Where do Igo?" You know. Erm... and that is difficult, because you feel like you 
haven't got anything to contribute. 
Michelle's story highlights the extent to which it is the women, rather than their male 
partners, who are continually exposed to reminders of their childlessness and the 
practical ways in which that continues to set them apart, no matter how accepting they 
are of their own lives without children. This demonstrates the way in which those 
women living without children can find themselves curiously bereft of gender, 
139 She also marked her progress by the fact that she had just been on a shopping trip with a heavily 
pregnant friend for baby clothes, and it had not upset her at all. In fact, she remarked that she was simply 
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inhabiting an ill-defined third space. As Cathy observed of her husband's club, "I go 
over there and sit with them [the men] ...because I'm odd. I'm one of the boys. Well, 
not one of the boys, but I mean.. .they wouldn't choose to ask me to go and play golf 
with them." 
The demonstration of a general concern for the welfare of children also featured 
significantly in the accounts. This manifested itself over small issues such as concern 
about friends or acquaintances not reading to their children, not disciplining them 
properly, or smoking during pregnancy or around young children, but also over more 
serious child welfare issues: 
Susan: [...] it's like the sort ofpaedophile business on the television. You know, I 
mean, that incenses me, you know, that if somebody was like anywhere near my 
godchildren, or our nephews, I'd be out there banging on the door, and yet, no, 
because I've got no children, therefore I should believe that everyone should live 
in harmony with everybody else. But I don't —I still have that ....I mean, I would 
kill somebody if they went anywhere near any of the children we knew. [...] And 
we don't know what it's like [to be a parent], but that doesn't mean to say that we 
don't have that same anger or nurturing or wanting to protect those children, 
even when they're not ours. 
Susan was interviewed at a time when paedophilia was in the news following the 
tabloid newspaper campaign which was publicly identifying sex offenders in response 
to the murder of the young girl, Sarah Payne. The subsequent protests and campaigns 
for a public register of known offenders was led by a group of mothers, and Susan 
resented the implication that only those who have children can care about children, 
asserting instead her own fiercely protective instincts towards the children in her life. 
This desire to be seen as worthy of motherhood was influential for several of the 
participants in the decision not to enter into the adoption process, since it was perceived 
as carrying the risk of being professionally judged unfit to mother. Conversely, as Anne 
disgruntled because it was a beautiful day and she would have preferred to have been visiting garden 
centres! 
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found, approval for adoption was experienced as a positive affirmation of the suitability 
to parent — perhaps even more so than when parenthood is achieved naturally: 
Anne: [...] having gone through the adoption assessment, I feel incredibly 
validated, and, you know, affirmed as a parent. You know, because it is hard 
being assessed to adopt, and it...you know, it feels like.., that feels good. It feels 
good to be able to ...because when you give birth, you don't go through this 
assessment, so that feels validating. 
Not only adoption, but also god-parenting, or "special" relationships with the children 
of friends or siblings were perceived by many of the participants as offering this 
validation. 
Another way in which the meeting of parenting criteria is demonstrated is through the 
assertion of creativity and nurturing in other areas of life not involving children: 
Sarah: [...] I thought, I've got all this maternal energy that I've been saving up, 
because I wanted, I mean, I've...I'm not sure it's a broody thing, it's just that I've 
learned so much — and I want to pass it on to someone [...] And I kind of wanted 
that, and I'm quite good at teaching — I find myself in training situations quite a 
lot so this ...I feel that I wanted to...I've learnt so many things since, you know, the 
age of 30 that I wish I'd known when I was 16, you know. 
Karen: Yeah! [both laughing] 
Sarah: So I just thought, this energy, I want to put it somewhere, but I'm not 
going to have kids. That's when I decided, I mean, it wasn't an overnight decision, 
but for a while I thought, "Well, you know, I've got all this energy. I'm going to 
start a business." 
The energy Sarah describes herself as drawing on is explicitly maternal, which she 
applied to her business, and particularly to the teaching / training aspects of her work as 
a management consultant. The energy that she feels would have made her a good 
mother is now directed towards her business, but by focusing on the giving aspects of 
her job, she is affirming her suitability to mother and rejecting the selfish stereotype of 
women living without children. When we met 6 months later, Sarah described this 
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energy as creative rather than maternal — she had just won a major jewellery-making 
competition and her work was being displayed in a nationally renowned museum. This 
separation of the capacity to conceive from the core qualities and skills that define the 
social institution of motherhood facilitates the creation of a positive future which is not 
defined by lack or absence whilst still demonstrating the essential conformity to the 
socially and culturally determined standards of womanhood in all but actually becoming 
a mother. 
Living childfree (?)  
Franklin identifies two conventional narrative categories for IVF stories: the happy and 
the hopeless (Franklin 1990: 212-214). The happy stories are those of success, 
encapsulated in the iconic image of the miracle baby in the arms of its grateful parents. 
The hopeless stories speak of treatment failure, where failure becomes a metaphor for 
the relationship itself (Franldin 1990: 213). Both these stories are committed to 
parenthood as the only possible satisfactory resolution to infertility, offering a salutary 
vision of life after IVF for those who are not successful, and a powerful incentive to 
return to treatment. The former IVF patients emerge from stories of hopelessness as 
tragic and pitiful, perpetually defined by their lack of a child, or the desired number of 
children. This status as sympathy figures was not welcomed by the participants in this 
study, who spoke exasperatedly of "little pats on the wrist" (John), and of being the last 
to hear about other people's pregnancies. Another of the participants was not asked back 
to babysit for a neighbour — a task that she greatly enjoyed — once the neighbour 
discovered that she was unable to have children, worrying that the babysitting would 
distress her. 
For several of the participants, their life without children (or the desired number of 
children), caused them to reflect critically on the social construction of motherhood as 
essential to feminine identity: 
Claire: [...] being a whole person, being a good person, [having] a meaningful 
life, does not mean being a parent. You know, there 's lots of ways that you can 
have a perfectly valid existence. 
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Charlotte: And I remember being very angry at the god-like person who I'd 
decided was responsible. I remember saying, "You've taken away from me the 
one thing that I'd be good at!" [...] Why did I think that? [...] When I actually 
had a child, I'm not that good at it [...] And I might well have been good at other 
things, had I allowed myselfjust to keep ...get off this track of wanting a child [...] 
That's what's interesting — how you limit yourself by what you believe is 
important. 
The resistant positions to the ideology of motherhood articulated by Claire and 
Charlotte are risky in their directness, and while the interviews constituted a safe space 
to explore these ideas, they were both more circumspect in interactions in other 
contexts, and also in other parts of their interviews, where more conventional discourses 
of the motivations for parenthood were marshalled to enable them to construct an 
account of the engagement with IVF which avoided portraying themselves as having 
been duped into it. This highlights the fact that the accounts can be seen to be 
performing several different tasks at once — in this case, constructing themselves as 
normal and rational both in the engagement with treatment, and in the decision to stop. 
It is also important to note that while Claire and Charlotte were unusual in expressing so 
directly their resistance to the normative construction of women as only of value as 
mothers, this was also expressed in other, less overtly resistant, ways by several of the 
participants. 
The ability to find and express appreciation of the post-IVF life provides a useful means 
of rebutting the pitiful image in favour of a more positive and forward moving self-
representation. However, this is a strategy of resistance that has to be used with care 
because of the pejorative association of a childfree life with selfishness: 
Sarah: So, we were convinced we'd done all we could, within reason. So, that was 
good, because if we hadn't, we might have been, you know, sort of we could have 
done something... Urn, in a bit of a horrible sense, it also ...for friends, 
who... might be tempted to think "They're a selfish pair. They've chosen not to 
have kids." This is a bit horrible, but you do get that sense from people. People 
see you, you have things, you've got money to spend on holidays and things, 
you've got more free time and they think that you're selfish. And fyou say, if they 
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ask, "Have you got kids?" and you say, "We can't. We had IVF", and they leave 
you alone [...] 
For most of the participants who continued to live without children, the advantages of 
childlessness post-IVF included more frequent holidays, increased free time, a higher 
percentage of disposable income, greater professional mobility (particularly for women) 
and the freedom to act spontaneously without having to worry about childcare 
arrangements. It is important to note, however, that this financial freedom was not 
experienced by all the participants, and for a small number, this was simply an 
opportunity to not get into more debt, or to pay off loans. 
However, as in the excerpt from Sarah above, those positive aspects to living without 
children from which the participants were able to benefit are strongly associated with 
the presumed selfishness of the voluntarily childless lifestyle — an association that runs 
contrary to the desire to demonstrate conformity to normative social and reproductive 
standards. The two discourses of having done everything possible and of fate are central 
to the resolution of this dilemma, justifying not only the decision to stop treatment, but 
effectively licensing the pursuit of a lifestyle that would otherwise be deemed selfish. 
The benefits of living without children are constructed here not as the first choice, but 
as making the best of a bad job — "Plan B", as Melissa described it: 
Melissa: [...] I just thought, "Sod it! ", you know. Life's what you make it. 1 
haven't got what I wanted, so I'm going to find something I do want then go for 
that. 
Some of the women threw themselves into "Plan B" with great determination, with two 
setting up thriving businesses, and several retraining within their current employment 
field in order to take on more challenging positions. Melissa initially returned to 
education to study horticulture with the goal of setting up a nursery — "plants, not 
children" — with her husband, although this plan had been shelved at the time of the 
second interview because they were still enjoying the freedom and financial benefits of 
not having treatment. Other participants carried on with their lives much as before, 
simply enjoying not having IVF, and being able to spend money on their house or on 
holidays, or by restocking savings depleted by IVF treatment. These attempts to create a 
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positive outcome out of the IVF failure were used directly to deflect sympathy and to 
gain affirmation from friends and relatives: 
Susan: I think the nicest thing was when our friends stopped doing that, "Oh, 
poor Susan and Matthew", and did the, "You're blooming lucky, you two! ! " And I 
thought, "Yes, we are very lucky". You know, we are lucky that we're...cause I 
mean, not everyone that can't have a family can afford to do other things, and 
although we haven't got pots of money, we are able... if we want to go and do 
something, we can. 
Significantly, Susan and Matthew recounted stories of having reacted angrily to being 
told how lucky they were to be leading their childfree life by people who were unaware 
of their history of infertility. However, from friends who knew that their childlessness 
was not chosen, this was received as acceptance and affirmation. Matthew even became 
confident enough in his childfree identity to use it as a put- down against a work 
colleague who, while they were having treatment, had crudely offered to "come round 
and see your wife". Matthew taunted him in a later encounter with his recent trip to the 
Caribbean to see the cricket and with their upcoming trip to the US. 
This demonstration of a fulfilling life without children also proved useful in convincing 
others of the end of treatment: 
Mary: In fact, my friends were a bit of a pain in the neck sometimes, because at 
the end of the third one, they were just like, "Oh, no, go for the donor sperm!" 
And I'd reached a stage where ...I'd moved on to a stage where I was able to let 
go of it, but actually, they weren't. And they were actually still fired up around it, 
you know. It was quite difficult,  actually, saying "I'm ready to let go of this. I 
actually don't need children around me any more. What I need you to do is come 
to terms with 'it won't happen '". 
Liz also encountered the same problem when a friend of hers who worked in adoption 
services kept telling her about the number of very young, white babies that were being 
handled by his service, and encouraging her to apply for adoption — an intervention that 
was not particularly welcome after years of "psyching yourself up to the benefits of not 
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having children" (Liz). Therefore, the demonstration of those benefits communicated 
the end of treatment firmly back to those offering encouragement and support. The main 
drawback of this strategy is that to be convincing, it offers no room to express the 
continuing sorrow and grief that emerges, often unpredictably, for many years after the 
experience of IVF has ended. This means that the responsibilities of the participants to 
put on a brave face during treatment — what Susan called "[doing] the response" — in 
order to protect others from awkwardness and embarrassment have to continue in order 
for the categorical end of treatment to be entirely convincing. 
Age also emerged as a means of claiming the benefits of living without children whilst 
still conforming to normative reproductive standards. Firstly, for women (but not men) 
reproduction in the late thirties and early forties is considered risky both because of the 
increased risk of chromosomal disorders and because of the possibility of either not 
living to see the child into adulthood, or not having the energy to provide proper care 
for the child. Therefore, citing age as a reason for stopping proved a very effective 
strategy in demonstrating conformity in terms of concern for child welfare over self 
interest. However, age also enabled the participants to "pass" as parents, preventing 
their conformity ever coming into question with those who were unaware of their 
history of infertility: 
Matthew: [ ...] it's the case now, at our age, that people...some of whom assume 
where I'm working, assume that the kids have gone off to university, you know, 
away from home. 
Approaching 40, both Matthew and Susan found that the constant questioning that they 
had experienced in their late twenties and early thirties had now dwindled to nothing, 
since nobody any longer expected her to become pregnant. This is not to say that they 
were inventing children they did not have, but rather, that this assumption enabled them 
to enjoy a decreased interest in their reproductive history. 
Susan and Matthew also developed a new conception of "the family" which enabled 
them to take pride and pleasure in their family unit of two. This emerged in the 
interviews in the context of work, where particularly Susan found herself constantly 
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providing cover for others because she had no children and was therefore assumed to be 
constantly available: 
Susan: It was "Oh, we've got children. We need the time off at Christmas. You 
haven't got children." - "But I've got a family" — "Oh, but it's not the same. You 
don't understand." And I thought, "Why should I not have time off at Christmas 
to be with my family, just because I haven't got children? Why is my family less 
important than your family? Why is Matthew and my elderly parents of less value 
to me than your children are to you?" 
The conventional "family" of two (heterosexual male and female) adults and two 
children emerged repeatedly in the interviews as the ideal. Susan and Matthew had 
planned for their "family", purchasing a house on an estate that was well served with 
good schools and other services. When they decided to stop treatment, they literally as 
well as emotionally moved on, buying a new house, and divesting themselves of their 
accumulated "baby stuff": 
Susan: [ I'd collected all these Beatrix Potter frames —pictures that were 
going to go up in the nursery. I kept all these bits and pieces, and I thought, you 
know ...and we just got rid of it all, and we gave it to people's children, and we 
took it to the charity shop. 
Matthew: We totally got rid of it. It was a cleansing. 
They moved to a cottage in the country, deliberately selecting a house that would not 
have easily accommodated children. By establishing a lifestyle and environment where 
they did not so readily perceive "this gaping hole" (Susan), they were able to reinvest in 
their own relationship. As their confidence grew, they were able to celebrate their 
lifestyle, joking that they were able to indulge their passion for travelling by "spending 
their children's inheritance". It is important to note that living childfree and wanting 
children are not mutually exclusive, and whilst asserting their status as a complete 
family of two, Susan and Matthew remained extremely sad that they had been unable to 
have children. This highlights their liminal location in relation to the dominant 
discourse of reproductive normality, and points to the disruptive potential of their 
construction of themselves as a complete family of two. However, it is also important to 
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recognise that Susan and Matthew are aided in this construction by their access to 
material resources, both in terms of moving house, but also in the lifestyle they were 
able to lead once they had decided to stop. 
Age also allowed the participants to account for the childfree aspects of their lifestyles 
as what would have happened anyway, and therefore perfectly within the normal course 
of events: 
Sarah: I do these things — I make jewellery, and Igo to Aikido, and I'm very 
grateful for being able to do those things. The other interesting thing about this as 
well is that because we leave it so late to have kids these days ...Urn, I was talking 
to my friend earlier, [saying] "do you realise that by the time [friend's two 
children] have left home, I'm going to be 60". And she said, "in the normal 
course of things, we would have had our kids in our 20's and by 40 we would be 
free to start living our own lives." I think that's true as well. So I think if I had 
had a child in my 20's, and that child was now ...whatever...I'd be starting on 
what I'm doing now. 
Sarah is eager to emphasise the normality of her life in her 40's, and the extent to which 
her life path has now merged back with the more conventional life path of motherhood. 
For Cathy and John, too, the fact that they now have two holidays a year and weekends 
away was simply a more affluent version of the lifestyle they would have led had they 
had children. This diminishing of the divergence of the lifestyles of those with and 
without children normalises the life without children. However, particularly for women 
whose peers have small children, their own freedom to be spontaneous was not matched 
by their friends, meaning that they were still forced to plan social activities well in 
advance. Their male partners did not experience the same constraints on their social 
lives since their friends' female partners were primarily responsible for childcare. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the advantages of the childfree life are not so 
easily available to those experiencing secondary infertility, and whose social lives 
continue to revolve very much around children. 
It is also significant that the prospect of ageing was a cause of fear and sadness for 
several of the participants, and for some, the prospect of a lonely old age without 
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grandchildren was dreadful. For Alice, her long-term childless future was an appalling 
prospect for her: 
Alice: And I think to myself, right, this is it. You know, this is it forever, until we 
get taken into a home and we die. That's what life is. It'll just be work and more 
work. 
With an imagined future of only work, institutionalisation and death to look forward to, 
the prospect of finally ending treatment was understandably fearful for Alice, and she 
continued to seek treatment. Consequently, while this chapter focuses largely on 
strategies that were used to achieve resolution around infertility, for some the inability 
to imagine a positive future without children remained an apparently intractable barrier 
to that. It is important, therefore, to appreciate that there is nothing that is easy or 
inevitable about the transition from being "not yet pregnant" to "never going to be 
pregnant". 
Conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the ways in which the participants sought to resolve the 
"abnormality" of their childlessness. The analysis began by exploring the ways in which 
an end to treatment was constructed as a pre-requisite to making the transition out of 
infertility, where infertility is understood as a state of active desire. This is an important 
point, since resolution around childlessness, or living childfree, is in no way exclusive 
of the desire to have a biological child (or more children). In fact, the resolution which 
is sought is precisely one which can accommodate both the desire to have a child, and 
also the possibility of a positive present and future that is not negatively defined by that 
desire. 
The achievement of resolution is crucially dependent on the ability of the individual 
participants to construct themselves as having done everything that is reasonably 
possible in order to become biological parents. This is certainly a strategy for managing 
the responses of others to their childless future, but it also reflects their personal desires 
for children, and the need to postpone future regrets. As has already been described, 
there is no objective end point to IVF, and it is a technology of seemingly endless 
possibilities. The end point, then, is discursively determined and individually managed. 
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This is, of course, easier said than done, but there are aspects of the treatment process 
which could certainly facilitate this difficult task. The clinic environment is charged 
with the likelihood of success, not least because of the baby photographs which are 
conventionally on display in waiting rooms and offices, and the publishing of success 
rates. I will return to the implications of this analysis as a whole for treatment providers 
in the conclusion to the thesis. However, the important point here is the need for frank 
representations of IVF, both to prospective patients, and also in the wider social context 
within which treatment failure is experienced and given meaning. 
Beyond establishing closure around the experience of IVF itself, those for whom 
treatment fails are confronted with the task of creating, or at least imagining, a different 
future from the one on which their engagement with IVF was predicated. As discussed 
in relation to the concept of masculinity in the previous chapter, the discursive work 
which the participants perform is crucially not about suppressing the desire for a child 
per se, but is about seeking ways to live with that desire without being negatively 
defmed by it in a social context that prescribes parenthood as a facet of normality. This 
discursive agency exposes the constructed nature of the apparently static categories 
which constitute reproductive normativity, whilst both reproducing and reworking those 
categories. In laying claim to explicitly maternal feminine attributes, for example, the 
participants effected a separation of actual motherhood from femininity, reworking both 
categories as a result. Ironically, then, a strategy of conformity functions as a form of 
careful resistance to normative standards. Similar reworkings are evident in the analysis 
of the categories of "the family", and ultimately, of IVF itself, which is transformed 
from an "end of the line" attempt to become pregnant to a validating structure upon 
which to construct a positive future without children. It is precisely the "ongoing 
inbetweenness" of the experience of IVF failure which creates the circumstances for this 
reconfiguration of categories, and this can be seen as part of the "transformative" 
project explored in Linda Layne's edited collection (Layne 1999a), through which a 
close examination of the "fringes" of mothering creates a space from which the 
categories of reproduction are both produced and transformed. However, it is important 
not to overstate the transforrnative potential of the experience of IVF failure, which can 
be experienced as devastating and isolating. 
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The accounts demonstrate the extent to which the normativity of reproduction can be 
managed in order to accommodate a life without children (or the desired number of 
children) once WE treatment has ended. Nevertheless, this is highly constrained, and 
the accommodations that are reached require constant maintenance through repetition. 
Furthermore, the capacity to imagine and create a positive future without children after 
unsuccessful WE is shown in the accounts to be dependent on a wide variety of 
personal, educational, material and social resources, to which not everybody had access. 
More fundamentally, what the analysis makes visible is that the vast majority of the 
discursive work performed by the participants in the interviews is related directly to the 
task of managing normativity, in order to locate themselves within the domain of 
normality when treatment fails. This is distinct from (although related to) the grieving 
process which follows IVF failure, and from a feminist perspective, the necessity of this 
discursive labour points to a depressing lack of change in the narrow construction of 
femininity through reproduction, in spite of decades of feminism. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions  
In concluding this thesis, I would like to return to my assertion in the first chapter that 
this research does not aim simply to plug a gap in our knowledge about IVF. Instead, I 
have argued that the relative invisibility of IVF failure from the dominant 
representations cannot be explained simply in terms of biased oversight, but instead can 
be seen as actively produced by exclusion from those dominant representations. Where 
the dominant discourse of IVF is of technology giving nature a helping hand to produce 
miracle babies, there is simply no space for any representation of treatment failure other 
than ones of devastation following the failure to achieve restitution through biological 
parenthood. Furthermore, I have argued that those for whom treatment has failed 
occupy an extraordinary and liminal location among the dominant discourses of gender, 
technology and the body. Consequently, their accounts can be understood as 
constituting faithful, situated lcnowledges which produce new ways of seeing not only 
IVF, but also the power relations which produce and maintain the dominant 
representations, and which exclude others. In the remainder of this chapter, I will first 
set out some of the key findings of the analysis; the second section will discuss some of 
the implications of the analysis for IVF policy and treatment delivery; the third section 
will outline areas of future research which this analysis has opened up; and the chapter 
will conclude with some brief reflections on the research and the thesis. 
Key findings  
Perhaps the most significant finding of the analysis presented in this thesis is discursive 
orientation of the accounts to the task of managing normativiO, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. This stands in stark contrast to the dominant representations of IVF 
failure as the catastrophic absence of restitution through motherhood, where the desire 
for a child dominates the narrative. In this research, it is not the desire for a child which 
dominates the narrative, but rather, the desire to locate the self as normal, where normal 
is always normatively determined. This marks a divergence from the seductively 
coherent narrative of restitution — a divergence which disrupts the coherence of the 
dominant discourses of gender, technology and the body which comprise that narrative, 
and which exposes them as contradictory, fluid and mutually imbricated. The task of 
managing normativity that emerges so strongly out of the analysis produces a burden of 
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work for the participants, and particularly the women, to reframe those discursive 
resources in order to locate themselves positively in relation to them. 
The understanding of the interviews as rhetorically organised around the management 
of normative discourses in relation to which they are ambiguously and ambivalently 
located points to a number of important findings. While the strategies of normalisation 
are in essence oriented towards conformity to social and cultural norms, the very act of 
locating themselves as belonging from a position of non-belonging constitutes an act of 
resistance to those categories and a refraining of the boundaries through which 
normality is defined. These gentle, micro-level acts of resistance lack the spectacular 
gesture of Donna Haraway's embracing of the transgressive potential of nature-
technology hybridity, or of the categorical rejection of the NRTs that the FlNRRAGE 
position advocates. Instead, this reframing of the boundaries of social and cultural 
norms points to the inadequacy of theoretical or political paradigms based on 
conformity and transgression as opposing and irreconcilable categories. Instead, by 
conceptualising both conformity and transgression as actions rather than outcomes, it is 
possible to perceive both aspects at work simultaneously in the discursive labour being 
performed by the participants. 
This fluidity of and between categories is particularly evident in the context of the 
management of discourses of nature and technology. As described in Chapter 4, the 
normative positioning of women and reproduction in the natural domain, and of men as 
rational and cultural, renders the discursive management of the unsuccessful 
engagement with technology for reproduction highly problematic for the participants. 
While the dominant discourse constructs the nature and technology as complementary 
in the (re)production of miracle babies, the analysis presented here demonstrates an 
alternative strategy which is oriented towards the naturalisation, and therefore, 
normalisation, of the technology. However, while it can be seen as an effective strategy 
for diffusing fears about "meddling with nature", the discursive rendering of natural and 
normal as synonymous also has the effect of shoring up the dominant representations of 
IVF as mainstream and unproblematic. This leads to technological "creep", where 
concerns around particular technologies are diffused by normalising them relative to 
newer, more controversial technologies. Those seeking fertility treatment can claim, for 
example, to have only had "normal" IVF, as opposed to ICSI, POD or other less 
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mainstream procedures. Furthermore, the construction of the engagement with rvF as 
natural, and therefore normal, effectively renders those who do not engage with 
treatment unnatural and abnormal. This fortifies the imperative to engage with treatment 
that rvF produces, as well as reinforcing the normative construction of proper 
womanhood as synonymous with motherhood 
This points to IVF the usefulness of thinking about IVF as a disciplinary technology 
through which new identities and norms are produced, and in their accounts, the 
participants identified those who do not seek treatment, or who had undertaken 
treatment less moderately or under less conventional circumstances, as the abnormal 
Others against which their own normality in having tried and been unsuccessful was 
defined. However, the fluidity of the boundaries between abnormality and normality 
means that the task of managing normativity is one that is constant, requiring the 
rigorous surveillance of the self. This can be seen, for example, in the concerns 
discussed in Chapter 5 about spending money on themselves once IVF has ended in 
case that is misunderstood in terms of being "too selfish" to have a child. The 
disciplinary surveillance of women by themselves and others highlights the process of 
meaning production as constantly ongoing, and one in which the women themselves are 
actively engaged. This provides a useful antidote to the strategies aiming at the closure 
of meaning around TVF, as in the radical feminist opposition to the NRTs. 
However, to argue that the process of meaning production is ongoing, and therefore 
always contingent, is not to suggest an array of free-floating meanings waiting to be 
plucked by those engaged in that process. On the contrary, one of the most sobering 
findings of this analysis is the extent to which the dominant discourses are deeply 
entrenched and seemingly intractable. This emerged as particularly true in relation to 
gender, where narrow definitions of masculinity and femininity have been identified as 
impacting deleteriously (if asymmetrically) on both partners. In particular, the defmition 
of normal femininity in terms of reproduction has been identified repeatedly in the 
analysis as a central focus of the task of managing normativity, generating a constant 
burden of discursive labour for women. From this perspective, agency and constraint 
can be seen as always simultaneously present and productive of each other. This points 
to the inadequacy of conceptualisations of the engagement with IVF as either the 
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exercise of choice or as violent imposition, and therefore, of the need for an approach 
which can accommodate the contradictory and ambivalent nature of that engagement. 
The apparent intractability of gender norms that emerges from this analysis also serves 
as a reminder of what is at stake in the management of normativity in the accounts, 
pointing to the impossibility of a definitive conceptual split between the discursive and 
the material. What Donna Haraway condemns as the "mundane fiction of Man and 
Woman" (Haraway 1991: 180) is far from mundane for the participants, and both non-
belonging and the strategies employed in order to belong can have tangible 
consequences in terms of feelings of guilt and responsibility, social exclusion, short and 
long term health, fmancial security, employment prospects and emotional well-being, to 
name but a few. Furthermore, it is important to note that it is women who bear the lion's 
share of these negative impacts. Therefore, in these accounts, the management of 
normativity and the reframing of the boundaries between discourses should not be 
understood in terms of blasphemous "play" (Haraway 1991: 149) which can rise above 
the risks of transgression, and the participants do not celebrate, or take pleasure in, their 
(potentially) disruptive boundary location. This points to the importance of retaining the 
lived realities of IVF failure in the foreground of any attempts to draw theoretical 
insights from those experiences. This blurring of the boundaries between feminist 
theory and practice is embodied in the methodological framework of this project as a 
means of both seeking out new and productive connections between categories and of 
redrawing the categories themselves. 
Implications for IVF policy and treatment delivery 
One of the strengths of the methodological approach taken here is that it is able to 
generate fmdings not only at the theoretical and conceptual level, but also at the level of 
IVF policy and practice. Many of these findings have already been discussed with the 
medical team at the clinic through which the participants were recruited, as described in 
Chapter 3. However, it is also anticipated that these findings will be of interest to policy 
makers, treatment providers, counsellors, patient support groups and organisations, and 
those experiencing or seeking treatment. The targeted dissemination of the research 
findings to as many potential users as possible is fundamental to the feminist orientation 
of this research. 
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At the policy level, this research raises important issues in relation to the health 
authority funding of treatment. At the current time, funding is not consistent across 
health authorities, and is generally subject to widely varying eligibility criteria and long 
waiting lists. This creates uncertainty for those seeking treatment, causing women in 
particular to place their lives on hold. Furthermore, the analysis presented here has 
demonstrated that IVF does offer, at least potentially, a means of achieving resolution 
around the experience of infertility, even when treatment fails. Therefore, I would argue 
that there is a strong case to be made for the prompt, predictable and nationally 
consistent provision of health authority funding for IVF treatment. However, it is also 
important to note that the provision of health authority funding may also create an 
imperative to engage with treatment, the refusal of which may expose women to the 
accusation that their desire for a child was somehow deficient. This is an area that 
requires considerable further research. 
At the level of the delivery of treatment, three key sets of conclusions can be drawn. 
Firstly, the research findings point to important issues of informed consent. While the 
clinics provide technical information about the procedure of IVF, the wider process in 
which that procedure is embedded, and particularly the emotional aspects, are largely 
disregarded, with the exception of the mandatory mention of the availability of 
independent counselling — an option which the participants in this study were reluctant 
to make use of. Consequently, pre-emptive strategies for coping with treatment failure 
are rarely raised with patients before entering into treatment, such as setting limits, even 
if only provisionally, drawing up post-IVF contingency plans, and considering in 
advance of treatment some of the complex relational issues that IVF raises, such as who 
to tell about treatment. However, those participants who had been able to consider these 
issues in the early stages of treatment, either under their own initiative or on the advice 
of friends or relatives, felt that these had been extremely beneficial. Conversely, the 
benefit of hindsight led several of the participants to express regret that no-one had 
warned them of the problems which confiding (or not confiding) in others had 
subsequently created. Patients cannot be said to be fully informed if they have not been 
made aware of the implications of the treatment they are undertaking, not just 
medically, but socially and emotionally. I would argue, therefore, that it is incumbent on 
the clinics to develop accessible forms of information and advice that do not necessarily 
242 
carry the stigma of counselling, but which focus on the wider process in which the 
patients are engaged. 
Secondly, the interviews revealed a number of occasions where the medical staff 
inadvertently made particularly the female participants feel responsible, sullied or 
stupid. These include, for example: informing women that they, rather than the doctors 
or the medication, had not produced good enough eggs; carrying out fmancial 
transactions in the corridor; or laughing off women's fears about standing up or going to 
the toilet after embryo transfer. These are not malicious acts, but they ignore the 
normative social and cultural context within which WE operates which easily blames 
women for their own infertility, and which views the commodification of reproduction 
critically. Many of the women in this study, for example, read the silence from the 
clinics following the failure of treatment as proof that the doctors were only ever 
interested in boosting the clinic's success rates, thereby sullying the reproductive 
endeavour. Therefore, it might be useful for clinics to consider making a short phone 
call expressing sympathy, or sending a small card. This is an area where more research 
in the context of treatment delivery would be extremely useful, as would programmes to 
raise the awareness of treatment providers of the unintended, but potentially 
undermining, effects of their everyday talk and actions. 
And finally, the research points to the need to think carefully about the clinic 
environment itself. In an NHS context, in particular, this is clearly subject to the 
availability of resources. However, issues such as the importance of privacy in relation 
to the provision of sperm samples, the conducting of consultations and transactions in 
public spaces, and the use of baby pictures as decoration in the waiting areas repeatedly 
emerged as problematic for the participants, but subject to positive change at very little 
cost. One of the steps taken at the clinic through which the participants were recruited, 
for example, was to reduce the number of baby pictures down to a single panel, and to 
replace them with art work by former patients, including those whose treatment had 
failed. When we met to discuss the research fmdings, the possibility of including 
positive images or narratives from those whose treatment had not been successful in the 
patient literature was also under consideration. These are important areas of future 
research, both by the clinics themselves, and also by those external to those contexts. 
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Future research  
The analysis presented here opens up a number of potentially productive areas of future 
research. In the context of this study, the interview transcripts constitute a rich data set, 
to which it is not possible to do justice in the relatively limited space of a thesis. In 
particular, there are several themes which are only touched upon in the analysis which 
warrant further explanation, including: the management of risk; issues of privacy; the 
impact of existing children on the experience of IVF failure; the use of statistics; and the 
construction of "the family" It is anticipated that a further analysis of the interview data 
along these thematic lines would enrich the existing analysis. 
In addition to focusing on themes which run across the accounts, a narrative analysis of 
selected interviews would offer an alternative perspective which would bring out the 
contradictions within individual narratives. In writing up the analysis here, I have 
chosen to illustrate the different discursive strategies using the best examples possible, 
thereby moving freely between accounts. This has the effect of bringing out the 
contradictions between the accounts, but can also inadvertently obscure the 
contradictions within individual narratives. Therefore, a narrative analysis would 
complement the more thematic approach taken in this thesis to produce a more nuanced 
analysis of the interview data as a whole. This would be a particularly interesting 
approach to take to Alice's narrative. At 47 and still hoping to conceive through the 
engagement with increasingly high-tech procedures, Alice was, in many ways, a tragic 
figure, and of all the interviews I conducted, I found hers the most depressing and 
disturbing. However, she also emerges from the interviews as intelligent, creative, witty 
and excellent company — characteristics which I found difficult to reconcile with the 
despair which infused the interviews and with her bleak vision of her future without 
children. As a result, I had great difficulty in writing about Alice in a way which reflects 
this complexity and a narrative approach offers a potentially productive alternative 
perspective from which to think about her story. 
The thesis also points to a number of interesting and important epistemological, 
methodological and ethical issues which warrant greater discussion than I have been 
able to give them here. In the process of conducting the research, I repeatedly 
encountered a conflict between my role as analyst and my ethical responsibilities 
towards the participants, particularly with regards to the risk of imposing meanings or 
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interpretations with which they would not agree. This dilemma is a product of the 
adoption of a discourse analytic approach to empirical data, and a more detailed 
discussion of this dilemma and the ways in which it was manifested in the research 
process would make an interesting contribution to the literature on feminist 
methodology and epistemology. 
Beyond this particular research project, the analysis points to a number of other areas of 
research which would intersect productively with the findings presented here. Firstly, in 
the context of IVF, treatment failure is not the only experience which is marginalised by 
the dominant discourse, and the experiences of those who would qualify as candidates 
for treatment but who choose not to engage with it, and of those who want to engage 
with treatment but are unable to gain access to it, can also be understood as lirninal, 
boundary perspectives which would constitute equally productive arenas from which to 
think about rvF and its context. In particular, these perspectives would offer interesting 
insights into the management of the normative pressures to engage with treatment; the 
ways in which pejorative constructions of childlessness, particularly in women, are 
resisted; the strategies by means of which resolution around involuntary childlessness is 
achieved or attempted; and the ways in which IVF impacts upon the experience of 
involuntary childlessness even when it is not experienced directly. 
In addition, the mutual imbrication of discourses of gender, technology and the body 
that is apparent in the dominant discourses of IVF is not confmed to that context. 
Therefore, the findings presented here could be usefully developed in the context of 
other medical interventions which are legitimised within a discourse of disease, but 
where the contravention of gendered bodily norms is clearly at play in the designation 
of that disease. These might include, for example, obesity surgery or breast 
reconstruction following mastectomy. In particular, an analysis of the way in which 
discourses of the gendered body, nature, technology, responsibility and agency play out 
in these contexts would further enrich the analysis presented here. 
Concluding remarks  
In Chapter 1 of this thesis I listed three questions which marked the starting point of this 
research project. At the end of this concluding chapter, it is clear to me that my analysis 
has moved some distance away from these questions, which I have not answered 
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directly in the analysis or in my conclusions. This is particularly true of my first 
research question — what are the factors informing the decision to stop treatment? — 
which was an extremely useful point from which to think about the drawing up of 
interview questions, but became virtually redundant once I had embarked upon the 
analysis. However, I retained the initial questions in the writing up of the thesis in order 
to demonstrate the ways in which the research, analysis, and ultimately, the thesis have 
evolved over the four and a half years I have been working on it — a process which I 
anticipate will continue through the areas of future research discussed in the previous 
section. This highlights the status of this thesis as a situated knowledge which would 
become unfaithful precisely at the point at which I attempted to make any defmitive 
claims for it. As such, my claims for this thesis are as a contribution to ongoing debates 
rather than a conclusion to them. 
One of the regrets I have in concluding this thesis is the feeling that I have offered here 
a very sober reading of the participants' experiences that does not adequately capture 
the dynamic nature of the interviews, or the creativity and courage with which they 
were all, in different ways, seeking to find a way forwards. Therefore, while I stand by 
my analysis, the separating out of one particular aspect of someone's life for analytical 
purposes will always be a contrivance, and the participants should never be seen as 
defmed solely by their experience of IVF failure and the challenging task of managing 
it. Instead, this should be understood as just one aspect of their identity among many, 
and while the participants inevitably feature in this analysis in terms of IVF failure, this 
says nothing about the proliferation of other talents, interests and desires which 
manifested themselves both within the interviews, and when the tape recorder had been 
switched off. Alice's beautiful garden, Rachel's skilfully restored house, Sarah's 
successful business built from scratch, and Claire's completion of her degree are all 
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Appendix 
Letter of Invitation 
The [clinic] is currently co-operating in a research project being conducted by Karen 
Throsby, a PhD sociology student at the Gender Institute of the London School of 
Economics and we are writing to ask whether you would consider participating in this 
research. In summary, the project aims to identify the factors that lead people to 
withdraw from IVF programmes and to consider the impact of this decision over time 
on attitudes towards IVF and towards infertility. It is hoped that this research will not 
only contribute to a more complete picture of the range of experiences of IVF, but will 
also identify elements in the delivery of treatment and the more general experience of 
infertility that might make it easier for a couple who wish to withdraw from treatment to 
do so. 
Karen would like to interview women and, where possible, their husbands or partners, 
who have had one or more unsuccessful cycles of WE, with the most recent cycle 
having taken place at least two years ago. The records at the [clinic] show that you may 
meet these criteria and your contribution would be greatly appreciated. The attached 
Patient Information Sheet details what would be involved if you were to participate, but 
Karen would be happy to answer any further questions that you may have without any 
obligation. If you have sought treatment elsewhere since you attended the [clinic], or if 
you have since become parents by a means other than IVF (e.g. adoption, fostering, 
natural conception), your participation would still be greatly welcomed as long as your 
last WE cycle was more than two years ago. Your participation in no way affects your 
right to seek treatment at [hospital] or elsewhere in the future. 
Karen is bound by the same legal obligations as the staff at the [clinic] under the license 
issued to [hospital] by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and 
your confidentiality is guaranteed, whether or not you choose to participate. Your 
anonymity is assured in the final report. 
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If you are interested in participating, please contact Karen by telephone, e-mail or using 
the reply card supplied. If you do not wish to participate, you can either indicate this by 
not responding or by marking the appropriate box on the reply card provided. There will 
be no further attempts to contact you in this regard. If you have any further questions, 
the contact details are listed on the Patient Information Sheet. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this letter. 
Yours sincerely, 
[clinic director — details deleted] 
	 Karen Throsby 
Gender Institute, LSE 
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Patient Information Sheet 
Calling It A Day: the decision to withdraw from IVF treatment and its impact over time 
You have been invited to participate in the research project named above. This 
project is being conducted by Karen Throsby, a post-graduate student at the Gender 
Institute of the London School of Economics under the academic supervision of Dr 
Rosalind Gill and in co-operation with the [clinic] at [hospital]. 
The research will consider the experiences of women and their partners, where 
relevant, who have had one or more unsuccessful cycles of IVF and who have 
withdrawn from treatment programmes at least two years previously. The research 
aims to identify the factors which make it more, or less, difficult to withdraw from 
treatment and to consider what the implications are for the delivery of treatment. 
The final report will take the form of a PhD thesis, as well as a comprehensive 
report for practitioners, and a condensed report for publication in academic journals 
and those of advocacy and counselling organisations. 
If you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete two 
questionnaires. The first covers basic biographical information, and the second 
covers your treatment history. You will then be asked to participate in two taped 
interviews, approximately six months apart, concerning the factors which led you to 
withdraw from treatment and your subsequent feelings concerning reproductive 
technologies and your own difficulties conceiving. These interviews will be 
transcribed and the transcripts will be sent to you to be reviewed. You are free to 
make any changes that you feel necessary to the transcript. You will receive a 
summary of the fmdings of the research when the project has been concluded. 
This project has been approved by the Research Ethics Committee of [hospital] and 
the researcher is under the same legal obligations as the staff of the [clinic]. The 
confidentiality of all participants is assured. Personal information will be stored in a 
locked filing cabinet to which only the researcher has access and only Karen 
Throsby and Dr Rosalind Gill will have access to the interview tapes. Pseudonyms 
will be used in the transcripts and all identifying information will be removed in the 
fmal report. Confidential information will not be retained beyond completion of the 
project, with the exception of your contact details. Both the researcher and the 
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[hospital] will retain a copy of this information in order to allow your name to be 
excluded from any future projects of a similar nature. You will be asked to sign a 
consent form agreeing to this arrangement. 
It is possible that you may find the interviews distressing and that it may raise issues 
which you would like to discuss further with a counsellor. Therefore, at the time of 
the interview you will be given the contact details of an independent counsellor who 
is aware of this research project who would be happy to talk with you. 
You will be free to withdraw from the project at any time, or to refrain from 
answering particular questions, and your participation will not have any effect on 
your right to seek treatment in the future. 
For further information, please contact the researcher, as given below. This will not 
place you under any obligation to participate. 
Researcher: Karen Throsby 
Address: Gender Institute, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London 
WC2A 2AE 
Home telephone: 0181 451 7692 
E-mail: karen@throsby.freeserve.co.uk 




Flat 1, 133 Roundwood Road 
London NW10 9UL 
ILL: 0181 451 7692 
e-mail: karen@throsbv.freeserve.co.uk  
Dear 
Thank you very much for agreeing to participate in my research project. 
I have enclosed two questionnaires which it would be very helpful if you would 
complete and then return to me in the envelope provided. If your husband / partner is 
also willing to participate, you should complete one copy of Questionnaire A each, and 
Questionnaire B can be completed together. The aim of the questionnaires is just to give 
me some background information before we meet, so if there are questions included that 
you would prefer not to answer, that is no problem. 
I have also enclosed two copies each of the consent form. One signed copy each should 
be returned to me and the other copy is for you to keep. The purpose of the consent 
form is to clarify what you can expect from me and it does not place you under any 
obligation to continue should you change your mind about participating. I should also 
point out that Dr Rosalind Gill, my academic supervisor, is currently on leave and I am 
being supervised by Dr Clare Hemmings until she returns. I have therefore added 
Clare's name to the consent form as having access to the interview tapes. If you have 
any objections to this, please let me know. 
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Once all the papers have been returned to me, I will call you and we can arrange a time 
to meet for our first interview. I am very grateful for your participation in this project, 
and I am looking forward to meeting you. Please do not hesitate to contact me if 







2. Sex (please circle) F / M 
3. Address 
4. Telephone. 	  
5. Age 	  
6. Date of birth 	  
7. Marital status (please circle): 
married 
single 




8. How long have you been married or living with your partner? 
9. Do you have any dependants? (please include adopted children, step-children, foster 
children, or elderly relatives whose full-time care you are responsible for). 
10. Which ethnic group would you describe yourself as belonging 
to'? 
11. What is your religion, if any? 
Education 
12. Which of the following levels of qualification do you hold? Please specify the 
subject for degree level and upwards. 
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0 level / CSE / GCSE 
NVQ 
- Access 






13. When did you complete your final qualification? 	  
14. Are you currently studying for a qualification? Please specify 
Employment 
15. If you are in paid employment or self-employment, what job are you currently 
working in? 
16. If you are not currently working, when were you last in paid employment? What 
kind of employment was it? 
17. What is your current gross annual income? 
£0 — 10,000 
£10,001 —20,000 
£20,001 — 40,000 
£40,001 — 60,000 
more than £60,000 
18. What is your household income? 	  
272 
Questionnaire B 
Infertility treatment history 
I. When did you first begin trying to conceive? 
2. Did you have any reason to suspect that you may have trouble having a baby when 
you first decided to try? 
. When did you begin to think that you might have a fertility problem? 
4. When did you first seek medical advice? 
5. Where did you go for this advice? 
6. When did you begin having tests? 
7. What tests did you have? (Please give the month and year, and location, if possible) 
8. When and where did you begin your first cycle of IVF? 
9. Please detail the procedure used (e.g. GIFT, ZIFT, ICSI etc.) 
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10.Please list any subsequent treatments you have had, including dates, and the 
location, where possible. 
11.Did you try any alternative therapies prior to, or during, these courses of treatment? 
If yes, please give details. 
12.How much money do you estimate you have spent on fertility treatment? 
13.What treatments, if any, have you received on the NHS? 
Withdrawing from WE programmes  
14.Did you set a limit on the number of cycles before you began treatment? Did you 
stick to that limit9 
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15.When did you finally decide to cease treatment? 
16.Would you say that your decision to have no further cycles of IVF is a permanent 
one? 
Post-IVF 
17.Following the decision to withdraw from IVF, did you stop trying for a child, or did 
you pursue other strategies, such as adoption, fostering or surrogacy? 
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Consent Form 
Calling It a Day: the decision to withdraw from IVF treatment and its impact over time 
I am conducting a research project into the experiences of women and couples who have 
had one or more unsuccessful cycles of IVF and who have made the decision to 
withdraw from treatment programmes. As a part of this study, you have volunteered to 
complete questionnaires covering biographical details and your treatment history, and to 
participate in two taped interviews, approximately six months apart, concerning the 
factors which led you to decide to withdraw from treatment and your subsequent 
feelings concerning reproductive technologies and your own difficulties in conceiving. 
There is the possibility that these interviews could revive some distressing emotions for 
you and you may feel that it would be useful to speak to a counsellor in relation to these 
following the interview. Therefore, prior to the first interview, you will be given the 
contact details of an independent counsellor who is aware of this project. Your 
participation is entirely voluntary, and you are free to withdraw at any time or to decline 
to answer particular questions. Your participation will not prejudice any treatment you 
seek at a later date. 
As the researcher, I undertake the following: 
Anonymity of all research participants is guaranteed and in transcripts and in 
the final report, all identifying information will be removed. 
All information will remain strictly confidential. Only I will have access to 
the questionnaires and other personal information, and myself and my 
academic supervisors, Dr Rosalind Gill and Dr Clare Hemmings will have 
access to the interview tapes. All information will be kept in a locked filing 
cabinet when not in use. Confidential information will not be retained 
beyond the completion of the project, with the exception of your contact 
details. Both the researcher and the [clinic] at [hospital] will retain a copy of 
this information in order to allow your name to be excluded from any future 
projects of a similar nature. 
You will receive a typed transcript of each of your interviews and you will 
have the opportunity to make any changes you feel are necessary. 
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- You will receive a summary of the findings of the research on its 
completion. 
The final report will take the form of a PhD thesis and may be used for publication at a 
later date 
If you have any questions, you can contact me on 0181 451 7692. 
I agree to participate in the research project entitled "Calling it a day: the decision to 
withdraw from IVF and its impact over time". I have been given a complete copy of this 
form and have had a chance to read it. 
Name 
Date 
Signature of researcher 	  
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First Interview Guide 
1. Treatment: 
How did you choose your clinic'? 
Did you consult the HFEA literature? 
How important were published success rates? Cost? Location? Particular 
practitioners? Clinic atmosphere? General appearance? 
Did you visit more than one clinic in making your choice? 
How useful was clinic literature in making your choice? 
Was IVF your first choice of treatment? (Did you have IVF in mind when you 
first sought treatment?) 
What steps did you take to educate yourself about IVF? Internet? 
Did you consider not having IVF? 
How did the treatment compare with your expectations? 
2. Withdrawal from treatment: 
Can you describe how you came to the decision to withdraw from treatment? 
Before starting treatment did you have a clear limit on how many cycles 
of treatment you would undertake? Did you stick to that limit 9 
Was it a definite decision or something you drifted into? 
Who instigated the decision to withdraw? 
Was the decision mutual? 
Are you happy with your decision to withdraw when you did? Do you 
wish you had stopped earlier / later? 
How absolute is that decision? 
To what extent did friends / relatives influence your decision? 
How widely known was it that you were having fertility treatment? 
What was the reaction of those who knew you were having treatment to 
your decision to stop? 
Did you have a particular confidante (other than your partner) who 
helped you to make that choice? 
Do you continue to talk to friends about the decision? 
Did you use internet support groups? 
Were financial constraints a significant factor in your decision to withdraw 
from treatment? 
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- What kind lifestyle sacrifices were you making in order to pay for 
treatment? 
- Do you feel that the money was well spent even though the treatment 
was not successful in your case? 
What role did your clinic play in your decision to withdraw from treatment? 
Were you advised to stop treatment? 
Were you satisfied with the treatment provided by the clinic? 
- Did you make use of counselling opportunities (inside / outside the 
clinic)? 
- Were you able to make use of support groups (inside / outside)? 
3. Post-IVF: 
Did you have any clear plans for the future in terms of other strategies for 
becoming parents before you withdrew from treatment? 
- Did you consider adoption / surrogacy / fostering / alternative 
therapies? 
Did you follow-up with those plans? 
- Did you make other plans, prior to ending treatment, not directly 
related to your infertility? (Career / travel / study) 
Did you continue any form of counselling / support groups after withdrawing 
from treatment? 
At the time you decided to withdraw from treatment, did you regret having 
tried IVF? Have those feelings changed since you first decided to end 
treatment? 
Do you consider yourself to be infertile? 
Did your experience of IVF change the way you thought/felt about your own 
infertility? Have these feelings changed over the years since you withdrew 
from treatment? 
At the time you decided to withdraw from treatment, how did you feel about 
IVF? (Disillusioned? Generally positive?) Have those feelings changed since 
you first decided to end treatment? 
- To what extent are your feelings influenced by media coverage of 
reproductive technology, especially the high profile stories such as Mandy 
Allwood, or Diane Blood? 
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4. The future: 
Do you follow advances in reproductive technology (in the media)? If there 
were an advance in an area that could be beneficial to your case, would you 
consider returning for treatment? 
If financial constraints were removed, do you think you would return to 
treatment? 
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Second Interview Guide 
1. Update: 
- changes in circumstances (careers / parenting / other people's babies etc.) 
- treatment started / planned 
2. Clarifications from first interview: 
factual details (number of cycles / location etc.) 
money 
whose money was used for treatment (joint / individual / family)? 
- Who is responsible for money in the household? 
3. Approach to infertility: 
Has your approach to your infertility changed since you finished treatment? 
Since the last interview? (How? Why?) 
Have you considered using contraception? 
Would you consider yourself as still hoping / expecting to conceive? 
- Do you count days in your cycle? (for ovulation / menstruation) 
4. Negotiation 
- as a couple, how did you go about making the necessary decisions involved 
in having IVF? 
organised / structured discussions? 
Information gathering? (who?) 
- Planning ahead vs. taking it as it comes? 
Would you say that one of you took the lead in the decision-making? 
5. Confiding 
Do you think that you would find confiding in people that you were having 
treatment easier now (because IVF is more common)? 
Do you think you made the right decisions about confiding / or not 
confiding? 
Were you ever given any advice by the hospital about telling people? 
What would you advise others to do about telling people? 
Were you in agreement as a couple over who to tell and when? 
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- If you'd conceived through IVF, would you have told people / the child? 
6. Relationships 
circle of friends 
would you say that your social circle is changing? (e.g. fewer people 
with children / same people / new friends from new job etc.) 
7. Children 
why do you / did you want children? 
had you considered why before you tried to conceive? 
social inclusion? 
had you always wanted children? 
Had you ever imagined / considered living without children? 
Would you say that you were both equally keen to have children? 
how important is genetics? Physical similarity? 
How important is the idea of continuity? 
Are there any childless women (e.g. aunts / god-parents etc.) in your family? 
How about in your social / working life? (in terms of role models for living 
without children). 
If you the IVF had been successful, would you have continued working? 
8. Body 
why do you think the treatment failed? Did you see the technology as having 
failed? The doctors? 
Would you say the failure of the treatment affected your own self-esteem? 
Confidence? The way you saw yourself? 
Do you think that positive thinking (from you, or the doctors) affects the 
outcome? 
Do you think the failure of treatment affected you differently (as a couple) in 
terms of your sense of self? 
Did you fmd that having had IVF gave you any answers / greater certainty / 
resolution? 
When you say you had to try everything, was that for yourself or to show 
others? 
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9. Advice to others 
- would you recommend other to have IVF (in a similar situation to yourself)? 
Are there any circumstances when you wouldn't recommend it? 
- Is there anything you wish you had done prior to having IVF (e.g. more 
personal research / counselling / discussing particular issues with partner or 
family)? 
Is there anything you regret / wish you hadn't done? 
10. Being interviewed: 
how did you find being interviewed (the first time)? (upsetting / thought 
provoking). 
Did you discuss it with your partner after the interviewer had left? 




• reproduction as natural (for women) 
• nature / fate 
• nature as superior / good 
• interfering with nature 
2. Technology / Science 
• progressive 
• modern life 
• regulation 
• fear of technology (designer baby) 
• limits 
• alternative therapies 
3. IVF consumer 
• shopping around 
• money 
• resource distribution 
• gifts from others (or spending as a gift to others) 
• statistics 
• NITS / private 
• Other conventional treatments 
4. Drugs  
• injections 
• long / short term effects 
• hormones / stress 
• privacy issues 
• images of drug taking 
5. Life path 
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• parenthood expectations / motivations 
• identity 
• old age 
• employment 
• ageing / public perception 
6. Infertility 
• disease 
• causes (iatrogenic) 
• continued hope 
• male factor 
• negative images 
• confusion with childfree (outside perceptions) 
• explanatory work 
• subfertility 
• female age factor 
• counselling 
7. Social relations 
• communication 
• support 
• other people's babies 
• privacy / telling others 
• social exclusion 
• reintroducing children 
• cruelty of others 
• (grand)parents 
8. Agency / control 
• information seeking 
• decision making 
• IVF as work / activity 
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• Weakness / strength 
• Positive thinking 
• Doing everything 
• Being deserving 
• Guilt / shame 
• responsibility 
9. Stopping treatment 
• reasons 
• decision / imposed 
• contraception 
• treatment of other conditions 
• life plans 
• adoption 
• childfree / selfish 
• regrets 
• responses of others 





• action (e.g. sperm quality) 
• communication with others 
286 
